Western University

Scholarship@Western
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository
5-4-2012 12:00 AM

Anti-Foundational Categorical Structuralism
Darren McDonald, The University of Western Ontario
Supervisor: John L. Bell, The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
in Philosophy
© Darren McDonald 2012

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd
Part of the Logic and Foundations of Mathematics Commons

Recommended Citation
McDonald, Darren, "Anti-Foundational Categorical Structuralism" (2012). Electronic Thesis and
Dissertation Repository. 533.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/533

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

Anti-Foundational Categorical Structuralism
by
Darren McDonald
Graduate Program in Philosophy
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

c Darren McDonald 2012

THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO
School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION
Supervisor

Examiners

Dr. John L. Bell

Dr. Wayne Myrvold

Dr. Robert DiSalle

Dr. Mike Dawes

Dr. David DeVidi
The thesis by
Darren Joseph McDonald
entitled:
Anti-Foundational Categorical Structuralism
is accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Date

Chair of the Thesis Examination
Board

ii

Abstract
The aim of this dissertation is to outline and defend the view here dubbed
“anti-foundational categorical structuralism” (henceforth AFCS). The program put forth is intended to provide an answer the question “what is mathematics?”. The answer here on offer adopts the structuralist view of mathematics, in that mathematics is taken to be “the science of structure” expressed in the language of category theory, a language argued to accurately
capture the notion of a structural property. In characterizing mathematical
theorems as both conditional and schematic in form, the program is forced
to give up claims to securing the truth of its theorems, as well as give up a
semantics which involves reference to special, distinguished “mathematical
objects”, or which involves quantification over a fixed domain of such objects. One who wishes—contrary to the AFCS view—to inject mathematics
with a “standard” semantics, and to provide a secure epistemic foundation
for the theorems of mathematics, in short, one who wishes for a foundation
for mathematics, will surely find this view lacking. However, I argue that a
satisfactory development of the structuralist view, couched in the language of
category theory, accurately represents our best understanding of the content
of mathematical theorems and thereby obviates the need for any foundational
program.
Keywords: category theory, philosophy, foundations of mathematics,
structuralism, properties, schema, conditional, mathematical truth
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Chapter 1
Foundations
Let us now try, guided by the axiomatic concept, to look over the
whole of the mathematical universe. [15, p. 228]
As the name suggests, anti-foundational categorical structuralism (henceforth AFCS1 ), combines a number of the principles and perspectives that
have risen to prominence in contemporary philosophy of mathematics, in
particular
1. the idea that mathematics concerns structure,
2. the move away from foundational approaches in the philosophy of
mathematics, and
3. the notion of a (mathematical) category.
The aim of this chapter is to elucidate the sense in which the program to be
proposed in this work is anti-foundational. Indeed, it is rather presumptuous
to label the program anti-foundational at this stage, as the program may
be seen to potentially satisfy some notions of a foundation for mathematics,
while failing to satisfy others. As the notions of foundation for mathematics which the program fails to satisfy are those of principal importance in
1

This program has also been called top-down categorical structuralism in [2, 48].
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philosophical enquiries into the foundations of mathematics, I expect that
the label will be recognized as appropriate.

1.1

Axiomatic Systems

Crucial to a contemporary discussion of the foundations of mathematics is
the notion of an axiomatic system. Here the term axiomatic system will
be used in a deliberately loose sense, including both formal and informal
systems, with or without an explicit specification of the admissible rules of
inference.2 This work will focus primarily on formal axiomatic systems, and
informal systems will be assumed formalizable. When a formal system is
under consideration, I take it that the logical operators are given their usual
interpretation.3 The rise to prominence of the methods of formal representation and symbolic manipulation in mathematics—in some sense a recent
development—has brought about a dramatic change in the way that mathematics is typically characterized. The formal methods that emerged from
the late 19th and early 20th century developments in logic and set theory
are now taken to be an essential, and perhaps principal, component of any
philosophical account of contemporary mathematics.
With the increased expressive powers of the various languages of first–
and higher-order logic, a number of grand philosophies of mathematics came
to the fore. In Frege’s logicist program, it was hoped that these new languages would be able to bridge the seemingly close-set gap between logic
and mathematics, and, in so doing, ultimately free arithmetic from its supposed intuitive foundation. A quite different approach, also dependent on
recently developed formal methods, can be found in Hilbert’s formalist program, according to which it was hoped that appeal to pure intuition could
2

When no specification is given, the background logic will be assumed to be first-order
(classical) logic, unless the axioms require formulation in a second– or higher-order system,
or require a restricted set of inference rules (intuitionistic, etc.).
3
Such a system can be called semiformal, as in [18].
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be removed, this time to be replaced, at the metamathematical level, by
perceptual intuitions concerning the manipulations of concrete objects.
Unfortunately, as the familiar story goes, both of these programs met
with failure; indeed, the result which is usually take to signal the defeat
of Hilbert’s program was itself a significant development in the application
of formal techniques.4 However, despite the failure of these two ambitious
programs, formal languages and the associated formal methods developed in
the study of these programs have undoubted been instrumental in leading
us to the current state of contemporary mathematics. Nowhere has this
shift been more apparent than in the contemporary emphasis on axiomatics,
particularly formal axiomatics in a mathematical context.

1.1.1

Assertory Axioms

The axiomatic method, of course, dates back to antiquity, with one of the
better known instances found in the Common Notions and Postulates of Euclid’s Elements. These Common Notions and Postulates are usually viewed
as having been intended as self evident or obviously true. As such, the axioms
were truth-apt, contentful expressions, what we might now call statements
or propositions.5 The formal axioms of Frege’s 1893 Grundgesetze [30] were
such contentful expressions; the basic laws of thought were taken to be “the
most general laws, which prescribe universally the way in which one ought to
think if one is to think at all” [30, p. 12]. Indeed, Frege himself observes that
his methods might properly be considered Euclidean, insofar as he clearly
identifies those propositions (i.e., axioms) which are not to be proved [30,
4

Incidentally, Gödel’s result concerned the system of Russell’s Principia Mathematica,
a system born out of the failure of that system proposed by Frege in his ill-fated Grundgesetze. Of course, Gödel’s result applies to a more general type of formal system of which
Russell’s is but one example.
5
The distinction between statements, i.e., declarative sentences, and propositions, which
may correspond to a number of distinct declarative sentences, will not concern us here,
and one may choose either to be the bearers of truth values for the purposes of this work.
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p. 2].6 Following the terminology adopted in some recent writings in the
foundations of mathematics [37, 38, 79], systems of this sort—in which the
axioms are taken to be propositions—will be called assertory.

1.1.2

Algebraic Axioms

A second important class of axioms are algebraic axioms7 , which, unlike
assertory axioms, are not propositions, and so not meant to be taken as
true simpliciter. Instead, they are typically taken as definitions of a type
of structure; the classic example of such axioms are those for rings, groups,
fields, topological spaces, etc., of the sort typically found in modern algebra
textbooks. Axioms used in this way define a type of object at the meta level.
The axioms are propositional schemata, and any model in which the axioms
are true is thereby an object of the sort defined. Thus, in a mathematical
context, algebraic axioms require some sort of (typically informal) model
theory. The following example is typical:
A group is an ordered pair (G, ?), where G is a set and ? is a
binary operation satisfying the following axioms:
(i) (a ? b) ? c = a ? (b ? c) for all a, b, c ∈ G, i.e., ? is associative,
(ii) there exists an element e in G, called an identity of G, such
that for all a ∈ G we have a ? e = e ? a = a,
(iii) for each a ∈ G there is an element a−1 of G, called an inverse
of a, such that a ? a−1 = a−1 ? a = e. [27, p. 16–17]
Such a definition immediately raises meta-theoretic questions of satisfiability: are there any groups, rings, fields, etc.? If so, how many, and what
are the relationships that obtain between such entities? Further, once such
6

Frege notes, however, that his approach extends that of Euclid’s in that he also provides a specification of the admissible rules of inference.
7
These axioms are sometimes also called formal or schematic [38].
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a move to meta-theoretic questions is made, what is the framework in which
we conduct our meta-theoretic investigations? Finally, does this type of axiomatic presentation function correctly as a definition? In answering these
questions, it will be useful to compare the preceding definition of a group
with the definition of the type of structure with which this work will be
primarily concerned: categories.

1.2

Category Theory

Following roughly the treatment found in [60], a category is a collection
of objects A, B, C, . . . and arrows f, g, h, . . ., where each arrow f has an
associated domain and codomain (sometimes called the source and target,
respectively), represented as f : A → B. Arrows f, g are composable provided dom(g) = cod(f ), and for any such composable pair f : A → B and
g : B → C there is an arrow g ◦ f : A → C such that the diagram shown
below commutes, i.e., the arrows obtained by composition on any connected
path depend only on the endpoints of that path.
Composition
f

A

?B

g◦f

g

/



C

Identity
For each object A there is a (unique) arrow 1A : A → A such that the
diagrams below commute for any f : A → B and g : B → A. (For a given

CHAPTER 1. FOUNDATIONS

6

object A, 1A will sometimes be represented in diagrams by A.)

g

B

?A

1A


g

/

?A

1A

A

f



A

f

/

B

Associativity
For any f, g, h as shown, the diagram below commutes.
?B
h

A

g◦h

f ◦g

/

g


/C

>D

f

When giving a first-order axiomatization of category theory it is customary to use a typed first-order language (with object and arrow types), but this
can be dispensed with either by the familiar technique of introducing predicates and rendering the axioms as conditionals, or by giving an “arrows-only”
presentation.8 It is initially useful to think of the arrows as functions and
the objects as sets, where a category is then a collection of sets and functions
defined on those sets. With this sort of picture in mind, category theory can
be roughly described as “the mathematical study of (abstract) algebras of
functions” [3, p. 1]9 . However, the connection between category theory and
set theory will require closer examination, and for the moment it is perhaps
more useful to view the category axioms as the axioms of an uninterpreted
first-order theory. Consequently, the objects and arrows need not be viewed
as elements of, for example, the cumulative hierarchy.
Some familiar types of mathematical objects are very easily described
in the language of category theory. For example, a monoid is standardly
8

For details on the arrows-only definitions, see [52, p. 9].
“Abstract” because “the objects do not have to be sets and the arrows need not be
functions” [3, p. 5].
9
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presented as a set of objects with an associative binary operation and a distinguished identity element. So, hN, +, 0i is a monoid, as addition on the
natural numbers is associative, with 0 functioning as the (additive) identity.
Similarly, hN, ×, 1i is also a monoid with the binary operation of multiplication and 1 as the multiplicative identity. In the language of category theory,
a monoid is simply a category with one object. Elements of the monoid
corresponds to arrows from that single object to itself, and the associativity
of arrow composition corresponds to the associativity of the monoid operation, with the identity arrow serving to represent the identity element of the
monoid. Thus, categories can be viewed as generalized monoids.
Other important types of mathematical structures10 also have natural
definitions in categorical terms. A preorder on a collection of elements is a
reflexive, transitive relation. In categorical terms, a preorder is a category in
which every pair of objects A and B have at most one arrow from A to B 11 ,
where A ≤ B iff there is an arrow f : A → B. Associativity of arrows yields
transitivity, and identity arrows yield reflexivity. Similarly, a partial order on
a collection of elements is a reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric relation. In
categorical terms, a partial ordering on a collection of elements corresponds
to a category in which every pair of objects A and B have at most one arrow
between them, where A ≤ B iff there is an arrow f : A → B as before.
Transitivity and reflexivity follow as before, and any arrows f : A → B and
g : B → A must be identical by the condition on arrows, and so A = B.
Thus, the arrows f and g must both be 1A , the unique arrow from A to A.
The closed well-formed formulae of a system of first-order logic can be taken
as objects in a category, where the arrows f : A → B are derivations of B
from A. Taking as objects the positive integers we can form a category by
taking n × m real-valued matrices as arrows f : n → m, where composition
10

The term structure will come to be used in a more precise sense later in this chapter,
but the usage here will agree with that later definition.
11
Note that the ordering of the domain and codomain of the arrow is important here,
as we are allowing the case where there are distinct arrows f : A → B and g : B → A.
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corresponds to matrix multiplication. More obvious examples of categories
include the category of sets and functions, groups and group homomorphisms,
and the category of continuous functions f : R → R. A wealth of similar
examples can be found in [3, 52].

1.3

Foundations for Mathematics

There are a number of senses in which one can speak of a foundation for
mathematics, and, unfortunately, debates concerning the merits of one or
another proposed foundation often suffer from this plurality. Thus, Putnam
declares that
I don’t think mathematics is unclear; I don’t think mathematics
has a crisis in its foundations; indeed, I do not believe mathematics either has or needs “foundations.” [67, p. 5]
while Mayberry declares that
. . . mathematics not only needs, but in fact has, foundations.
Mathematics can no more lack foundations than a building can:
wherever a building touches the ground, there, for good or ill, its
foundations are to be discovered. Those foundations may have
been carelessly laid, they may be shaky or unsound, the whole
edifice may threaten to collapse about our ears; but it cannot lack
foundations. [57, p. 17–18]
In an attempt to map out the various notions of foundations for mathematics,
Marquis in [53] identifies no less than six separate—but interrelated—senses
of the term, and provides examples of single authors shifting their emphasis
from one sense to another.
Before exploring the various senses of foundation for mathematics it will
be convenient to introduce the notion of a framework, where a framework is an
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axiomatic system, algebraic or assertory, and either formalized or presented
informally.12 Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (with or without the axiom of
choice) constitutes a framework, both as an informal system and, for example,
as a formal first-order system. Clearly the interpreted system and the formal
system are suited to different tasks, and so we may expect to observe a
difference in their suitability to various of the possible foundational roles.

1.3.1

Organizational Frameworks

As a tentative account of a foundation for mathematics, consider the view
that Lawvere offers in “The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics”, wherein “. . . by “foundation” we mean a single system of first-order
axioms in which all usual mathematical objects can be defined and all their
usual properties proved” [50, p. 1]. The type of foundation Lawvere considers would allow one to characterize mathematics as the investigation of
the consequences of those axioms. Let us call a framework that allows for
the formulation of definitions (and, given a suitable logic, the production of
proofs) that arguably captures all of mathematics an organizational framework.13 Is an axiomatic system that constitutes an organizational framework
sufficient as a philosophically adequate foundation for mathematics?
One important observation about such an approach to foundations is that
it yields an account of mathematics. As a very rough initial approximation,
we might identify mathematics as the subject matter mathematicians are
concerned to investigate: groups, rings, fields, functions, geometry, statistics,
probability, analysis, computability, graph theory, and a myriad of other areas of mathematical enquiry. However, the inadequacy of lists of this sort
highlights one of the important roles that a framework for mathematics might
play: provide the criteria according to which an area of research counts as
12

The term framework is approximately equivalent to the notion of linguistic framework
as found in [20] and discussed in [47].
13
This formulation of the notion of an organizational framework does not involve the
restriction to first-order systems.
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mathematics. Given a set of axioms of the sort envisioned by Lawvere, a
research project counts as mathematics to the extent that it involves exploring the deductive consequences of definitions (either new or preexisting) in
the language of the theory. A first-order axiomatization of ZFC may be argued to provide a framework of this sort, and similarities between the sort
of foundation characterized by Lawvere and that offered by a framework like
first-order ZFC serve to highlight some important philosophically-motivated
concerns about the merits of such an approach.

1.3.2

Epistemology, Semantics, and Ontology

Benacerraf’s seminal paper entitled “Mathematical Truth” serves to illustrate
two desiderata that I take to be characteristic of the philosophical notion of
a foundation for mathematics. In that paper Benacerraf presents his wellknown argument that
. . . two quite distinct kind of concerns have separately motivated
accounts of the nature of mathematical truth: (1) the concern for
having a homogeneous semantical theory in which semantics for
the propositions of mathematics parallel the semantics for the rest
of the language, and (2) the concern that the account of mathematical truth mesh with a reasonable epistemology. . . . almost all
accounts of the concept of mathematical truth can be identified
with serving one or another of these masters at the expense of
the other. [11, p. 661]
For those accounts that emphasize the semantical aspect, there is the problem
of explaining how we can come to know anything of the seemingly unusual
(typically atemporal, acausal) mathematical objects. Those accounts that
emphasize the epistemological aspect—for example, a framework couched in
some familiar (formal) logical structure—are also faced with a serious difficulty. Views of this sort (which Benacerraf calls combinatorial ) are subject
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to the objection that, while having established a way to come to (apparent)
mathematical knowledge, it is not clear that a claim’s derivability within a
particular formal system is sufficient to warrant the judgment that the given
statement is true. Within a particular deductive system L, a separate argument is required to establish the connection between derivability in L (or
L-truth) and the concept of truth as it is otherwise understood. Thus, if
we accept Benacerraf’s request for what he calls a “Tarskian” semantics, a
view like that suggested in Lawvere’s remark must be supplemented (if indeed the theorems deduced are meant to be taken as true) by an account
of the objects—categories—the axioms purportedly describe. What justifies
our taking the axioms of Lawvere’s system as true of all such categories? The
difficulty involved in providing such an account seems particularly imposing
given Lawvere’s own description of the means by which he arrived at the
axioms for his framework:
The author believes, in fact, that the most reasonable way to
arrive at a foundation meeting these requirements [defining the
usual objects of mathematics and proving their usual properties]
is simply to write down axioms descriptive of properties which
the intuitively-conceived category of all categories has until an
intuitively-adequate list is attained; that is essentially how the
theory described below was arrived at. [50, p. 1]
Of course, an organizational framework of the sort Lawvere aims to provide
does serve to clearly define the semantic and epistemological target for any
philosophical account of the sort Benacerraf identifies; the organizational
framework clearly identifies the sentences whose epistemology is to be accounted for, and the sentences whose semantics is to be unpacked. In this
way, the construction of an organizational framework is necessary for the
development of a characterization of mathematics that accounts for the semantic content of mathematical statements, together with an account of the
truth of mathematical statements wherein we appeal to “. . . the theoretical
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apparatus employed by Tarski in providing truth definitions, i.e., the analysis of truth in terms of the “referential” concepts of naming, predication,
satisfaction, and quantification” [11, p. 677].
Thus, for the purpose of this work, the following three criteria will be
taken to be necessary (and sufficient)14 conditions on any framework that
constitutes a philosophically acceptable foundation for mathematics.
1. The framework is an organizational framework, and thereby identifies
what counts as mathematics.
2. The framework can be linked to an account of the epistemology of
mathematical statements, providing a characterization of the features
in virtue of which mathematical statements are, and can be, known to
be true.
3. The framework accounts for the semantics of mathematical statements,
and proceeds to do so via the theoretical apparatus “of naming, predication, satisfaction, and quantification”.

1.4

Classical Approaches to Foundations

The most influential programs of the past century in the philosophical foundations of mathematics can each be seen to present an account aimed at
satisfying the three criteria identified above. A brief account of two of these
programs, Hilbert’s finitist program, as well as Frege and Russell’s logicist
program, will be useful when later we come to explore features of the AFCS
program.
14

While I take these conditions to be sufficient to identify a foundation for mathematics,
necessity is all that is required for the purpose of establishing that the program I aim to
defend does indeed fail to count as a foundation.

CHAPTER 1. FOUNDATIONS

1.4.1

13

Finitism

Consider Hilbert’s finitist program, in which an (informally presented) framework was provided by the (assertory) axioms of finitary proof theory. Hilbert
took this system to play an important justificatory role with respect to mathematical statements. The meta-theoretic methods of finitary proof theory
were taken by Hilbert to justify the use of axiomatic systems at the object
level, and this justification proceeded in two steps. First, axiomatic systems
of the various branches of mathematics were shown to have an interpretation
in arithmetic. Consequently, the consistency of any such system in question
was guaranteed, provided the system of arithmetic could itself be shown consistent. The second step, then, involved using the methods of finitary proof
theory to establish the consistency of the formalized theory of arithmetic.15
Mathematics could then be characterized as the investigation of formal systems which could be shown to be consistent by those methods, satisfying the
first criterion for foundational programs identified above. As Hilbert notes
after presenting a sketch of the system of formal arithmetic, “we are now in
a position to carry out our theory of proof and to construct the system of
provable formulae, i.e., mathematics” [43, p. 199].
Hilbert’s account of the semantics and epistemology of mathematics (by
which he satisfies the second and third criteria for foundational programs)
proceeds via appeal to the direct, perceptual intuition of concrete symbols:
. . . something must be given in conception, viz., certain extralogical concrete objects which are intuited as directly experienced
prior to all thinking. For logical deduction to be certain, we must
be able to see every aspect of these objects, and their properties, differences, sequences, and contiguities must be given, together with the objects themselves, as something which cannot
be reduced to something else and which requires no reduction.
15

It is generally agreed that Gödel’s incompleteness result [33] show this second step to
be impossible, see [84] for a discussion.
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This is the basic philosophy which I find necessary, not just for
mathematics, but for all scientific thinking, understanding, and
communicating. The subject matter of mathematics is, in accordance with this theory, the concrete symbols themselves whose
structure is immediately clear and recognizable. [43, p. 192]
A formal deductive system for arithmetic, shown to be consistent via finitary
proof theory, was taken to be epistemically sound insofar as the theorems
are true when interpreted as claims about the realm of finite, immediately
presented concrete symbols.16 A proof of the consistency of the system of
arithmetic would thereby justify reasoning involving other formal systems,
as, for such systems, “proof of consistency is effected by reducing their consistency to that of the axioms of arithmetic” [43, p. 200]. The investigation of
other axiomatic systems would be warranted insofar as their theorems could
be interpreted as true statements concerning the intuitively given concrete
symbols. Finally, in addition to the realm of concrete symbols, ideal elements
of systems (such as infinite cardinals and the points at infinity of projective
geometry), could also taken to exist, as Hilbert describes in correspondence
with Frege:
. . . if the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict each other
with all their consequences, then they are true and the things
defined by them exist. This is for me the criterion of truth and
existence. [79, quoted on p. 69]17
Thus, via the framework of finitary proof theory, Hilbert’s program aimed
to characterize the objects of mathematics (and thereby account for the semantic properties of mathematical statements), account for the means by
16
Hilbert had been particularly interested to justify the use of ideal objects in number
theory, as most famously advocated in [43].
17
Note that this quotation is from early in Hilbert’s career, but that he maintained such
a view (against instrumentalist readings) in his later writings has been argued in [34].
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which we can acquire mathematical knowledge (through proofs in consistent axiomatic systems, grounded in the immediately-intuited structure of
the concrete objects of mathematics), and identify mathematics as the discipline concerned with the construction of proofs in those consistent axiomatic
systems.

1.4.2

Logicism

Frege claims that one of his aims in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik is to show
that—contra Kant—synthetic a priori judgements are not required in order
to secure the truths of cardinal arithmetic.18 After having defined numbers
as extensions of concepts and deriving several important theorems19 , Frege
writes
I hope I may claim in the present work to have made it probable
that the laws of arithmetic are analytic judgements and consequently a priori. Arithmetic thus becomes simply a development
of logic, and every proposition of arithmetic a law of logic, albeit
a derivative one. [32, p. 99]
The logical formalism Frege pioneered in the Begriffsschrift [31] finally allowed for the formulation of the view that logic and mathematics were not
simply closely related (as had long been held), but that the truths of mathematics were in fact logical truths. The claim that mathematics is, in some
sense, reducible to logic taken along with suitable definitions of the objects
of mathematics is the characteristic tenet of the logicist view, and both Frege
and Russell’s developments in pursuing that view have shaped much of the
debate in the philosophy of mathematics for more than a century.
18

While Frege may have emphasized this aim in the Grundlagen, it has been argued
that focus on this aspect of his program does not do justice to the full scope of the logicist
program, see [21].
19
One, the derivation of the Peano axioms from a tentative early definition of number
that has come to be called Hume’s Principle, forms the core of the neo-Fregean view
advocated by Hale and Wright, see [83].
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While a great deal of attention is given to their work in arithmetic, the
reduction of mathematics to logic was meant to encompass all of mathematics. As Russell boldly claims in the Introduction to The Principles of
Mathematics,
By the help of ten general principles of deduction and ten other
premises of a general logical nature (e.g., “implication is a relation”), all mathematics can be strictly and formally deduced;
and all the entities that occur in mathematics can be defined in
terms of those that occur in the above twenty premises. In this
statement, Mathematics includes not only Arithmetic and Analysis, but also Geometry, Euclidean and non-Euclidean, rational
Dynamics, and an indefinite number of other studies still unborn
or in their infancy. The fact that all Mathematics is Symbolic
Logic is one of the greatest discoveries of our age. . . [73, p. 4–5]
While the “discovery” Russell claims in the quote above never saw the light of
day20 and the aims of the program were never realized, the logicist program
is perhaps the program which most clearly set out to meet the foundational
criteria identified here. The logical systems Frege and Russell developed were
explicitly taken to provide “organizational frameworks” for the logical truths,
insofar as these systems were taken to permit all definitions involving only
logical constants, and yield all proofs that proceed only by the most general
principles of inference. As Frege explains, “Everything necessary for a correct inference is expressed in full, but what is not necessary is generally not
indicated; nothing is left to guesswork ” [31, p. 12]. While Russell outlines
a syntactic distinction that could be drawn between mathematics and logic
(casting mathematical truths as a subset of the logical truths with a given
form), “But for the desire to adhere to usage, we might identify mathemat20

Gödel’s undecidability result in [33], can be taken to have shown the program untenable, as some mathematical truths “escape capture” in systems of the sort Russell had
proposed.
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ics and logic” [73, p. 9]. Thus, a framework which permitted derivations of
all and only the truths of pure logic was thereby a framework that identified mathematics—that same set of truths, or a syntactically distinguishable
subset of them—as well.
In providing for the semantics of mathematical statements, both Russell
and Frege identified a distinguished collection of logical objects. Frege invoked the notion of the extension of a concept, while Russell made use of the
notion of a class.21 In either case, mathematical objects, such as cardinal
numbers, were defined as classes (of classes) or extensions of concepts, and
the true mathematical propositions expressed truths about those distinctly
logical (and, hence, mathematical) objects, in accordance with the third
foundational criterion. Similarly, the logical systems on offer were taken to
represent the most general rules of inference, and so they provide a secure
route to mathematical knowledge, yielding inferences from the definitions
of the purely logical (mathematical) objects to truths about those objects.
Thus, the successful reduction of mathematics to logic in accordance with
the logicist program, taken along with the seemingly secure epistemic and
ontological features of the logical systems in question, yields each of the three
criteria offered as characteristic of a foundation for mathematics.
We turn now to outline the principal features of a philosophical position,
AFCS, which does not satisfy those criteria. What, then, can an advocate of
such a position hope to accomplish?

1.5

The AFCS Program

To illustrate one aspect of the AFCS view, consider again the definition of a
group presented in Section 1.1.2. One can prove from these axioms that, for
21

Russell would later abandon the primacy of the concept of a class in favour of that of
a propositional function.
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any elements a, b, c of a given group,
(a ? b ? c)−1 = c−1 ? b−1 ? a−1
This result could be described as a theorem of first-order logic (with function
symbols) that is conditional in form, taking as antecedent the conjunction of
(the universally quantified versions of) the axioms defining a group, and the
formula above as consequent. However, as Shapiro observes,
Say that a theory is ‘Fregean’ if it is intended to be about a specific subject matter, and that a theory is ‘Hilbertian’ if it consists
of taking the logical consequences of an axiomatization regarded
as an implicit definition of a type of structure. Contemporary
group theory and ring theory are not pursued, for more than a
few minutes, in this Hilbertian manner. Rather, the group theorist studies all groups, developing relationships between them
and with other structures. [79, p. 67 ff]
While not strictly required by the group-theoretic theorem above, one might
render that theorem as one whose subject matter is any group, and so, a
theorem of the form “In any group G. . . ”. However, if our starting point
is the first-order group axioms, some standard mathematical results about
groups will require what might be called the “model-theoretic” perspective.
For example, the result that the kernel of a group homomorphism f : G → H
is a subgroup of G cannot be rendered simply as a first-order consequence of
the universally-quantified axioms, as this theorem involves explicit reference
to the group(s) involved in the group homomorphism. Similarly, there are
existence theorems, for example, the theorem that, given any two groups G
and H, there is at least one group homomorphism f : G → H. One who
aims to account for mathematical truths in a manner that appeals to notions of naming, satisfaction, and quantification, has then the task of saying
something about those objects, be they groups, sets, or categories. Are there
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product groups for every pair of groups, powersets for every set, enough arrows for our categories? The axioms which define a category, and similarly
the axioms which define a group, do not assert anything about the existence of the categories or groups, but some standard results in mathematics,
as with the kernel theorem, seem to involve quantification over groups and
other purportedly mathematical objects. Taking mathematical propositions
of this sort as true, then, seems to lead us to the familiar problem Benacerraf
highlights: how can we provide a “Tarskian” semantics for our propositions
(which would then involve some account of the mathematical objects that
figure in those propositions) while at the same time ensuring that our proofs
have the epistemic features necessary to secure their truth?
In Awodey’s “An Answer to Hellman’s Question: Does Category Theory
Provide a Framework for Mathematical Stucturalism?”, we find a presentation of a view Awodey dubs “top-down” structuralism, and his characterization of mathematical propositions as both schematic and conditional in
form is adopted in the AFCS proposal. Unlike those views that identify
a privileged class of objects (for example, pure sets, classes, or extensions
of concepts), and then “build up” the entities of the various branches of
mathematics from those objects, the top-down perspective
. . . is based instead on the idea of specifying, for a given theorem or theory only the required relevant degree of information
or structure, the essential features of a given situation, for the
purpose at hand, without assuming some ultimate knowledge,
specification, or determination of the ‘objects’ involved.
Thus according to our view, there is neither a once-and-for-all
universe of all mathematical objects, nor a once-and-for-all system of all mathematical inferences. [2, p. 56]
In virtue of this perspective, all the theorems of mathematics are all taken
to be conditional in form, with an antecedent condition which functions as
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a partial specification of context, providing that “relevant degree of information”.
Every mathematical theorem is of the form ‘if such-and-such is
the case, then so-and-so holds’. That is, the ‘things’ referred to
are assumed to have certain properties, and then it is shown,
using the tacitly assumed methods of reasoning, that they also
have some other properties. . . . Of course, many theorems do not
literally have this form, but every theorem has some conditions
under which it obtains. [2, p. 58].
It might then be thought that mathematical claims on this view should be
taken as universally quantified expressions. Considering the group-theoretic
results discussed earlier, we might take it that the theorem concerning the
existence of a (group) homomorphism between any two groups is of the form
“For all objects G and H, if G is a group and H is a group then there exists a
(group) homomorphism from G to H”. However, if we ask whether the theorem is true, and adopt the usual semantic treatment of expressions involving
the universal quantifier, we are left wondering whether there are any groups,
and whether the theorem might simply be vacuously true. A description
of the features of a group via the axioms appearing in the antecedent of a
theorem in elementary group theory does not suffice to determine whether or
not there are any groups, nor does it give any indication as to how we might
try to make this determination. As Awodey explains,
This lack of specificity or determination is not an accidental feature of mathematics, to be described as universal quantification
over all particular instances in a specific foundational system as
the foundationalist would have it. . . rather it is characteristic of
mathematical statements that the particular nature of the entities involved plays no role, but rather their relations, operations,
etc.—the structures that they bear—are related, connected, and
described in the statements and proofs of theorems.
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The ‘schematic’ element in mathematical theorems, definitions,
and even proofs is not captured by treating the indeterminate
objects involved as universally quantified variables, as quantification requires a fixed domain over which the range of the variable
is restricted. [2, p. 59]
In adopting this distinction, it seems problematic to account for the truth
of a mathematical theorem in terms of the “Tarskian” apparatus required by
our third criterion for a foundation. Note that the view of mathematical
theorems as conditional in form is not to be understood as identifying those
theorems with trivial claims of the form “Assuming that we are given an
object (or objects) of the following description and that all the steps in the
given proof are legitimate, then such and such follows”. Instead, the content of a mathematical theorem is taken solely to concern properties of the
object(s) described : groups, continuous real-valued functions, objects in a
category, and the vast array of other objects treated as singular terms in the
various branches of mathematics. Briefly, the theorems of mathematics are
not taken to embed the conditions of their proof in the antecedent.22 The
proof, of course, does involve steps which lead from the antecedent to the
conclusion, and how are we to know that such rules which permit such steps
are sound, given objects of the sort that might satisfy the antecedent? Is it
legitimate to appeal to the law of excluded middle, or the axiom of choice,
when reasoning about the basis of a vector space? In short, the deliberate silence on the status of the objects that might satisfy the description contained
in the antecedent precludes any response to concerns about the legitimacy
of particular rules of inference employed in a proof. We are led, then, to
another view that will feature in the development of the AFCS program: a
proof provides grounds for the assertibility of a theorem, but does not suffice
for the claim that the theorem is true.
22

This allows there to be more than one proof of the same theorem.

CHAPTER 1. FOUNDATIONS

22

Thus, when considering whether the AFCS program constitutes a foundation for mathematics, we see that it fails to satisfy the second criterion,
which required an account of the way in which mathematical statements can
be known to be true. If, contrary to the AFCS proposal, we pack the rules
of inference employed in the proof of that theorem into the antecedent of
the conditional corresponding to that theorem, then take the theorem as a
universally quantified proposition, we obtain a trivial truth, but one which is
certainly of little interest, and, on the AFCS view, one which does not correctly represent the content of the theorem. As the AFCS view takes mathematical statements to be assertible in virtue of a proof, but not demonstrated
to be true by that same ground, this second criterion is not satisfied. Further, the third criterion also fails to be satisfied within the AFCS program,
insofar as mathematical theorems are taken to be schematic in form, and so
the semantics of such statements does not proceed solely via the semantic
apparatus identified in the third criterion. Given that the second and third
criteria for a foundation fail to be satisfied on the AFCS view, does the view
offer an organizational framework? Here the answer is yes, but the manner
in which the view satisfies this criterion differs from the manner in which
the logicist or formalist views satisfy the criterion. It is in describing how
the view aims to offer an organizational framework that we have the (long
overdue!) appearance of the notion of a category, the use of which will also
show the program to be a type of mathematical structuralism.
As Shapiro remarks, “The slogan of structuralism is that mathematics
is the science of structure” [79, p. 61]. While there are a number of ways
in which one might proceed in developing this viewpoint (several of which
will feature in Chapter 2), it will be argued that the correct rendering of
the insights that motivate the structuralist views of mathematics is not to
focus our attention on special, intrinsically featureless objects that bear only
relational properties, but instead to focus on structural properties, those properties which are common to all instances of the same structure. The language
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of category theory has the property that (in a manner to be made precise in
the coming chapters), objects with the same structure have the same properties expressible in that language. The language of category, then, is capable
of expressing properties with the “right level of detail”, in contrast to, for
example, the language of set theory. Consequently, if mathematics is a “science of structure”, and this involves shifting attention away from special sorts
of objects to structural properties, the language of category theory will be
shown to be particularly well-suited to the task.
So, on this initial sketch of the AFCS view, a mathematical theorem
will be argued to be best represented as a schematic conditional, and the
correct account of the content of that conditional will be argued to involve a
claim about objects with a particular sort of structure: that of a group, field,
topological space, etc., and the structural properties of any such objects will
be argued to be best captured using the language of category theory. Unlike
either the logicist or finitist programs, the AFCS program does not identify
a single privileged framework of assertory axioms with a special justificatory
role. In the case of the logicist program, a system of ramified type theory,
for example, was taken to be a framework in which all of the mathematical
(logical) objects could be defined, and all of the theorems about those objects
could be proved. In the case of the finitist program, finitary proof theory was
taken to confer legitimacy on the axiomatic systems of the various branches of
mathematics via consistency proofs. The axioms defining a category are not
meant to offer a “bedrock” framework of this sort. Thus, while the language
of category theory provides a linguistic framework arguably well suited to
reflect the structural properties of interest, it constitutes an organizational
framework in a manner quite different from that of programs which adopt
assertory axioms. Mathematics is identified as the science of structure, and
more specifically, the science of structural properties. Structural properties,
as will be argued, are best rendered in the language of category theory.
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Having outlined the AFCS program, one aspect of the program bears
emphasis. The view that mathematical theorems are conditional in form,
and involve no commitment to a special class of mathematical objects is not
adopted in virtue of a prior commitment to nominalism. Rather, the view is
very closely aligned with that expressed by Russell when he claims
What pure mathematics asserts is merely that the Euclidean
propositions follow from the Euclidean axioms—i.e. it asserts an
implication: any space which has such and such properties has
also such and such other properties. Thus, as dealt with in pure
mathematics, the Euclidean and non-Euclidean Geometries are
equally true: in each nothing is affirmed except implications. All
propositions as to what actually exists, like the space we live in,
belong to experimental or empirical science, not to mathematics; when they belong to applied mathematics, they arise from
giving to one or more of the variables in a proposition of pure
mathematics some constant value satisfying the hypothesis, and
thus enabling us, for that value of the variable, actually to assert
both the hypothesis and consequent instead of asserting merely
the implication. [73, p. 5]
Whether abstract entities are admitted into one’s ontology or not, mathematical theorems apply in either case—mathematics is not the arbiter of
existence. If one considers a cube and is willing to speak of the symmetries
of the cube as objects, those symmetries constitute a group of 24 elements.
If one is willing to speak of the squares of a chessboard as objects, and the
possible moves of a knight on the chessboard as arrows, the collection of
such objects and arrows yields a category. Whether or not such objects are
admitted is not a question that one’s mathematical program should settle.
This view immediately allows the proponent of AFCS to reply to one line
of criticism. Consider Hellman’s claim that category theory is inadequate
given its failure to address the “problem of mathematical existence”,
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This problem as it confronts category theory can be put very
simply: the question really just does not seem to be addressed!
(We might dub this the problem of the ‘home address’ : where do
categories come from and where do they live? ) [38, p. 136]23
If one aims at a foundational program of the sort envisioned by the logicists
or finitists, this is a reasonable request: if a framework is to account for
the truth of mathematical statements (and retains the “face-value” semantics which involves reference to mathematical objects), then there must be
enough such mathematical objects to ensure theorems about the existence
of exactly two four-element groups (up to isomorphism), the infinity of the
natural numbers, and the uncountability of the real numbers. However, if
one aims not at a foundation by instead at what might be called a purely
organizational framework, this issue is avoided. If, further, it is correct to
hold that mathematics should remain ontologically neutral, it would in fact
be a mark of deficiency for the view to imply, or require, the existence of any
objects, distinctly mathematical or otherwise.
To summarize, the AFCS program involves the following claims.
1. The structuralist view that “mathematics is the science of structure”,
is best expanded as the claim that “mathematics is the science of structural properties”.
2. Mathematical theorems are both conditional and schematic in form.
3. Mathematics is taken not to concern any particular, determinate collection of objects, distinctly mathematical or otherwise; mathematical
theorems involve no commitment to objects of any sort, structures included.
23

Hellman’s own program of modal structuralism, as presented in [35], addresses this
concern via axioms that stipulates the possibility of, for example, a model of the (secondorder) Peano axioms. If the ontological neutrality of mathematics is to be taken seriously,
though, it might naturally be taken that mathematics should no more make claims about
possible existence than it makes claims about actual existence.

CHAPTER 1. FOUNDATIONS

26

4. The language of category theory is better suited to express structural
properties than available alternatives.
The AFCS view embodies a number of ideas that have been variously expressed in recent work in the philosophy of mathematics, particularly Awodey
[2], Bell [5], and Landry and Marquis [48]. The details of this view will be
explored in the chapters to follow, and concerns of the sort raised in Shapiro
[79], Hellman [38], and Feferman [29] will be addressed. The development of
the AFCS will now proceed via an analysis of the notion of structure—and
in particular, the notion of a structural property—in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2
Structures and Structural
Properties
The central dogma of the axiomatic method is this: isomorphic
structures are mathematically indistinguishable in their essential
properties. [57, p. 19–20]
Category theory is the most elaborate and successful instance of
an axiomatized theory allowing for a systematic characterization
and analysis of the different structures, and the recurring mathematical phenomena that come forward in the latter. [23, p. 12]
While the claim that mathematics is correctly viewed as the “science of structure” has received considerable attention in recent work in the philosophy of
mathematics1 , the proponents of the view each offer distinct—and sometimes
incompatible—accounts of their various structuralist projects. In this chapter I will be concerned to distinguish the structuralist element of the AFCS
program, and to consider the way in which the category-theoretic account
of structure, via structural properties, captures what can be identified as the
key insight of the structuralist perspective in mathematics. This chapter
1

See, for example, Shapiro [78], Hellman [35], and Resnik [69].
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concludes with a comparison of the category-theoretic treatment of structure
to that of two alternative structuralist programs.

2.1

Early Structuralism

An important early work that can be taken to illustrate several of the key
structuralist insights is Dedekind’s 1888 essay on “The Nature and Meaning
of Numbers” [24]. In that work Dedekind introduces his construction of the
natural numbers, achieved through a characterization of what would now
be called an ω-sequence. This definition of an ω-sequence will be reviewed
here and then used to illustrate and motivate a number of the insights that
reemerge in contemporary structuralist views in the philosophy of mathematics.
Working against a background of informal set theory, Dedekind takes the
range of objects in his framework to consist of “every object of our thought”,
and these objects can be collected up into “systems”, where “a system S (an
aggregate, a manifold, a totality) as an object of our thought is likewise a
thing” [24, p. 21]. Against this informal set-theoretic background, Dedekind
appeals to the notion of a transformation, where “By a transformation φ of
a system S we understand a law according to which to every determinate
element s of S there belongs a determinate thing which is called the transform of s and denoted by φ(s)” [24, p. 24]. Thus, in modern terminology
Dedekind provides an informal set-theoretic framework along with the notion
of a function defined on a set S. A transformation φ, which maps S to φ(S)
is similar provided it is injective, in which case it has an inverse, φ, mapping
φ(S) to S. Two systems S and R are said to be “similar” when there exists
a similar transformation φ such that φ(S) = R, that is, when there exists a
function φ mapping S to R that is a bijection. With these notions Dedekind
is able to introduce his now familiar definition of an infinite set: a set is
infinite (now commonly referred to as “Dedekind-infinite”) provided there is
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a similar (i.e., injective) function φ which maps S to a proper part of itself.
The final ingredient of Dedekind’s definition of a simply infinite system—
in modern terms, an ω-sequence—involves the definition of a chain. A set S
is a chain (relative to a function φ) provided φ(S) ⊆ S. Give a subset A of S
and a function φ (where S is a chain relative to φ), the chain of A (relative
to φ) is defined to be the intersection of all chains containing A. In essence,
the chain of A is the minimal closure of A under φ.2 With this definition at
hand, Dedekind defines a simply infinite system:
A system N is said to be simply infinite when there exists a
similar transformation φ of N in itself such that N appears as
chain of an element not contained in φ(N ). We call this element,
which we shall denote in what follows by the symbol 1, the baseelement of N and say the simply infinite system N is set in order
by this transformation φ. [24, p. 33]
Using modern terminology, a set N is simply infinite provided there exists
an injective function φ mapping N to a proper subset of itself, for which one
of the elements a ∈ N \ φ(N ) is such that the minimal closure of {a} under φ
is N itself.3 Consequently, any such N is an ω-sequence, and can be shown
to satisfy the Peano axioms.4

2.1.1

Structuralist Perspectives

There are two key features of Dedekind’s treatment of simply infinite systems
that can be described as structural. First, the elements of any simply infinite
system N are described in solely in terms of their relational properties; that
2

That is, if A0 is the chain of A under φ, then A ⊆ A0 and for all a ∈ A0 we have
φ(a) ∈ A0 , where A0 is the smallest set with this property.
3
Here we might observe that Dedekind is not distinguishing between an element and
its singleton, as chains have only been defined for sets.
4
Indeed, Dedekind effectively shows that the Peano axioms hold of any such N , one
year prior to the paper in which Peano presents these axioms.
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is, the elements of such a simply infinite system N are not required to have
any particular intrinsic properties. Indeed, given a simply infinite system N
(relative to a function φ) with base-element b and an element a not in N , we
can simply define a function
(
ψ(x) =

φ(b) if x = a,
φ(x) otherwise.

to get a simply infinite system N 0 (with a replacing b, and which is now
relative to the function ψ). Compare this situation to one in which, instead
of simply infinite systems N , we consider systems C of objects of the same
colour. We cannot, for a given such system C—say, a system of red objects—
replace one such red object with an arbitrarily selected object not already in
the system and produce a new system of objects all of the same colour. Any
object can play the role of a base-element (or similarly, any other element)
in a simply infinite system, but this is not true of objects in a system of
similarly coloured objects. An element of a system of red objects must be
red, and replacing it with an object of another colour yields a system which
is no longer a system of similarly coloured objects.
A second structural feature of Dedekind’s approach concerns not the arbitrary interchangeability of the elements of a system, but instead concerns
the interchangeability of the systems themselves. In an investigation of the
properties of simply infinite systems, we might say, with Benacerraf, that
“any old ω-sequence would do” [12, p. 189]. The particular features of a
given simply infinite system N , such as the particular elements of which it is
composed, are irrelevant to the role of N qua simply infinite system; the elements of any such N can be used in counting, arithmetic, and so forth. Any
simply infinite system could be taken as the natural numbers (or taken as a
convenient surrogate), and the theorems of arithmetic, purportedly about the
natural numbers, would apply equally to the elements of that simply infinite
system. As Dedekind puts it
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. . . it is clear that every theorem regarding numbers, i.e., regarding the elements n of the simply infinite system N set in order by
the transformation φ, and indeed every theorem in which we leave
entirely out of consideration the special character of the elements
n and discuss only such notions as arise from the arrangement φ,
possesses perfectly general validity for every other simply infinite
system Ω set in order by a transformation θ and its elements ν
[24, p. 48]
Both of these perspectives reflect the structuralist focus, which involves
not the intrinsic properties of elements or systems themselves, but involves
instead the relational properties, i.e., the relational structure of the entities
in question. In effect, these two different perspectives amount to a difference
in emphasis, and are taken here to characterize the structuralist view of
mathematics. These perspectives are roughly
1. The particular elements of a system don’t matter, only their standing
in relations of the right sort is of mathematical concern—any suitablyrelated elements would do.
2. The particular system of elements doesn’t matter, only that the system’s elements stand in certain relations—any suitably-structured system would do.
To illustrate these differences in perspective, consider the case of a jeweller
who has grouped emeralds according to colour. If asked to explain to a potential customer the variability permitted within colour groupings, we may
suppose that any group of similarly coloured stones would suffice. However,
it is clearly not the case that a gemstone in one collection could be arbitrarily replaced with a gemstone from another—the colour would be wrong.
In this circumstance, then, we have variability of the second sort, but not
of the first: any group of gemstones would serve to illustrate the variability
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permitted within a group, but we cannot arbitrarily replace individual gemstones in one group with those of another. Now imagine that the jeweller has
created several different piles of emeralds on a table, with different numbers
of emeralds in each pile, and a customer has requested that a necklace be
made with exactly five gemstones. If our jeweller identifies a group of five
gemstones, then we have variability of the first sort, but not the second. Any
of the individual gemstones in the selected group of five could be switched
with a gemstone taken from another group (as there would then remain five
gemstones in the selected group), but other groups may not suffice, as some
contain more than or less than five gemstones. The structuralist approach
in mathematics can be viewed as highlighting the insensitivity—for mathematical purposes—of both sorts: insensitivity to the particular elements in
a system of a given type, and insensitivity to the particular system of that
given type.
While Dedekind’s remarks cited earlier may suggest that he favoured the
second of these perspectives, other remarks suggest that instead he favoured
this first perspective, and indeed it is this first perspective that leads him to
a view that
If in the consideration of a simply infinite system N set in order by
a transformation φ we entirely neglect the special character of the
elements; simply retaining their distinguishability and taking into
account only the relations to one another in which they are placed
by the order-setting transformation φ, then are these elements
called natural numbers or ordinal numbers or simply numbers
[24, p. 33]
This passage from Dedekind can be read in two ways. First, it may be read
as suggesting that, attending only the the relational properties of a system’s
elements, any simply infinite system could serve as the natural numbers.
Alternatively, it can be read as suggesting that one proceed by a process of
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abstraction5 to arrive at the natural numbers, which have only those properties common to all ω-sequences, i.e., they have only the structural properties
possessed in virtue of being an ω-sequence. In support of this latter reading
of Dedekind, Dedekind writes in a letter to Heinrich Weber that
I should still advise that by number. . . there be understood not
the class (the system of all mutually similar finite systems), but
rather something new (corresponding to this class), which the
mind creates. We are of divine species and without doubt possess creative power not merely in material things (railroads, telegraphs), but quite specially in intellectual things. [80, p. 248,
quoting from an 1888 letter found in Dedekind’s Gesammelte
Mathematische Werke]
Of course, placing emphasis on this first perspective need not lead to a commitment to a special sort of “purely relational” (mathematical) object, possessing no intrinsic properties, and we will consider modern structuralist
programs that do not involve commitment to objects of this sort.6
These structuralist perspectives account for the ease with which structuralist programs may account for the application of mathematics in, for
example, the sciences. Given that, as Dedekind notes, the theorems of arithmetic will apply to any simply infinite system, there is a clear link between
the pure mathematics of arithmetic—effectively the study of any simply infinite system—and the applied mathematics of arithmetic, which arises from
the (extra-mathematical) determination that a given system of objects counts
as a simply infinite system, and that the objects in view can serve as elements in a simply infinite system. This naturally fits with the schematic,
conditional view of mathematics adopted on the AFCS view. Given the
determination that a system can be taken to satisfy the axioms defining a
5

This abstraction process is dubbed “Dedekind abstraction” in [81].
Although, as well shall see, Shapiro’s ante rem program does invoke such a commitment.
6

CHAPTER 2. STRUCTURES AND STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES

34

type of structure (thereby satisfying the antecedent of the conditional of a
theorem), the consequent of that theorem, having been proven to hold for
structures of the relevant sort, is also true of the given system. As the theorem is schematic, there is no mathematical constraint on the sorts of entities
that can be viewed as systems, nor the sort of entities that can be viewed
as elements of systems. Therein lies the key to the universal applicability
of mathematics; one willing to treat forces as objects will discover that they
can then be fruitfully studied as vectors, one willing to treat symmetries of
regular polygons as objects can appeal to the results of group theory. There
are no mathematical prohibitions which concern what can count as a system,
or what can serve as an object in a system.
Dedekind’s well-known attempt to prove the existence of infinite systems
is generally taken to have been inadequate. Recall Dedekind’s claim that
My own realm of thoughts, i.e., the totality S of all things, which
can be objects of my thought, is infinite. For if S signifies an
element of S, then is the thought s0 , that S can be object of my
thought, itself an element of S. If we regard this as transform
φ(s) of the element S then has the transformation φ of S, thus
determined, the property that the transform S 0 is part of S; and
S 0 is certainly proper part of S, because there are elements in S
(e. g., my own ego) which are different from such thought S 0 and
therefore are not contained in S 0 . Finally it is clear that if a, b
are different elements of S, their transforms a0 , b0 are also different, that therefore the transformation φ is a distinct (similar)
transformation. Hence S is infinite, which was to be proved. [24,
p. 31]
As Hellman rightly notes,
. . . there were at least two flaws in Dedekind’s “proof”: first, there
was the problem of meaningfully iterating a “the thought that. . . ”
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operator an arbitrary finite number of times, obtaining a new
object at each stage. And, second, there was the need to collect all
such objects via some comprehension principle, which Dedekind
did not explicitly articulate. [35, p. 29]
However, the failure of Dedekind’s argument as a proof of the existence of
infinite systems does not prevent him from using the results of his mathematical framework to investigate the simply infinite system generated by
taking a particular thought a, and considering the minimal closure of {a}
under φ. If he is willing to speak in this manner (though we may not be inclined to follow), he can then produce the prime factorization of a particular
such element, (secure in the thought that such a factorization is unique up
to ordering), or use those elements to create and solve equations.
Before moving to consider recent structuralist programs in the philosophy
of mathematics, one further feature of Dedekind’s approach bears mention,
and it will be a feature that plays a prominent role in category-theoretic
approaches to structuralism. There is another sense in which a system N
counting as a simply infinite system depends on an external feature, one
that is not intrinsic to the system N (nor is this feature intrinsic to the
elements of such a system): whether or not a system N counts as simply
infinite depends crucially on the existence of a function φ, a function which
“sets N in order”. Thus, one can conceive of a system of objects that would
count as a simply infinite system, but for a poverty of functions. While
Dedekind says little about the ontological assumptions governing functions,
he notes (in article 21) that there are identity functions for any system S, that
function composition is defined for all composable pairs (article 25), and that
function composition is associative (article 25). That is, Dedekind establishes
that taking functions as arrows and systems as objects yields a category.
Whatever the elements of the structures are taken to be, the systems of
such elements are described throughout Dedekind’s essay entirely in terms
of the properties of functions acting on those systems; whether a system
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is finite, infinite, simply infinite, and so forth depends not on the specific
nature of the elements of the system, but instead depends on the “external”
characterization of those elements via the functions defined on those systems.
Dedekind’s treatment of simply infinite systems is quite naturally expressed
in the language of the category theory, and the distinctions Dedekind makes
concerning the cardinality of his systems—the objects of this category—
depends entirely on the features of this ambient category. We will have an
opportunity to pursue this account of Dedekind when we explore categorytheoretic, or categorical, structuralism. Now we will briefly consider how
some of Dedekind’s structuralist approach within mathematics emerged in
the modern structuralist approach within the philosophy of mathematics.

2.2

Modern Structuralism

The structuralist perspective came to the fore in philosophical circles with
Benacerraf’s seminal “What Numbers Could Not Be” [10]. Benacerraf in
this familiar paper presents the situation of Johnny and Ernie, one of whom
is taught, within a set-theoretic framework, the Zermelo definition of the
finite ordinals, while the other is taught the von Neumann definition.7 Discussing their rival accounts of the numbers, Johnny and Ernie notice that
their accounts are incompatible; on the Zermelo version, for instance, it can
be proven that all finite ordinals are singletons, a result that is (obviously
and provably) false on the von Neumann account. Benacerraf’s assessment
of the problem is that “the accounts differ at places where there is no connection between features of the accounts and our uses of the words in question”
[10, p. 62]. Benacerraf’s response to this observation is to claim that any ω7

On the von Neumann definition (now the standard choice) the finite ordinals begin
with ∅ and each element in the sequence is the set of all its predecessors, so the sequence
is ∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}}, . . . , while the Zermelo definition also begins with
∅, but then takes each successive element to be the singleton of its predecessor, giving the
sequence ∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, {{{∅}}}, . . . .
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sequence can be taken to play the role of the natural numbers,8 but that the
natural numbers are not to be identified with any particular such collection
of objects. Numbers cannot be sets because when presented with incompatible set-theoretic accounts of the numbers we have no criteria to which we
can appeal in breaking the tie. Further, numbers can’t be objects on Benacerraf’s view for essentially the same reason: the numbers are characterized
only in relational terms, and so an object might play the role of the number
3, but to claim that an object is the number 3 is to predicate a non-relational
property of that object, and so any attempt to identify an object as this or
that particular number can do so only by smuggling in some inappropriately
intrinsic features. Arithmetic, for example, is then “the science that elaborates the abstract structure that all progressions have in common merely in
virtue of being progressions” [10, p. 70].
Benacerraf’s discussion of the problem of identifying the natural numbers
informs many of the debates concerning contemporary structuralist views.
Benacerraf’s remark that “any ω-sequence will do” invites one to consider
the sense in which this claim is intended: any ω-sequence will do for what
purpose? Benacerraf notes that “For arithmetical purposes the properties of
numbers which do not stem from the relations they bear to one another in
virtue of being arranged in a progression are of no consequence whatsoever”
[10, p. 69–70]. Recalling Dedekind’s observation that any theorem we arrive
at having ignored “the special character of the elements” of a particular simply infinite system N will also be true of any other simply infinite system
M , it is clear that “any ω-sequence will do” is intended in the sense that any
properties of mathematical interest are common to all ω-sequences. Provided
we appeal only to properties possessed by a system in virtue of being a system of that type our theorems will be true of all such systems. Enlarging the
target from arithmetic to all branches of mathematics and agreeing to call
8

Benacerraf originally required that the sequence in question have a recursive order
relation, and supplied a confused argument to that effect, but has since retracted that
additional requirement in [12].
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such properties of mathematical interest structural properties (as they are
common to all systems of a particular type, i.e., all systems of a particular
structure), we can express the key structuralist insight, reflected in the two
structuralist perspectives, as follows: mathematics is concerned only with
the study of structural properties—mathematics is the science of structural
properties. The particular objects in a given simply infinite system don’t
matter (any objects “will do”), because their intrinsic properties are irrelevant to the mathematical study of that system; the properties of interest,
those the elements exhibit simply in virtue of featuring in a system of that
sort, do not involve any intrinsic properties of the elements. The particular
system does not matter precisely because all of its properties of mathematical interest—the structural properties it possesses simply in virtue of being
a system of the relevant sort—are common to any system of that sort. Thus
we arrive at a positive proposal that captures the central insight of the two
(negative) structuralist perspectives identified earlier. Clearly some care is
required to articulate precisely what is meant by a structural property, and
the next section will be concerned to articulate and assess the merits of the
category-theoretic account of structural properties.

2.3

Structural Properties

In sharpening the notion of a structural property, focus on the natural numbers (via ω-sequences) has the unfortunate consequence that two distinct approaches to identifying structural properties run together. First there is the
view that structural properties are those that a system has in virtue of being
a system of a given type. So, in the case of the natural numbers, characterized by, say, the second-order Peano axioms9 , the structural properties could
9

Informally these axioms state: (1) every number has a successor; (2) the successor
of a number is unique; (3) for any numbers x and y, if the successor of x is equal to the
successor of y, then x equals y; (4) there exists a number which is not a successor of any
number; and (5) the principle of induction holds. The second-order formulation differs
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be taken to be exactly those which are consequences of the axioms. Writing
N and M to represent models10 hN, s, 0i and hM, s0 , 00 i of the second-order
Peano axioms, for any closed sentence A in the (second-order) language of
arithmetic, we have
N  A ⇔ M  A.11
As any such A holds (or fails to hold) in both N and M, structural properties might then be identified with those which correspond to the logical
consequences of the Peano axioms. Restricting attention to the first-order
case12 , which admits of non-standard models, we may still make this identification, as the (now first-order) consequences of the axioms will still hold of
any model of the axioms; any properties that serve to distinguish the models
may then be deemed non-structural. Thus, for example, any model of the
Peano axioms is such that (the interpretation of) the sentences “2 + 3 = 5”
and “1 + 4 6= 7” both hold, and so those formulae corresponds to structural
properties, while the property of “having cardinality ℵ0 ” will not count as a
structural property.13
Second, we have the view that the structural properties of a given system are those which are true of all models of the same sort. Slightly more
precisely, a property may be deemed structural provided it holds in all isomorphic models. Given that all models of the second-order Peano axioms are
isomorphic,14 when the theory in question is that of natural number arithfrom the first-order formulation in that (5) can, in the second-order formulation, be taken
as a single axiom, while it must be taken as an axiom schema in the first-order formulation.
PA2 will be used to indicate the (conjunction of the) second-order Peano axioms.
10
It is important to note that the notion of model invoked here is not meant to involve
any restriction to, for example, models constructed in a privileged set-theoretic framework.
The notion of model invoked will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
11
This is a consequence of the (second-order) categoricity result. For details, see [75,
p. 82–83].
12
First-order presentations of the Peano axioms typically incorporate additional axioms
that recursively define addition and multiplication.
13
The existence of models of the first-order Peano axioms having cardinality > ℵ0 is an
immediate consequence of the (upward) Löwenheim-Skolem theorem; see [9, p. 82].
14
The details of this proof are essentially due to Dedekind, and can be found in [75,
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metic this account of structural properties collapses into the first account.
If a property is a logical consequence of the Peano axioms then it holds in
all models, and so a fortiori in all isomorphic models. Conversely, if a property holds in all isomorphic models of the Peano axioms then it holds in all
models (as they are all isomorphic), and so it is a logical consequence of the
Peano axioms.15
Consider, however, the notion of a group (see Section 1.1.2). The axioms
of a group are not categorical, and so, unlike the case with ω-sequences, the
two preliminary accounts of structural properties come apart. On the second
account, where structural properties are those true (or false) in all isomorphic
models, “having a commutative group operation”16 , “having order 5”, and
“being generated by a single element” all count as structural properties.
However, all of these properties are such that there are both groups that
exhibit those properties and groups that do not. Hence, on the first account of
structural properties, all of these properties would fail to count as structural.
There are three reasons to favour pursuit of this second account of structural properties. The first is a purely pragmatic consideration: when mathematicians study groups, they are typically interested in studying exactly the
sorts of properties listed above: commutativity, generators, order, subgroups,
etc., and all of these are preserved under (group) isomorphism. Second, those
properties that would count as structural on the first proposal also count as
structural on the second proposal. So, no properties are “lost” in pursuing
the second account. Finally, and most importantly, by restricting attention
to groups in a particular isomorphism class (rather than taking into account
all groups) the two structuralist perspectives are preserved. The particular
elements don’t matter, as it is possible to redefine the group operation in
p. 82–83].
15
It is worth noting that such a property may not be derivable from the Peano axioms
in a chosen deductive system, as “full” second-order logic is not recursively axiomatizable.
Details are covered in [75].
16
A commutative group operation is one for which a ? b = b ? a for all a, b ∈ G. A group
with a commutative group operation is called an Abelian group.
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such a way as to permit any object to replace a given object in a particular
group,17 and it is possible to do so in a manner that yields a group isomorphic to the original. Similarly, by definition these properties are exhibited by
all groups in the isomorphism class, and so the particular group selected for
study doesn’t matter—any group from the isomorphism class will do. Thus,
the second approach to structural properties is consistent with mathematical
practice, subsumes the first candidate approach, and preserves both structuralist perspectives. We now turn to examine an account of the notion of a
structural property cast in the language of category theory.

2.4

Structural Properties in the Language of
Category Theory

2.4.1

The Language of Category Theory

Consider a typed first-order language L, with lowercase letters x, y, z, . . .
used for terms of the first type (arrow type terms) and uppercase letters
A, B, C, . . . used for terms of the second type (object type terms).18 As is
usually the case, letters from the first part of the alphabet are typically used
for constants of their respective types, though context will usually suffice to
distinguish constants from variables of either type. There are two primitive
unary function symbols Dom and Cod which take arguments of arrow type
and yield objects, one primitive unary function symbol 1− which takes an
object as argument and yields an arrow, one binary relation symbol = which
accommodates arguments of either type, and one binary function symbol ◦
which takes two arguments of arrow type and yields an object of arrow type.
17

This is accomplished simply by introducing a new group operation defined in terms
of the previous one, as was done with ω-sequences in Section 2.1.1.
18
This presentation of the language of elementary (first-order) category theory is a
modified version of that found in [50]. In this case, composition of arrows, ◦, is taken as a
(partially-defined) function on arrows, Lawvere makes use of a primitive ternary relation
Γxyz, corresponding to y ◦ x = z.
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Note that f ◦ g is only defined when Cod(g) = Dom(f ), and so ◦ is a partial
function on the class of arrows. The following clauses then determine the
well-formed formulae (wffs) of the language L.
1. For any term of arrow type x and term of object type A, Dom(x) = A
and Cod(x) = A are wffs.
2. For any terms of arrow type x, y, and z, x ◦ y is a term of arrow type,
and x ◦ y = z is a wff.
3. For any terms x, y of arrow type and A, B of object type, x = y and
A = B are wffs.
4. For any wffs φ and ψ, ¬φ, φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ, and φ → ψ are wffs.
5. Where a wff φ has a free variable x of arrow type, ∀xφ and ∃xφ are
wffs; similarly for φ with a free variable F of object type.
Given such a language L and using the usual abbreviations, one can form
expressions such as
∀A∃!x(Dom(x) = A ∧ Cod(x) = B),
which expresses the claim that B is a terminal object,19 and
∀x, y((Cod(x) = Cod(y) ∧ Dom(x) = Dom(y)) → (z ◦ x = z ◦ y → x = y)),
which expresses that z is a monic.20

2.4.2

Axioms and Definitions in Category Theory

The axioms that define a category were presented in Section 1.2 are here
repeated, now presented as formulae in the language L.
19
20

Terminal objects are the category-theoretic analogue of a singleton set.
Monic arrows are the category-theoretic analogue of an injective function.
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1. ∀x∃A, B(Dom(x) = A ∧ Cod(x) = B)
2. ∀x, y((Dom(x) = Cod(y)) → (Dom(x ◦ y) = Dom(y) ∧ Cod(x ◦ y) =
Cod(x))).
3. ∀A((Dom(1A ) = A = Cod(1A )) ∧ (∀z((Cod(z) = A → 1A ◦ z = z) ∧
(Dom(z) = A → z ◦ 1A = z))))
4. ∀x, y, z((x ◦ y) ◦ z = x ◦ (y ◦ z))
As the notion of isomorphism will play a critical role here, we will need
to introduce the category-theoretic rendering of this notion. Objects A and
B in a category are said to be isomorphic provided there is an arrow between
them (in fact, a pair of arrows) with a particular property. Arrows of three
types play an important role in category theory. For the sake of brevity, these
definitions are presented informally, rather than as formulae in L. Note that
two arrows with the same domain and codomain are said to be parallel.
• An arrow f : A → B is monic (represented by f : A  B) provided,
given any T and parallel arrows g : T → A and h : T → A, f ◦ g = f ◦ h
implies g = h.
• An arrow f : A → B is epic (represented by f : A  B) provided,
given any T and parallel arrows g : B → T and h : B → T , g ◦f = h◦f
implies g = h.
∼

• An arrow f : A → B is iso (represented by f : A → B) provided
there is an arrow g : B → A such that f ◦ g = 1B and g ◦ f = 1A . If
f
f : A → B is iso, we will sometimes write A ∼ B, or simply A ∼ B.
Such an arrow g is unique, and so typically represented as f −1 .
Monics are the category-theoretic analogue of injective functions; if two parallel functions h, j : T → A are distinct then they disagree on some value
t ∈ T , then h(t) 6= g(t), and so (for an injective function f ) f (h(t)) 6= f (g(t)),
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i.e., f ◦ h 6= g ◦ h. The converse of this result is reflected in the definition of
a monic. Epic arrows are akin to surjective functions, although the analogy
is less fitting in this case; as McLarty explains “It is better to think of an
epic as ‘covering enough of B’ that any two different arrows out of B must
disagree somewhere within the part covered by f ” [60, p. 15].21 Every iso is
both epic and monic, but the converse holds only in balanced categories.22
As arrows in a category need not be functions 23 , it is important to note that
these examples are merely suggestive. Monics, epics, and isos are defined in
terms of properties of arrows in a category, and arrows are primitive.

2.4.3

The Structural Properties Theorem

The question of principal interest, then, is given an object A in some category, which predicates expressible in L correspond to structural properties
of A? Recalling the two structuralist perspectives (see Section 2.1.1), those
properties which depend on particular elements and particular systems are
ruled out. In the case of ω-sequences hN, s, 0i and hN 0 , s0 , 00 i, we would not
want to consider, for example, “having successor function equal to s” as a
structural property; ω-sequences are required to have a successor relation,
but not to have the same successor relation. Similarly, having a particular
base-element a, or for the system to contain a particular element b, should
not count as structural properties, those particular elements are not essential, we merely require elements that play the same role. This leads to the
first restriction on predicates corresponding to structural properties in L:
structural properties should not involve names of particular elements, i.e.,
constants, in their formulation.
21

In the category of rings and ring homomorphisms, the inclusion f : Z → Q is monic
and epic, but not iso.
22
In an arbitrary category, an arrow is iso iff it is both monic and split epic, where an
arrow f : A → B is split epic provided there is some arrow g : B → A such that f ◦g = 1B .
The details will not concern us here.
23
Recall the examples given in Section 1.2. For example, taking positive integers as
objects and n × m real-valued matrices as arrows f : n → m.
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The first restriction leads directly to a second restriction that shares the
same motivation. If we allow parameters—unquantified variables—in the
formulae meant to correspond to structural properties, then the problem we
hoped to avoid by prohibiting constants would reemerge. Again considering
ω-sequences A = hN, s, 0i and B = hN 0 , s0 , 00 i, take a formula with variables Z, x, and y such as “x is the base-element of the ω-sequence Z and
has immediate successor y”. Representing this formula as F (Zxy), consider
the formula obtained by existentially quantifying over x and leaving y free,
∃xF (Zxy). Structural properties are meant to hold of all models of the
same sort—in this case, all ω-sequences—but while all ω-sequences have a
base-element (which then has a particular successor element), the successor
element of the base-element in one sequence may not be that of the baseelement in another. Thus, if a is the successor of the base-element 0 in the
ω-sequence A and b is the successor of the base-element 00 in the sequence
B, then, provided a 6= b, we have one sequence that satisfies ∃xF (Zxa) and
another that does not. In short, allowing parameters permits the substitution of particular elements into formulae, which may then yield predicates
corresponding to properties that depend on those particular elements, and
so would not count as structural. In summary, the structuralist perspectives
yield an account of (the predicates corresponding to) structural properties
that prohibits constants and parameters. We now proceed to establish a
result that shows the language of category theory to be particularly well
suited to express structural properties: given any object A in a category, all
formulae in L which do not involve constants or parameters correspond to
structural properties of A. That is,
Structural Properties Theorem. If Φ is a formula in L with one free
variable of object type and no constants or parameters, then if A and B are
isomorphic objects in some category C,
ΦA ⇔ ΦB.
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Proof. (sketch)24 Fix a category C and objects A and B such that u : A → B.
The proof proceeds by structural induction on Φ, and makes use of a mapping
F , a function taking objects to objects and arrows to arrows defined as
follows.
Let F (A) = B, F (B) = A, and F (C) = C for any object C 6= A, B.
Thus, F exchanges objects A and B, and leaves all other objects unaltered.
Note that F is a bijection on objects, as F is clearly surjective, and for any
object X of C, F F (X) = X.
The action of F on arrows depends on whether the arrow has either of A
or B as domain or codomain. Analogous to the case with objects, the action
of F on arrows will be to swap to roles of A and B, leaving other objects
fixed. For any f : X → Y such that X, Y 6= A, B, let F (f ) = f . When either
A or B feature in an arrow, composition with either u or u−1 will be used
to yield an arrow which exchanges A and B. The clauses that determine the
action of F on such arrows are given in the table below.
For any X, Y 6= A, B,
f
f
f
f
f
f
f
f

:X→A
:X→B
:A→X
:B→X
:A→B
:B→A
:A→A
:B→B

7→
7
→
7→
7→
7→
7→
7→
7→

u◦f :X →B
u ◦f :X →A
f ◦ u−1 : B → X
f ◦u:A→X
−1
u ◦ f ◦ u−1 : B → A
u◦f ◦u:A→B
u ◦ f ◦ u−1 : B → A
u−1 ◦ f ◦ u : A → B
−1

A long, but straightforward case analysis suffices to show that, for any arrow
f we have F F (f ) = f , the latter following by the definition of F taken
along with the associativity of composition and properties of u and u−1 . For
24

This proof follows the technique presented in [61], in which McLarty establishes a
result specific to natural number objects in a category of sets (a category with additional
axioms appropriate to the specific case investigated in that article). In particular, the core
of this proof, the definition of the functor F , carries over from McLarty’s proof.
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example, consider an arrow f : A → X as above. We get
F F (f ) = F (f ◦ u−1 )

by the definition of F,

= (f ◦ u−1 ) ◦ u

as f ◦ u−1 : B → X,

= f ◦ (u−1 ◦ u)

by associativity,

=f

as desired.

The other cases follow similarly. Again, routine case analysis shows F to be
surjective (the pre-image of any f can be built up using appropriately chosen
composites with u and u−1 ), and so F is a bijection on arrows.
The strategy is now to use structural induction to establish that
Φ(A) ⇔ Φ(A)F ,

(2.1)

where, for a given formula Ψ, the formula ΨF is obtained by replacing every
object term X with F (X) and every arrow term f with F (f ). As F is
a permutation on the objects and arrows of C, there existing an arrow f
(or object X) satisfying some condition is equivalent to there existing an
arrow F (f ) (or object F (X)) satisfying that same condition, similarly for
universally quantified expressions. As the only constant term appearing in
the formula Φ(A) in (2.1) is, by assumption, A, (2.1) would then simplify to
Φ(A) ⇔ Φ(B).

(2.2)

For the base case of the inductive proof, the atomic formulae are of the
form x = y or X = Y for arrow terms or object terms, respectively. Here
again, treating cases is lengthy but straightforward. It can be shown that F
respects domains, codomains, identities, and composites.25 That is, for any
25

These are precisely the conditions that establish that F is a functor F : C → C,
which is an arrow in the category of categories.
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arrows f and g and any object X,
Dom(F (f )) = F (Dom(f )),

(2.3)

Cod(F (f )) = F (Cod(f )),

(2.4)

F (1X ) = 1F (X) , and

(2.5)

F (f ◦ g) = F (f ) ◦ F (g).

(2.6)

For example, consider the following case of (2.6), with g : X → A and
f : A → B, where X 6= A, B. Then we have
F (f ◦ g) = u−1 ◦ (f ◦ g)

as f ◦ g : X → B,

= u−1 ◦ f ◦ u−1 ◦ u ◦ g

as u−1 ◦ u = 1A ,

= (u−1 ◦ f ◦ u−1 ) ◦ (u ◦ g)

by associativity,

= F (f ) ◦ F (g).
The other 26 cases of (2.6) follow similarly.
The inductive step of the proof then follows from the earlier observation
that quantification is unaffected by “exponentiation by F ”, and that exponentiation by F leaves the logical operators of a formula unchanged.
Structural properties are, on one approach, those that do not depend on
the features of particular elements or particular systems. This view is reflected in the (negative) structural perspectives identified in Section 2.1.1,
and leads to a prohibition against constants or parameters appearing in any
formula corresponding to a structural property. Second, in attempting to
sharpen the notion of a structural property, those properties were tentatively
identified as those which are shared by any system of a given type, where
two systems N and M being of a given type was identified with their being
isomorphic. The theorem above establishes that the language of category
theory unifies these views: all predicates without names or parameters correspond to structural properties, in the sense that any predicate of that sort
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corresponds to a property common to all isomorphic objects in a category.
Certainly some important questions need to be addressed in order to
properly assess the merits of this feature of the language of category theory.
If, for example, one is interested in establishing a theorem concerning cyclic
groups, one might take cyclic groups as objects in a category, where the
arrows in that category are group homomorphisms. But which groups are
there? And how are these groups related; i.e., which homomorphisms are
there? A homomorphism between groups can be represented as an arrow
between those groups in a category, but is there a homomorphism between
two particular groups G and F ? Also, should our category C perhaps contain
all groups, or all finitely generated groups? Recall that textbooks in group
theory typically identify groups as sets 26 , and so it may be more natural to
take the language for expressing the structural properties of groups to be the
language of some set theory, say, ZFC. The language of ZFC has the further
advantage of offering a uniform treatment of all its subject matter: groups
are sets, functions between groups are sets, elements of groups are sets.27
One way to describe these concerns is via a comparison to the language of
set theory: does category theory afford one the same expressive resources as
the language of set theory?
Exploring the AFCS account of models of an axiomatic system will be
postponed until Chapter 3, but recall that one aspect of the AFCS view
is a deliberate silence on Hellman’s problem of the “home address”, save
for advocating the language of category theory as particularly well-suited to
capture the notion of structural property.28 Any specification of the particular
objects taken to compose models, and, indeed, the nature of the models
themselves, is, so to speak, in the hands of the applied mathematician, the
physicist, and those who make use of the schematic, conditional theorems of
26

See the definition cited in Section 1.1.2.
This is a minor complaint against the category-theoretic approach, as an “arrows-only”
definition of a category is also available, see [52].
28
See the discussion in Section 1.5.
27
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mathematics. This view will be further explored in the next chapter.
There is, however, a separate, related issue that merits investigation. It
is well known that considerable work has gone into establishing the adequacy
of the language of set theory for the purpose of describing the objects of all
branches of contemporary mathematics. Set-theoretic models of axiomatic
theories—for example, the theory of rings—can be described directly within
the language of set theory. That is, one can translate the axioms for a ring
into the language of set theory, then construct a formula in the language of
set theory that says “x is a ring”, or “z is a (ring) homomorphism between
the rings x and y”. For all that has been said about the expressive resources
of the language of category theory thus far, one might worry whether the
language of category theory has this ability, or whether the language of category theory must necessarily reside “one level up” from languages like that
of set theory. Must one first define the objects of mathematics (and their
associated morphisms) in the language of set theory, and then “ascend” to
describe them as objects (and arrows) in the language of category theory?
Note that this concern is distinct from the problem of the “home address”;
the concern here is not that the objects must be shown to exist in some other
theory, but that they must first be described in some other theory. While
the observations contained in Section 2.5 might be taken to show that sort
of translation to be not entirely without benefit, such a “set theory first”
approach will be seen to be unnecessary.29
A proponent of the AFCS program may, of course, observe that the language of set theory is intended to describe sets 30 , and this restriction runs
counter to the tenets of AFCS program: one may hold the the rigid mo29

Should further conditions need to be imposed for the purposes of defining the objects
of interest (existence of products, function spaces, etc.), they can be added directly within
the language of category theory, as will come to light in the discussion of the elementary
theory of the category of sets.
30
Here the less common set theories which admit urelements are not being considered,
but one might observe that, while such elements may be present in the theory, there is
little sense to the claim that a set theory is equipped to describe such elements.
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tions of a tetrahedron form a group, but rigid motions are not sets (although
the group of rigid motions may be expected to be isomorphic to some settheoretic group). The particular nature of the models of a given axiomatic
system is deliberately unspecified within mathematics, a feature that may
help to explain the applicability of mathematics in novel contexts such as
may be required by a newly developed physical theory.
However, concerns about the expressive resources of the language of category theory as compared to the language of set theory can be addressed
directly, and here a particularly strong result obtains. In [49] Lawvere introduces his elementary theory of the category of sets (henceforth ETCS).
The language of ETCS can be taken to be the language L described earlier, and eight axioms are added to the axioms that determine a category.
It can then be shown that the theory ETCS is inter-interpretable with the
theory of BZC, Zermelo set theory with the axiom of choice and the axiom
of (bounded) separation.31 Further, McLarty shows in [62] that an axiom
scheme of replacement can be added to yield a theory ETCS+R, which he
shows to be inter-interpretable with full ZFC. One who wants to pursue
set-theoretic reconstructions of mathematical objects thus finds that the language of category theory has much to offer, but it offers a “function-based”
set theory as opposed to the “membership-based” theory like that of ZFC.
The technical details will not be pursued here, but the results of the Structural Properties Theorem carry over to ETCS+R; as McLarty notes
The theory ETCS is structural in the sense that each ETCS set
provably has all the same properties as any set isomorphic to it.
An ETCS formula can only specify a set up to isomorphism. [62,
p. 48]
Some delicacy is required when assessing the inter-interpretation results.
One concern is whether the interpretations involved are homophonic: are the
31

See [62] for details.
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sets and functions of one theory interpreted as sets and functions of the other?
Interpreting ETCS+R in ZFC proves relatively straightforward, with the
objects of ETCS+R interpreted as sets in ZFC, and the arrows interpreted
as (set) functions. However, the interpretation of ZFC in ETCS+R proves
more challenging. The homophonic interpretation is partial: many formulae
which involve membership in an essential way are not directly interpretable
in ETCS+R. As McLarty explains
For example there is no homophonic interpretation of the ZF
empty-set axiom: There is a set ∅ such that no set A has A ∈ ∅.
This relies directly on membership of sets. But consider this ZF
theorem: There is a set ∅ such that for every set A there is exactly one function ∅ → A. This is homophonically interpretable,
and is also a theorem of ETCS. Indeed all isomorphism-invariant
theorems of ZF have homophonic interpretation. [62, p. 46]
There is also a total interpretation that is not homophonic, which involves
the notion of a set’s membership tree. A set is represented as the bottom node
of a tree diagram, with its members corresponding to the base of each branch
directly above that bottom node node, and similarly for those members.32
The details of this interpretation will not be explored here, but the reader is
again referred to [62] for additional sources.
Of particular importance for the purpose of this chapter is McLarty’s remark that, on the homophonic interpretation of ZF in ETCS, all isomorphisminvariant theorems of ZF have homophonic interpretation in ETCS. What
of the theorems of ZF that are not isomorphism invariant? On the face of
it such theorems would seem to be of little interest to the structuralist—
structural properties are isomorphism invariant—and this remark highlights
an important distinction between the language of set theory and the language
of category theory that warrants investigation.
32

“Moving down” one level in the tree corresponds to “adding brackets”, collecting the
elements directly above that node, with each branch ending at the top with ∅.

CHAPTER 2. STRUCTURES AND STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES

2.5

53

Structural Properties in a Set-Theoretic
Setting

Despite the similarity between the category-theoretic (“function-based”) and
set-theoretic (“membership-based”) theories of collections discussed above,
for the purpose of the structuralist these theories are crucially different. Consider now the language of ZF, which consists of variables of only one type, two
primitive binary relation symbols ∈ and =, and no constant symbols. How
are the structural properties of its objects to be characterized? As structural
properties were viewed as those which did not depend on particular objects
(and so in this context, those which do not depend on particular sets), one
might expect that again those predicates with no parameters and no constant
terms would be those which correspond to structural properties. This view of
structural properties was seen to be motivated by the two structuralist perspectives (See Section 2.1.1). Unfortunately, a problem with this approach
emerges when one considers the other characterization of structural properties: those which are common to all isomorphic objects (where the objects
in question are sets in the present case). On the category-theoretic approach
these views were shown to coincide. Unfortunately, these two conceptions of
structural properties do not coincide in the language of set theory.
Given that set functions can be described directly in the language of set
theory33 , one may consider a simple case, where two sets are taken to be
isomorphic exactly when they stand in bijective correspondence. Already
in this case we see the two conceptions of structural property come apart.
Consider (using the usual abbreviations) the predicate
Φ(x) =df ∀y(y ∈ x → ∃!z(z ∈ y)),
which corresponds to the property of “having only singleton members”, and
33

Where an n-ary function is a set of ordered (n + 1)-tuples satisfying the standard
uniqueness condition.
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take the sets A = {1} and B = {2}.34 Note that Φ involves no constant
terms and no parameters, so exemplifies the first conception of a structural
property. Both A and B are themselves singletons, and so isomorphic in
the simple sense of being in bijective correspondence. However, the single
element of B has two members, and so Φ(B) fails while Φ(A) holds; 2 is not
a singleton, and so Φ is not preserved under isomorphism.
This example illustrates a difficulty inherent to the set-theoretic framework that is similar to the problem of identifying the natural numbers that
Benacerraf describes in [10]. In the case considered above, the language
of set theory allows us to distinguish—using (predicates corresponding to)
properties that do not involve particular elements—two isomorphic sets, but
this distinction is irrelevant to their role35 as singletons. Qua singletons, set
A serves us just as well as set B, but the language of set theory is, in a
sense, too fine grained: it allows for the formulation of predicates that are
structural in the sense of not depending upon particular objects (and so not
involving constants or parameters), but which are not structural in the sense
of being common to all isomorphic sets. Further, this result can be taken
to show that the characterization of structural properties as those which do
not involve particular objects is inappropriate with respect to the language
of set theory—the properties identified by that criterion are not structural.
The situation is no better when we take into account more complicated
structures along with their associated isomorphisms, as in the case of the
ω-sequences that feature in Benacerraf’s discussion [10]. In that case, the
von Neumann and Zermelo finite ordinals are equivalent as ω-sequences, but
differ with respect to their set-theoretic properties. Benacerraf’s complaint
is that, while the Zermelo and the von Neumann finite ordinals both stand
as candidates for the title the natural numbers, “the accounts differ at places
where there is no connection between features of the accounts and our uses
34

Here taking the von Neumann definitions: 1 =df {∅} and 2 =df {∅, {∅}}.
The role of these sets can be taken to be either identified implicitly by the isomorphism
type, or subject to some prior specification which then determines the isomorphism type.
35
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of the words in question” [10, p. 62]. The formula Φ constructed in the
example above serves to illustrate one of the inconsequential differences between ω-sequences that can be expressed in the language of set theory. One
aspect of this difficulty is due to the language of set theory itself, as the language permits the expression of non-structural properties. In contrast, the
category theoretic framework can be augmented by axioms (all expressed
in the language L) that allow for the definition of a natural number object,
the category-theoretic analogue of an ω-sequence. In fact, given one such
natural number object, there are provably infinitely many such objects.36
The category theoretic account of an isomorphism remains as before: two
∼
objects A and B are isomorphic provided there exists an iso f : A → B.
Again here, it is provable that (continuing to restrict attention to predicates
that do not involve constants or parameters) “All natural number objects
are indiscernible in this theory. They provably have all the same properties”
[61, p. 494]. Thus, taking the first account of structural property, distinct
natural number objects share all structural properties when expressed in the
language of category theory. Further, framed in the language of category
theory, the first and second accounts of structural property coincide; those
properties without constants or parameters are common to all isomorphic
objects.37
To summarize, structural properties on one view may be taken to correspond to those predicates in which particular objects do not feature (so
no constants, no parameters), or they can be taken to be those which are
common to all isomorphic objects. These two views coincide in the language
36

One proof of this result proceeds by taking different successor relations defined on the
same object, see [61, p. 493].
37
McLarty considers the more complicated case where systems of objects and one or more
arrow are taken into consideration, and so the structural properties are not represented
by predicates with a single free variable, but also include variables for any number of
distinguished arrows as well. In the case of natural number objects, two distinguished
arrows are admitted, one corresponding to the successor operation and one to the selection
of a base-element. In [61] McLarty establishes a more complicated Structural Properties
Theorem involving these natural number objects.
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of category theory: all predicates in which there are no constants and no
parameters correspond to structural properties—they are common to all isomorphic objects. In the language of set theory, these two views come apart;
predicates not involving constants or parameters do not all correspond to
structural properties. In the language of set theory, we have recourse only to
the account that identifies structural properties as those properties common
to all isomorphic structures. But which are those?
In the language of category theory, there is a syntactic criterion to which
we can appeal in identifying (predicates corresponding to) structural properties. In the language of set theory, a predicate’s avoidance of constant terms
and parameters is, as we have seen, not sufficient to guarantee its preservation under isomorphism. The structuralist who appeals to the language of
category theory finds that—rather than having to rely on the language of set
theory in order to describe the mathematically relevant features of the objects under consideration—it is the language of category theory which serves
to separate the wheat from the chaff, yielding only isomorphism-invariant
properties. And it is exactly the isomorphism-invariant properties that are
of interest to the structuralist.
It is worth remarking here that the problem facing the structuralist who
adopts a set-theoretic framework is not addressed merely by producing a
criterion according to which properties of the language can be identified
as being preserved under isomorphism. That structuralist faces a further
question: why use a language which so readily allows for the formulation of
(predicates corresponding to) properties not preserved under isomorphism?
If such properties are of no interest to the structuralist, why should they be
admitted at all into the framework of a structuralist program?
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Alternative Structuralist Programs

Given the suitability of the language of category theory to the structuralist
view, it is perhaps surprising to note that some key proponents of structuralism have not adopted, and, in some cases, have actively resisted the use of
the language of category theory in developing their programs. In this final
section of the chapter, we will consider the features of two current structuralist programs, and explore their alternatives to structuralist programs framed
in the language of category theory.
Before considering alternative structuralist programs it will be useful to
observe that the programs do not use the term “structure” univocally. One
may follow Shapiro and use “structure” as a sortal concept, where a structure
is taken to be a sort of object, or one may adopt the view that an object
has or exhibits a particular structure, as when one speaks of the finite von
Neumann ordinals exhibiting the structure of an ω-sequence. Denoting these
two options structure1 and structure2 , Benacerraf notes that
. . . the Empire State Building, although a paradigmatic concrete
object, is an imposing structure1 , as is the union of the Rα for all
α < ℵω , as is R, the structure1 of the real numbers between 0 and
1; whereas it is also true that the structure2 of the Empire State
Building has never been repeated in any other building. . . [12,
p. 184]
On the AFCS program, “structure” is used in the sense of structure2 , and
proponents of the AFCS program satisfy Benacerraf’s description of those
who
. . . represent mathematical theories as being about structures2 —
the structural or relational features that systems of “objects”
might exhibit, without any special concern about whether there
are or could be any systems of objects that indeed exhibit them. . . [12,
p. 185]
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Thus “structure” will typically be used here in the sense of structure2 . However, both Hellman and Shapiro use the term “structure” in the sense of
structure1 38 ; context should suffice to disambiguate. Despite this difference
in usage, all parties endorse the slogan that “mathematics is the science of
structure”, although the terminological differences point to their differing
motivations and goals in the development of these alternative structuralist
programs.

2.6.1

Shapiro’s Ante Rem Structuralism

Shapiro’s structuralist program is a foundational program according to the
criteria presented in Section 1.3.2. As Shapiro notes, “My structuralist program is a realism in ontology and a realism in truth-value. . . ” [76, p. 72].
The “realism in ontology” points to Shapiro’s aiming to satisfy the third
foundational criterion, as
. . . the ante rem structuralist interprets statements of arithmetic,
analysis, set theory, and the like, at face value. What appear to
be singular terms are in fact singular terms that denote bona fide
objects. [76, p. 11]
Given the view that mathematical theorems are true, Shapiro endeavours
to describe the manner by which we come to know that the theorems of
mathematics are true (Chapter 4 of [76]), thereby satisfying the second foundational criterion. Finally, his structuralist perspective, and particularly the
structure theory he presents (Chapter 3 of [76]), provides a unified view of
mathematics, and thereby aims to satisfy the first foundational criterion. In
short,
38

Although their usages do not entirely coincide either, with Hellman’s structure corresponding roughly to Shapiro’s system. Hellman, for example, speaks of distinct structures
potentially being “pairwise isomorphic” [35, p. 19], while on Shapiro’s view it is distinct
systems that may be pairwise isomorphic. On Shapiro’s view, provided all systems of a
given sort are pairwise isomorphic (i.e., the axioms defining the system type are categorical ) they determine a structure, and any isomorphic structures are identical [76, p. 93].
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I [Shapiro] try to say what mathematics is about, how we come to
know mathematical statements, and how we come to know about
mathematical objects. [76, p. 8]
One of the key features of Shapiro’s structuralist program is the distinction between “places-are-offices” and “places-are-objects” perspectives.
Consider, for example, the white queen’s bishop in the game of chess. Different physical objects have played the role of the white queen’s bishop, so the
usage of the term “white queen’s bishop” can be associated with the role of
that chess piece. Taking terms of this sort to indicate a role is to adopt the
places-are-offices perspective. Alternatively,
When we say that the Speaker presides over the House and that
a bishop moves on a diagonal, the terms “Speaker” and “bishop”
are singular terms, at least grammatically. Prima facie, they denote the offices themselves, independent of any objects or people
that may occupy the offices. This is the places-are-objects perspective. [76, p. 10]
Considering the natural numbers, number terms may designate places-asoffices: both the Zermelo {{∅}} and the von Neumann {∅, {∅}} occupy the
“office” of the number 2, insofar as they occupy the corresponding position
in their respective ω-sequences.
One central feature of Shapiro’s program is that he holds that there is a
sort of canonical occupant of some roles; in the case of the natural numbers,
for example, there is an object uniquely suited to the title the number 2.
One way to articulate the view is to consider how Shapiro characterizes the
structure vs. system distinction. Both the Zermelo finite ordinals and the
von Neumann are systems, where a system is taken to be a collection of
objects and relations on those objects [76, p. 73]. A system can be thought
of as a model of some set of axioms, and—provided the set of axioms is
coherent—to each isomorphism class of models of a particular collection of
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axioms there corresponds a structure. Structures, however, are not to be
viewed as equivalence classes of systems, instead they are best viewed as
involving a shift from the places-are-offices perspective to the places-areobjects perspective, a shift that is considered legitimate when the axioms are
both categorical and coherent.
Coherence is, by Shapiro’s admission, a difficult notion to capture, and
cannot be identified with deductive consistency, as there are consistent secondorder theories that are not satisfiable.39 Instead, coherence is taken to be
“something more like satisfiability” [76, p. 95]. To complete the picture,
Shapiro’s adopts a stipulation concerning when structures are to be identified: “we stipulate that two structures are identical if they are isomorphic”
[76, p. 93]. Thus, Shapiro’s view is that
A purported implicit definition characterizes at most one structure if it is categorical —if any two models of it are isomorphic to
each other. A purported implicit definition characterizes at least
one structure if it is coherent [76, p. 73]
As the axioms of (second-order) Peano arithmetic are taken to be both categorical and coherent, they serve to characterize a unique structure answering
to the title the natural numbers, and at the appropriate position in this structure we find the number 2, an office as far as other systems are concerned,
but an object in the structure of natural numbers. Shapiro dubs his view
ante rem structuralism after the ancient view of universals which holds that
universals exist independently of any particular instantiation, just as struc39

Shapiro offers the following example
Let P be the conjunction of the second-order axioms for Peano arithmetic
and let G be a standard Gödel sentence that states the consistency of P .
By the incompleteness theorem, P & ¬G is consistent, but it has no models.
Indeed, because every model of P is isomorphic to the natural numbers, G is
true in all models of P . Clearly, P & ¬G is not a coherent implicit definition
of a structure, despite its deductive consistency. [76, p. 135]
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tures are taken to exist independently of whether there are any systems that
exemplify them (see [76, p. 9]).
Concerns raised about certain features of Shapiro’s program will for the
most part be ignored here, as our focus here will be solely on those aspects of
Shapiro’s program that involve explicit rejection of some of the central tenets
of the AFCS program. A first such concern that needs to be addressed involves Shapiro claims concerning the view he calls eliminative structuralism:
a structuralist view which acknowledges only the legitimacy of talk of systems
of some sort, avoiding the reification of structures and avoiding the “placesare-objects” perspective. The AFCS program is of this sort. Furthermore,
Shapiro argues that eliminative structuralists are pushed to adopt ontological
assumptions in order to “make sense of a substantial part of mathematics”
[76, p. 86]. As the proponent of the AFCS view considers such ontological
assumptions to be misplaced if taken to be part of mathematics, it will be
necessary to reply to Shapiro’s arguments in support of this view.
Shapiro’s reason for concern about the ontological commitment required
by the eliminative structuralist involves the proposed interpretation of mathematical theorems as involving (implicit) quantification over systems. If Φ is
a sentence in the language of arithmetic, for example, “2 + 3 = 5”, then
According to eliminative structuralism, Φ amounts to something
in the form:
(Φ0 ) for any system S, if S exemplifies the natural-number structure, then Φ[S],
where Φ[S] is obtained from Φ by interpreting the nonlogical terminology and restricting the variables to the objects in S. If the
background ontology is finite, then there are no systems that exemplify the natural-number structure, and so Φ0 and (¬Φ)0 are
both true. Because mathematics is not vacuous, this is unacceptable. [76, p. 86]
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This concern is also presented earlier in [76], where Shapiro claims that
. . . eliminative structuralism requires a background ontology to
fill the places of the various structures. Suppose, for example,
that there are only finitely many objects in the universe. Then
there are no natural-number systems, and every sentence in the
language of arithmetic turns out to be true. For example, the
above rendering of “2 + 3 = 5” [as a conditional in the form of
Φ0 ] is true because there are no natural-number systems, but the
renderings of “2 + 3 = 0” and “2 + 3 6= 5” are also true. If
the background ontology is not big enough, then mathematical
theories will collapse into vacuity. [76, p. 9]
This concern is echoed in Parsons [66], who also uses this line of argument
to illustrate a seemingly fatal problem for eliminative structuralism. Taking
a formula like Φ0 to give the “canonical” representation of a mathematical
theorem of arithmetic,
. . . on the eliminative reading, if there are no simply infinite systems, then for any [natural number system] N, 0, S the statement. . . giving the ‘canonical form’ of an arithmetic statement A
is vacuously true. But then both A and ¬A have true canonical
forms, which amounts to the inconsistency of arithmetic. [66,
p. 310]
The proponent of the AFCS program does not take the program to be in
any way dependent on the number of objects in the universe, much less a
program that leads to an inconsistent arithmetic!
The obvious response to these concerns involves a discussion of the notion
of a system or model of a collection of axioms, such as the Peano axioms (in
either their first– or second-order formulation). Recall that the proponent of
the AFCS version aims to remain neutral on questions concerning models.
Are they sets? Are there many of them? Do any of them “contain” infinitely
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many elements? All of these questions are treated on the AFCS program as
questions concerning not mathematics proper, but the application of mathematics. In keeping with this view, the proponent of the AFCS program treats
such claims about models of the Peano axioms as not involving quantification
over models, but instead treats talk of models as schematic. This is related
to the failure of mathematical theorems, read as conditional and schematic,
to be true. These key aspects of the AFCS program will be explored in more
detail in Chapter 4.
For present purposes, it suffices to note that the proponent of the AFCS
program speaks of systems or models as Benacerraf suggests: “without any
special concern about whether there are or could be any” such entities [12,
p. 185]. If indeed there were no models of the axiomatic systems that characterize the subject matter of the various branches of mathematics—if there
are no groups, no ω-sequences, no topological spaces, it would indeed be
remarkable, but that would be a concern for the physicist and the applied
mathematician, not for the pure mathematician, nor for the proponent of the
AFCS program. The proponent of the AFCS program denies that mathematical theorems typically involve vacuous antecedents, while refraining from affirming that there are models that satisfy the antecedent specification. There
is simply no commitment to any ontological claims about models.
Shapiro, however, does take it to be necessary for his (foundational) program to account for an ontology of structures, and that is the role of his
structure theory, which stipulates the existence of certain key structures (via
an axiom of Infinity) and stipulates principles that allow for new structures to
be built up from others (via axioms like Replacement and “Powerstructure”)
(see Chapter 3 of [76]). “In effect, structure theory is a reworking of secondorder Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory” [76, p. 95]. It is curious that Shapiro’s
concern about the existence of mathematical systems can be addressed within
his own program by laying down an axiom that simply asserts the existence
of the structures (each of which also counts as a system) required! However,
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Shapiro’s metaphysical view (and other metaphysical views) can be accommodated on the AFCS program. Shapiro has no concerns about vacuity
because his structure theory asserts the existence of the structures he requires, a set theorist may happily assert that both the von Neumann finite
ordinals and the Zermelo finite ordinals establish that the Peano axioms have
a model, and Dedekind may be content to assert his thoughts suffice to show
the existence of ω-sequences. The nominalist may hesitate to commit to an
infinite totality, and some branches of mathematics may have no applications on the nominalistic conception. This is not to say that those branches
are any less “mathematical” than those accepted by the nominalist. A child
may refuse to eat vegetables, but that child cannot legitimately claim that
vegetables are not food, or that recipes for ratatouille have no place in a
cookbook.
There is, however, another response to the problem identified by Shapiro,
and that is to note that the canonical representation Φ0 does not quite capture all aspects of the AFCS program (or, presumably, other eliminative
structuralist programs). The relationship between the antecedent and the
consequent in a conditional taken to correspond to a mathematical theorem is not captured solely by the truth-functional behaviour of the material
conditional—the antecedent is meant to be related to the consequent by the
availability of a proof. The difference is rather like that of the following two
sentences of first-order logic
1. ∀x((F x ∧ Gx) → F x), and
2. ∀x((F x ∧ Gx) → ¬F x).
An interpretation I of the first-order language may be such that no elements
x in the universe of the interpretation satisfy Gx, and so both statements are
“true-in-I”. However, formula 1 will easily be recognized as having a feature
that distinguishes it from formula 2: formula 1 is a first-order theorem,40
40

Here the logical framework has been left unspecified, but this particular theorem holds
in, for example, classical and intuitionistic logic. The distinctions between systems will be
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while formula 2 is not. Thus, considering, for example, a system of firstorder classical logic, we have
` ∀x((F x ∧ Gx) → F x), but
0 ∀x((F x ∧ Gx) → ¬F x).
A (semantic) proof of ∀x((F x ∧ Gx) → ¬F x) would require that, for any
interpretation and any a in the associated universe of discourse, if F a ∧ Ga
holds, then so does ¬F a. All—except possibly the dialethic logician—would
hold such a circumstance to be impossible. Formula 1 can be asserted (perhaps as a schematic conditional, “For any properties F and G. . . ”) not solely
because of its truth-conditional behaviour, but because of the availability of
a proof. Formula 2 does not share this feature, and its assertibility depends
on the particular properties taken to be represented by F and G, along with
the features of the objects in the universe of discourse.
While the proponent of the AFCS program aims not to identify a single,
privileged framework in which to prove theorems, we may nevertheless abuse
the turnstile notation41 to observe that, again taking Φ to stand for the
sentence “2 + 3 = 5”, the theorem is characterized on the AFCS view as
` (if N  PA then N  Φ),

(2.7)

and a rather unremarkable proof suffices to establish this result. However,
we do not have
` (if N  PA then N  ¬Φ).
In order to obtain this result, one would need either a proof that models of the
Peano axioms are impossible (for example, if the Peano axioms were inconsistent), or a proof that Φ fails in all models of the Peano axioms. As neither
Shapiro nor Parsons provide such a result, even the eliminative structuralist
of no consequence here.
41
Here the turnstile is used to indicate provability simpliciter, without the specification
of a proof system. Provability will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
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seems to have available a consistent arithmetic. Note that using the standard
model-theoretic notation (though continuing to abuse the turnstile), we can
express (2.7) as
` (PA  Φ),
(2.8)
and so we might more succinctly express our reply as noting that the AFCS
program takes the conditional expressions corresponding to mathematical
theorems as meta-theoretic, involving the notion of entailment rather than
the notion of implication.
A further aspect of Shapiro’s system that bears on the AFCS program
concerns his treatment of the structuralist perspectives identified in Section 2.1.1. Shapiro makes a number of remarks that clearly indicate his
endorsement of these perspectives. The “particular elements of a system
don’t matter” perspective is reflected in his remark that “. . . anything at
all can “be” 2—anything can occupy that place in a system exemplifying
the natural-number structure. The Zermelo 2 ({{∅}}), the von Neumann 2
({∅, {∅}}), and even Julius Caesar can each play that role” [76, p. 80]. That
“the particular system doesn’t matter” perspective (and his recognition of
the importance of the notion of isomorphism) is reflected in his remark that
No matter how it is to be articulated, structuralism depends on a
notion of two systems that exemplify the “same” structure. That
is its point. Even if one eschews structures [treated as objects]
themselves, we still need to articulate a relation among systems
that amounts to “have the same structure.” [76, p. 90]
As remarked above, in Shapiro’s structure theory he takes isomorphic
structures (structures1 ) to be identical (although systems that exhibit that
same structure2 are not identified). Do structures (in the sense of structures1
here) have all the same structural properties? Certainly they do given Shapiro’s
identification of isomorphic structures—isomorphic structures share the same
properties because they are, in virtue of the isomorphism, identical. The
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same is not to be said of isomorphic systems, though, and Shapiro’s structure theory treats both systems and structures. Consider the “Subclass”
axiom, for example, which states that
If S is a structure and c is a subclass of the places of S, then
there is a structure isomorphic to the system that consists of c
but with no relations and functions. [76, p. 94]
While Shapiro does not give a completely formalized presentation of the
axioms of his structure theory, axioms such as “Powerstructure” involve settheoretic notions. The “Powerstructure” axiom asserts
Let S be a structure and s its collection of places. Then there is
a structure T and a binary relation R such that for each subset
s0 ⊆ s there is a place x of T such that ∀z(z ∈ s0 ≡ Rxz). [76,
p. 94]
Thus, structure theory treats both structures and systems, where a system
may be isomorphic to, but distinct from, the structure it exemplifies. Of
note, within structure theory the systems are “constructed” out of the places
of structures. As Shapiro explains,
Because structures, places, relations, and functions are the only
items in the ontology [of structure theory], everything else must
be constructed from those items. Thus, a system is defined to be
a collection of places from one or more structures, together with
some relations and functions on those places. For example, the
even-number places of the natural-number structure constitute a
system, and on this system, a “successor” function could be defined that would make the system exemplify the natural-number
structure. The “successor” of n would be n + 2. Similarly, the
finite von Neumann ordinals are a system that consists of places
in the set-theoretic hierarchy structure, and this system also exemplifies the natural-number structure [76, p. 93–94]
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Now we find exactly the ingredients of the problem faced in developing versions of the structuralist program in membership-based set theory—
there is a difficulty in articulating the notion of a structural property. Structure theory permits structures (structures1 ) and distinct isomorphic systems.
Their being isomorphic is important because the isomorphism ensures that
they have all the same properties of interest—the structural (in the sense of
structure2 ) properties. But which are those?
Given the finite von Neumann ordinals, the Subclass axiom suggests that
there are systems A = {1} and B = {2} (and, as a consequence of that
axiom, a single structure isomorphic to both). The language of set theory
(in particular, the membership relation appearing in the “Powerstructure”
axiom) permits the construction of the formula
Φ(x) =df ∀y(y ∈ x → ∃!z(z ∈ y)),
shown in Section 2.5, which does not involve constants or parameters but
which serves to distinguish isomorphic systems A and B, and which therefore
counts as non-structural. The problems of the set-theoretic approach, then,
seem to have been inherited by the structure theory proposed by Shapiro. If
isomorphic systems (structures1 among them) are interchangeable in virtue
of their exhibiting the same properties of interest, why use a language that
serves to carve out their irrelevant properties?

2.6.2

Hellman’s Modal Structuralism

In [76] Shapiro identifies a third alternative to the eliminative and ante
rem varieties of structuralism: modal structuralism. Like eliminative structuralism, modal structuralism avoids commitment to a realm of structures
(structures1 ) or, indeed, to any special class of objects particular to mathematics. However, unlike the eliminative programs, the modal program is
committed to asserting the possibility of there being systems that exemplify
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certain of the key mathematical structures. Shapiro holds that the modal
structural option fares better than eliminative programs like AFCS, in at
least the respect that “there is an attenuated threat of vacuity” [76, p. 10],
given that the modal translations of sentences of, for example, arithmetic
come out to something of the form “In every possible natural-number system. . . ”, and so are vacuous not merely in the case that natural-number
systems fail to exist, but are vacuous only in the case that such systems are
impossible.
The most detailed account of modal structuralism is given in Hellman’s
Mathematics Without Numbers [35]. Interestingly, Hellman’s program is not
obviously a foundational program according to the criteria of Section 1.3.2.
On the “realist” view that Hellman proposes, mathematical theorems are
taken to be true, and objectively so: “mathematical discourse is understood
as consisting of statements or propositions that have determinate truth value,
independent of our minds” [35, p. 2]. In accordance with this view, Hellman
does explicitly aim to satisfy the second criterion for a foundational program,
in that “a philosophical interpretation of mathematics ought to admit of an
extension that reasonably accounts for how we come to know or justify that
mathematics which we can reasonably be claimed to know or be capable of
knowing” [35, p. 3].
With respect to the first criterion, Hellman aims to tackle a project whose
origins he attribute to Putnam42 , which Hellman describes as aiming
. . . to develop explicit translation patterns of mathematical theories into suitable modal theories—capable of standing independently of set theory—and then to justify these as “equivalent for
mathematical purposes.” Like structuralism, the idea of “mathematics as modal logic” has remained at the level of some seemingly promising suggestions, but it has not been developed even
to the point at which a serious philosophical assessment would
42

Hellman cites Putnam’s view as presented in [67].
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become possible. One of our goals in what follows has been to
remedy this situation. [35, p. 8]
Thus Hellman’s program is, in some respects, like that proposed in Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics ([73], see Section 1.4.2) insofar as it
locates mathematics within a type of logic: modal logic in Hellman’s program, the theory of classes in Russell’s. Hellman may thus be considered to
aim at satisfying the first criterion for a foundational program: mathematics
is identified, identified as a part of a system of (second-order) modal logic.
Of course, some axioms adopted in Hellman’s framework explicitly assert
principles (for example, one asserts the “logico-mathematical” possibility of
an ω-sequence), that are not offered as purely logical truths. Like Russell,
Hellman does not aim at a clear separation between mathematics and logic.
As Hellman clarifies,
. . . in employing the phrase “second-order logic”, we are referring
to a well-known notation and its metatheory; we are not committed to the view that it is “genuine logic”. Nor are we committed
to any particular way of drawing a line between logic and mathematics. As we see it, structuralism does not need to draw such
a line. [35, p. 21]
Thus, while reluctant to draw a line between mathematics and logic, unlike
Russell, Hellman does not explicitly adopt the view that mathematical theorems can be characterized as logical truths. Indeed, it is the modal notion that
features in Hellman’s program that most clearly prevents such an identification. In the presentation of [35] the (primitive) modal notion is itself a partly
mathematical notion—a “logico-mathematical modality” [35, p. 15]—and so
any specification of the modal framework (prior to the introduction of axioms
explicitly postulating the possibility of ω-sequences, complete ordered fields,
etc.) may be thought to already embed mathematical content. Mathematics,
then, is not reduced to modal logic; rather, mathematics is already a part
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of the modal framework employed. Interestingly, in later writings Hellman
drops the “mathematico-” qualification, describing the strategy as involving
“taking a logical modality as primitive” [36, p. 103], and similarly, involving
the “use of a primitive modal operator, for (second-order) logical possibility” [37, p. 198]. Thus, Hellman’s more recent approach leaves open the
possibility of defending his program as a sort of contemporary “modal logicism”, although Hellman does note that in some cases—like that of modal
set theory—“the assumption of logical possibility is a reasonable working
hypothesis” [37, p. 204], and so not likely to be defended as a logical truth.
More difficult to assess, though, is whether Hellman’s program accounts
for the truth of a mathematical theorem via the mechanisms of “naming,
predication, satisfaction, and quantification”. Hellman aims at developing a
theory that is nominalistically acceptable, and the second-order quantifiers
and the modal language he requires both need to be given nominalistically
acceptable readings. Hellman notes that he wants
. . . to avoid literal quantification over abstract structures, possible worlds, or intensions, in order to provide a genuine alternative to objects-platonism [which involves commitment to abstract
(mathematical) objects], in which literal reference to such objects
is eliminated [35, p. 16]
It is useful to outline the key methods of Hellman’s program in order
to identify the features he hopes will avoid “literal reference” to abstract
objects.43 As Hellman explains (here discussing the special case of natural
number arithmetic),
Beginning with the standard Peano-Dedekind axioms for the natural numbers, P A2 , involving just successor, 0 , and the secondorder statement of mathematical induction, we treat an arbitrary
43

Abstract objects of the sort that feature so prominently in Shapiro’s program.
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sentence S of first– or second-order arithmetic (in which any function constants have been eliminated by means of definitions in
terms of 0 ) as elliptical for the modal conditional
∀X∀f [∧P A2 → S]X (0 /f ),
in which a unary function variable f replaces 0 throughout and
the superscript X indicates relativization of all quantifiers to the
domain X. This is a direct, modal, second-order statement to
the effect that ‘S holds in any model of P A2 there might be’. [36,
p. 105]
To this translation scheme for sentences of natural number arithmetic, Hellman adds a modal existence postulate,44
♦∃X∃f [P A2 ]X (0 /f ),
asserting the possibility of an ω-sequence. Real analysis and Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory are given an analogous treatment in [35]: a translation scheme is
provided, along with a modal existence postulate of the relevant sort.
The key, then, to Hellman’s avoiding commitment to abstract objects it
taken to lie in the modal element of his program. When Hellman provides
the translation of the modal conditional for a mathematical theorem, say S
of natural number arithmetic, the necessity operator distinguishes between
the intended ‘S holds in any model of P A2 there might be’ as distinct from
the (non-modal) ‘S holds in any model of P A2 there (actually) is’. While
this manoeuvre may avoid explicit commitment to ω-sequences and other
mathematical entities, there is the additional concern about the second-order
machinery: does second-order logic commit one to an ontology of sets, or
set-like entities over which the second-order quantifiers range? Here Hellman
Exponentiation with respect to X and the substitution of f for 0 are as in the translation scheme.
44

CHAPTER 2. STRUCTURES AND STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES

73

goes on to develop a sophisticated program that involves an appeal to the
notions of plural quantification 45 and mereology, the details of which will not
concern us here.46
Granting Hellman’s claim to have provided a nominalistically acceptable
way of reading the second-order quantifiers, what of the modal notion employed? As Burgess and Rosen observe, a nominalist who appeals to modalities as a way of avoiding reference to abstract objects must defend “primitivism”, the “acceptance of modal logical distinctions [involving possibility
and necessity] as undefined” [16, p. 124]. The modal structuralist who is also
a nominalist cannot give the necessity and possibility operators an interpretation involving non-actual possible worlds, and the possibilia (possible, but
non-actual objects) that inhabit such non-actual worlds. Causally isolated
from us and abstract by any account, one can hardly think of a better example of exactly the sort of entity to which the nominalist wishes to avoid
commitment! Similarly, Hellman wishes to avoid any dependence on a prior
theory of sets, given that the modal machinery he develops is going to be used
to show, among other things, how a nominalistically acceptable set theory
can be developed. Hellman, aware of these concerns, notes in his discussion
of modal set theory that
. . . possibilia are not recognized as objects. . . we do not quantify
over possible worlds or intensions; we simply use modal operators. . .
We are accustomed to giving set-theoretical semantics for modalities, and for a variety of logical purposes this is perfectly in order.
But the msi [modal structural interpretation] of set theory, while
aiming to respect such semantics as part of set theory, nevertheless, requires that its notion of logical possibility stand on its
own. It functions as a primitive notion, and must not be thought
45
46

The notion of plural quantification is developed in Boolos [13].
See, e.g., [35, 36].
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of as requiring a set-theoretical semantics in order for it to be
intelligible. Instead, of course, we may give modal axioms. [35,
p. 59–60]
Despite the prospects of having outlined a nominalistically acceptable
modality for his purposes, in so doing Hellman has blocked himself off from
an account of the truth of mathematical theorems using the “referential”
semantic apparatus called for in the third foundational criterion identified in
Section 1.3.2. Hellman’s noministically-motivated need to treat the modal
notion as primitive requires, for example, that the modal existence postulate
♦∃X∃f [P A2 ]X (0 /f )
is not simply understood as a claim about objects in an accessible possible
world, true because entities among the possibilia satisfy the matrix of existentially quantified expression. The possible world account of the modal terms
is unavailable to the nominalist, and so the reading of the modal existence
postulate as true in virtue of such (possibly non-actual) entities is unavailable. Given its set-theoretic characterization, a Kripke-style semantics is also
unavailable. In virtue of the necessarily primitive modality, Hellman’s modal
structuralist program cannot account for the truth of mathematical theorems
appealing only to the resources Benacerraf identifies in [11].
Here the proponent of the AFCS program can simply agree with Hellman’s remark that “modal primitives for mathematics are problematic” [37,
p. 205]. Of course, the AFCS program itself fails to count as a foundational
program according to the criteria of Section 1.3.2, and so it provides little
grounds for criticism! As was the case when considering Shapiro’s ante rem
structuralist program, our concern here will be to consider any of Hellman’s
claims that conflict with the principles of the AFCS program, and to consider
the extent to which Hellman’s program adequately captures the notion of a
structural property.

CHAPTER 2. STRUCTURES AND STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES

75

Among the most obvious differences between the AFCS and modal structuralist programs is the appeal to a (primitive) modality. Hellman does not
argue explicitly for the view that modal notions should be invoked in accounting for our understanding of mathematical theorems, instead he takes
up the view that “mathematics is the free exploration of structural possibilities, pursued by (more or less) rigorous deductive means” [35, p. 6], and
then proceeds to argue that such a view satisfies certain of his desiderata
concerning philosophical accounts of mathematics. Some of the desiderata
clearly point toward what is here considered a foundational program: accounting for the a priori, objective truth of mathematical theorems, etc. As
such, these features of the program are of little interest to the proponent of
AFCS, who aims to offer a similarly structured argument: given the AFCS
account of mathematics, treating theorems as schematic and conditional in
form, assertible rather than true, etc., is anything further required?47
However, the modal structuralist48 and the proponent of the AFCS program do both aim at an eliminative structuralism; one that does not involve
commitment to actual structures (structures1 ). Save for the modal operator,
the “hypothetical component”49 bears some resemblance to that suggested
on the AFCS proposal, but the AFCS proposal does not endorse any principle
resembling what Hellman terms the “categorical component” of his translation scheme: the claim that a system of the relevant sort is possible.50 What,
then, is the role of this categorical component?
As Hellman explains, the categorical component corresponds to “an indispensable “working hypothesis” of underlying mathematical practice” [35,
p. 27]: given such a categorical assumption in the modal reconstruction of
47

And of those features which may be prima facie thought required, can they in fact be
provided?
48
Hellman’s modal structuralism is the only modal view considered here, and so the
references to modal structuralism can be assumed to refer to Hellman’s program.
49
The hypotheticals in question are the conditionals of which ∀X∀f [∧P A2 → S]X (0 /f )
is one example.
50
Here, ♦∃X∃f [P A2 ]X (0 /f ) is one example.
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mathematics, one can view the categorical component as corresponding to a
step in, for example, a proof in arithmetic: informally put, “Assume an ωsequence” [35, p. 27]. Of course, such an informal claim might also be taken
to correspond to an assumption that begins a conditional proof, discharged
when the conditional itself is introduced. However, Hellman offers another
reason for adopting categorical claims of this sort, and it has a now familiar
form:
. . . a categorical assumption to the effect that “ω-sequences are
possible” is indispensable and of fundamental importance. Without it, we would have a species of “if-thenism”, i.e. a modal
if-thenism, and this would be open to quite decisive objections,
analogous to those which can be brought against a naı̈ve, nonmodal if-then interpretation. . . the very same situation would obtain in the case of modal conditionals if ω-sequences were not
possible, i.e. if there could (logically) be no standard realization of the PA2 axioms. . . In that case, the translation scheme
would not respect negation: all the original sentences A would be
translated as true. Thus, it is absolutely essential to affirm, categorically, an appropriate version of [the categorical component
for ω-sequences] [35, p. 26–27]
To the familiar problem, then, the familiar solution. Again we note that the
proponent of the AFCS program takes the analogous conditionals to involve
reference to models, and so the conditional is at the level of the metatheory,
involving the notions of model, interpretation, and satisfaction. The necessitated, universally quantified conditional in the hypothetical component of the
modal structuralist program corresponds to a non-modal, schematic, metatheoretic conditional on the AFCS program. Again, entailment rather than
implication is involved, and the schematic element—reflecting a deliberate
neutrality on the status of models—prevents51 treatment of the conditional
51

As will be discussed in the coming chapters.
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as true.
In developing the modal approach Hellman comes to advocate, he does
consider (quite early on in his discussion, which may hint at the “naturalness”
of such an approach), an attempt to render the hypothetical component of
his translation procedure using notions invoked in the AFCS translation.
Hellman offers this move as one way to address the concern to “respect the
full, classical truth-determinateness of the mathematical theory [arithmetic
at this stage] in question” [35, p. 16]. Then,
. . . one way of accomplishing this would be simply to use the
language of set theory, since we know how to express both “ωsequence” and “satisfies” in terms of set membership; (1.1) [the
natural language expression of the hypothetical component] could
then be made precise by
∀X(X  ∧PA2 ⊃ X  S),
. . . One disadvantage of this choice is that the translates all become metalinguistic, and this is surely an awkwardness, if not a
fatal misrepresentation of arithmetic discourse. But even more
serious is the problem that the structuralist programme, so articulated, becomes just a piece of modal set theory. . . [35, p. 18]
Hellman holds that branches of mathematics like natural number arithmetic
should be capable of a development independent of set theory, and the proponent of the AFCS program is sympathetic to this view. However, one might
note that talk of models or satisfaction need not be given a set-theoretic treatment. This line of thought will be pursued in Chapter 3. Further, it seems
that a structuralist might naturally adopt this metalinguistic translation as
exactly in keeping with the modal structural program: Hellman endorses the
characteristic structuralist slogan—“Any ω-sequence will do” [35, p. 18]—
and what is an ω-sequence if not a model of the (full, second-order) Peano
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axioms? In avoiding model-theoretic notions, Hellman instead represents the
Peano axioms and their “models” directly in the modal, second-order language of his chosen framework, exploiting the second-order machinery that
permits quantified variables ranging over functions and those ranging over
predicates, along with the possibility of using relativized quantifiers.
As established in the preceding section, the proponent of the AFCS program can avoid commitment to actual or possible ω-sequences, and still avoid
the threat of vacuity. Appealing to a schematic, meta-theoretic rendering of a
mathematical theorem, neither assumptions concerning the actual existence
or the possible existence of mathematical objects are required to avoid the
threat of vacuity. Of course, this will be seen to come at the cost of treating mathematical theorems as true, but subsequent chapters may suffice to
allay any concerns on that point. In disallowing meta-theoretic notions in
the modally bound, quantified conditionals of Hellman’s hypothetical components, Hellman does indeed require the categorical assumptions to guard
against vacuity. But are ω-sequences possible? Are any infinite collections
possible? Can an adequate account of mathematics avoid even these seemingly modest ontological claims?52
Turning now to the role of category theory in articulating those insights
of the structuralist view, Hellman has been a vocal opponent of the suitability of category-theoretic approaches to structuralism [38, 40]. Many of
Hellman’s objections are raised against category theory as part of a foundational program, and as such those objections will not be considered here.
Others (for example, dealing with the notions required in order to understand
category theory) will be taken up in later chapters. For the moment, then,
we turn to consider the treatment of structural properties available on the
52

In Hellman’s appeal to mereology, from which he is able to derive claims like the
categorical component for arithmetic, Hellman is driven to assert a mereological axiom
of infinity, an assertion concerning the possibility of infinitely many individuals. We are
then left to wonder with Hellman: “What sort of evidence can we have for the various
modal-existence postulates arising in mathematics. . . ?” [39, p. 556].
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modal structuralist program.
That Hellman acknowledges the importance of the relation between isomorphic systems and the preservation of structural properties is clear: the
system Hellman proposes suffices for the derivation of a categoricity theorem53 for arithmetic—all “possible” ω-sequences are isomorphic—but Hellman goes on to note that
. . . one may be tempted to suppose that, in recovering the categoricity of PA2 , the structuralist has accomplished whatever could
reasonably be demanded by way of an internal justification for
the translation schemes. For (1.11) [the categoricity theorem] is
a direct way of saying, within the second-order framework, that
our axioms characterize a unique type of mathematical structure;
obviously, then, it does not matter “which one” we are “talking
about” when we are doing the mathematics of such structures.
Isn’t our justification complete?
It would be pleasant to conclude this, but overly sanguine. For,
while the inference just drawn from (1.11) may indeed be intuitively obvious, really it demands a proof. For the inference
pertains to language used to describe the structures, viz. the
sentences of L(PA); yet (1.11) itself says nothing about these
sentences. And, remember, it is a translation scheme—a representation of sentences of a given mathematical language—that is
to be justified. There is thus a further step, from categoricity to
a claim involving language, that needs to be taken. [35, p. 40]
Thus, Hellman is led to produce his Elementary Equivalence Theorem (see
[35, p. 41]) a modal analogue of the Structural Properties Theorem for ω53

We return now to using the term “categorical” to describe axiomatic systems for which
all models are isomorphic.
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sequences: roughly, all ω-sequences exhibit the same structural properties.54
However, any optimism this result may encourage is short-lived, as axioms for
categorical systems (natural number systems and the system of real numbers,
being two prominent, important examples) are the exception rather than
the rule. Groups, fields, topological spaces, and so on, are decidedly noncategorical in their axiomatic presentations, and constitute an important part
of contemporary mathematics. What of their structural properties?
One might expect here that, given the reconstruction of ZF set theory
in the modal framework, the mathematical objects of the various branches
of mathematics might be recovered in this modal set theory, and so the
argument that the language of set theory is ill-suited to the structuralist
program would carry over to the modal structural program. Such a view is
encouraged by Hellman’s remark that
. . . set theory represents both a great opportunity and a challenge
to the [modal structural] approach; an opportunity since, as is
well known, so much mathematics can be represented within set
theory. In so far as set theory yields to a ms [modal structural]
treatment, so does all set-theoretically representable mathematics. (Thus, model theory—of special interest to logicians, but
not directly representable in the second-order framework of the
msi [modal structural interpretation]—would become available,
at least indirectly.) [35, p. 53–54]
However, Hellman seems to deny this view in later work, noting that in his
Mathematics Without Numbers
. . . it was left open how to treat generally some of the most important structures or spaces in mathematics, e.g., metric spaces,
topological spaces, differentiable manifolds, and so forth. This
54

The categorical version of this theorem presented by McLarty in [61], explicitly concerned with natural number structures, is a particularly good category-theoretic match
for Hellman’s result.
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may have left the impression that such structures would have to
be conceived as embedded in models of set theory, whose modalstructural interpretation depends on a rather bold conjecture,
e.g., the logical possibility of full models of the second-order ZF
axioms. [36, p. 100]
Perhaps, then, such structures are to be conceived as independent of any
set-theoretic reconstruction55 , instead treated in the manner of ω-sequences:
translate the axioms and theorems into necessitated, quantified second-order
conditionals, and adopt a possible existence postulate. For non-categorical
theories like group theory, such an approach is clearly inadequate: asserting
the possibility of a group doesn’t satisfy the modal structuralist’s concern
about vacuity. Is the assumed group Abelian? If not, theorems about Abelian
groups collapse into vacuity. Is the assumed group finite? If not, theorems
concerning finite groups collapse into vacuity. It seems then, we must assume
a group for every (group) isomorphism type in order to secure the standard
group theoretic results, and, moreover, since such results often concern claims
about all groups (for example, their each being isomorphic to some group
of permutations), we are pushed to assume them “simultaneously”, as it
were. On a standard model-theoretic account in a set theory like ZF, even
assuming a single group for each isomorphism type would involve a proper
class of (possible) groups—quite a number of objects to assume!
It seems, then, that a recovery of branches of mathematics involving noncategorical axiomatic presentations within Hellman’s program does require a
retreat to model theory, a model theory recovered via the modal structural
treatment of set theory.56 As these are typically “membership-based” theories, we arrive once more at the uncomfortable position in which isomorphic
objects (groups, etc.) can be distinguished in the set-theoretic language,
55

A point of agreement with the AFCS program.
The theories which are treated in Hellman’s [36] are treated in higher-order analysis,
and so built up from, e.g., sets of sets of reals. Algebraic theories such as those at issue
here are not discussed.
56
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while such distinctions are deemed, on the structuralist view, to be irrelevant. Why take on this extra baggage? One might expect, here, that a modal
structural recovery of a “function-based” set theory, like that of ETCS, may
offer a way out, and this is indeed an interesting possibility. However, granting that the threat of vacuity is not threatening on the AFCS view, one might
want to continue exploring an option that does not enter into the difficulties
faced by an appeal to a primitive modality.
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Chapter 3
Definitions and Primitive
Notions
. . . it will be found, in what follows, that the definitions are what
is most important, and what most deserves the reader’s prolonged
attention. [74, p. 12]
. . . nothing in the axioms says functions are not ducks [61, p. 491]
There are at least two senses in which one might speak of fundamental
mathematical notions:1
1. notions that play a central role within mathematics (such as the notions
of a limit or a field ), and
2. notions required in order to understand those notions used within mathematics (possibly including, for example, the notions of a rule or a
property).
1
Here the term “notion” is used in approximately the sense of concept. The term
“notion” is used here to highlight the fact that the arguments of this chapter are taken to
be independent of any particular account of the nature of concepts.
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Determining whether a given notion falls into one or the other category may
not be a straightforward task, as some of the notions that play a central role
in mathematics are used (prima facie without change in meaning) outside
of mathematics proper. For example, of which sort is the notion of a set?
Is the informal, extra-mathematical notion required in order to understand
that notion codified in ZFC? Similarly, at least some notions of the second
sort will have to be taken as primitive, and it may be argued that certain
notions cannot properly be taken as such.
In identifying a framework for mathematics, one will either implicitly or
explicitly classify notions as being of one or the other sort, and some debates
relevant to the defence of category theory as a framework for mathematical
structuralism turn on issues related to exactly this project of classification.
Feferman, for example, has argued that on the view of the categorical structuralist one must inappropriately
presume as understood the ideas of operation and collection. . . at
each step we must make use of the unstructured notions of operation and collection to explain the structural notions to be studied.
It follows that a theory whose objects are supposed to be highly
structured and which does not explicitly reveal assumptions about
operations and collections cannot claim to constitute a foundation
for mathematics, simply because those assumptions are unexamined. [29, p. 150]
While Feferman is explicitly concerned with foundational programs, the scope
of his concern can be take to present a difficulty for frameworks more generally. One interpretation of Feferman’s critique, in light of the distinction between the two types of fundamental notions, is to view the categorical structuralist as having (perhaps unknowingly) wrongly classified the
notions of operation and collection: if they are notions of the first sort—
distinctly mathematical notions to be explained by a philosophical account
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of mathematics—it is a mistake to treat them as notions of the second sort.
Alternatively, Feferman may be content to class operation and collection as
notions of the second sort, but view it as inappropriate to take them as
primitive—given their seemingly essential role in developing the categorical
structuralist program, failing to provide a detailed account of those notions
may be considered a serious omission.
This chapter offers a response to Feferman’s concern, a response which
provides a background against which to later develop the schematic treatment of mathematical theorems offered on the AFCS program.

3.1

Models

Expanding on the concern about operations and collections, Feferman notes
that, for example,
. . . we say that a group consists of a collection of objects together with a binary operation satisfying such and such conditions. Next, when explaining the notion of homomorphism for
groups or functor for categories, etc., we must again understand
the concept of operation. . . The logical and psychological priority
if not primacy of the notions of operation and collection is thus
evident. [29, p. 150]
Thus, one can read Feferman’s concern as applying generally to axiomatic
definitions: given a collection of axioms, be they axioms taken to characterize
a group, ring, ordered field, etc., simply understanding the manner in which
such axioms are meant to serve as definitions requires a prior understanding
of operation and collection.
In developing a reply to Ferferman’s concern it will be necessary to first
clarify the intended sense of “logical” and “psychological” priority. In speaking of “logical priority” Feferman notes that “My use of ‘logical priority’
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refers. . . to order of definition of concepts, in the cases where certain of these
must be defined before others” [29, p. 152], whereas “psychological priority”
“has to do with the “natural order of understanding” [29, p. 152]. As Feferman grants that the notion of “psychological priority” is somewhat unclear,2
here we will only be concerned to deal with the claim involving “logical priority”.
The strategy of the AFCS program is to concede Feferman’s claim that
that definition of a category presupposes the notions of operation and collection, but to deny the claim that this presupposition is illegitimate. The
proponent of the AFCS program holds that the notions of operation and collection are so ubiquitous that any attempt to present a view that avoids the
presupposition of those notions is doomed to failure. For example, the mechanisms involved in understanding the truth of a proposition in some natural
language may plausibly be taken to presuppose both of these notions. Understanding that the statement “Everyone here likes the smell of freshly-brewed
coffee” is true can be taken to involve a number of such presuppositions.
Understanding that the statement comes out true is a given situation may
plausibly be taken to involve an operation, mapping the term “here” to some
location, as well as a collection, the people3 over which the quantifier is taken
to range. There may be an additional function invoked in accounting for the
role of the quantifier in this expression: the notion of a valuation, mapping
the variable ranging over people that figures in this expression to an element
of the collection of people that constitute the universe of discourse for this
expression. Indeed, the expression bound by the quantifier can be viewed
as a propositional function, yielding a proposition whenever the name of an
object in the universe of discourse is substituted into the open sentence cor2

In response to an objection from Mac Lane, Feferman concedes that psychological
priority “. . . is admittedly ‘fuzzy’ but not always ‘exceedingly’ so” [29, p. 152].
3
The interpretation could instead be taken to involve a collection of, for example,
objects in a room, in which case the proposition would then be relativised to a class of
people in the usual way.
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responding to the matrix of the quantified expression. One’s understanding
of the role of the quantifier in this expression could then be taken to proceed
via an appeal to the notion of a further operation, that corresponding to
substitution into a propositional function.
Of course, one might object that here we have merely described languagerelated understanding in terms of operation and collection, but we have not
argued against there being a necessary order of dependence. This much
may be conceded, but the example above should serve to indicate that the
extremely general notions of operation and collection easily transcend their
treatment in any theory specifically concerned with their use in mathematics,
and appealing to a prior understanding of these notions in developing a mathematical framework is as legitimate as appealing to a prior understanding of
some of the most general features of language.
The advocate of the AFCS program can be somewhat more specific about
those notions the program takes as primitive. In particular, the program
takes the notion of a model as primitive, and so presupposes any of those
notions necessary to understand the notion of a model. A model can be characterized in terms of the notion of an interpretation of some collection S of
statements in given formal language.4 An interpretation of a given formal
language is understood as involving a collection (the universe of discourse)
and some number of properties and relations defined on the universe of discourse, corresponding to predicate and relation symbols, respectively, of the
language. The interpretation of constant symbols or function symbols may
also be required, and each of which is taken to correspond to an element of
the universe of discourse or a function defined on the universe of discourse,
respectively. For a given collection S of statements in the formal language, a
model M of S consists of a universe of discourse, properties, relations, and
designated functions and elements of the universe of discourse, corresponding
4

While the first-order case is treated here, the type of formal language is left unspecified,
and additional clauses required to interpret higher-order vocabulary are to be added as
needed.
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to an interpretation in which each statement in S is true. Thus, the notion
of truth is also presupposed. On the AFCS view, a model is taken to be an
object, which may then legitimately serve as the referent of a singular term.
Of course, any reader familiar with the “standard” set-theoretic semantics for a first-order language will be familiar with these notions, and may
worry that they presuppose a considerable amount of set theory—itself a
prominent branch of mathematics, and so there may be a concern about circularity. Here, unfortunately, the categorical structuralist can offer little in
the way of a direct reply to this concern. The program takes as primitive
those notions—whatever they may be—required in order to understand that
“Everyone thinks highly of Palin” is a substitution instance of an expression
of the form “∀xHxp”, a statement which is true in a circumstance where the
quantifier is taken to range over all the people in a particular room, each of
whom happens to think highly of the individual named “Palin”. The “settheoretic” presuppositions fall short of requiring anything akin to the Axiom
of Infinity or the Axiom of Choice, and whatever fragment of the set-theoretic
machinery is, in fact, required in order to understand this notion of a model
is accepted as necessary.5 Prima facie, the “thinks highly of” relation does
not require any “extensional” account—involving a set of ordered pairs, for
example—in order to be correctly understood by a speaker of the English
language, and similarly it may be possible to dispense with some of the other
informal set-theoretic notions typically invoked when defining components
involved in the notion of a model. An interpretation of “F a” in which the
universe of discourse is taken to be the collection of all films, “F ” is taken
to be the property is a modern classic, and “a” represents the film Låt den
råtte komma in yields a model of “F a”, and any notions or principles involved in recognizing this situation to obtain are taken as primitive on the
AFCS program. Insofar as these notions are plausibly taken to be involved
in the more general understanding of any natural language, this element of
5

The set-theoretic notions required can be found in, e.g., §2.4 of [8].
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the AFCS program should be deemed unproblematic.

3.2

Category-Theoretic Definitions

The notion of a model of some set of axioms—like those that form the familiar
definition of a group—is taken to be primitive. In accordance with the view
developed in Chapter 2, such models are to be treated as objects in a category,
as the language of category theory has been shown to be particularly wellsuited to the structuralist’s focus on structural properties.
On this picture, then, the following two questions arise:
1. Which other models feature in the ambient (background) category?
2. Given a category of models, how can these models be manipulated to
yield other models of the same (or of a different) sort?
The deliberately lack of specificity inherent in taking the notion of a model
as primitive affords a great deal of flexibility in addressing this first question. In essence, the ambient category provides the context of the study of
the mathematical objects under consideration, and there are no restrictions
placed on contexts admitted as legitimate on the AFCS view. Consider again
the study of the mathematical notion of a group. The ambient category for
models of the group axioms may be that consisting of monoids as objects
and monoid homomorphisms as arrows, in which case the ambient category
contains objects which are not themselves models of the group axioms. Alternatively, the ambient category may be that containing (only) groups as
objects and group homomorphisms as arrows, where groups are, for example,
identified as sets in ZFC. As a third option, groups may instead be identified
themselves as categories,6 where the ambient category is taken to be that of,
6

A group can be defined as a category with one object for which every arrow is iso.
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for example, all small categories,7 with functors8 as arrows. In this latter
case again we have objects in the ambient category which are not models of
the axioms in question.

3.2.1

Products, Equalizers, and Coequalizers

In addressing the second question concerning the manipulation of objects
in a category, the suitability of the language of category theory to the expression of some of the principal techniques of mathematical definition becomes apparent. Take, for example, the notion of forming a product of two
mathematical objects. Considering first the Cartesian product of two sets
in a set-theoretic framework, one may proceed by defining, for example, the
Kuratowski ordered pair, where the ordered pair hx, yi =def {{x}, {x, y}}.
Given two sets A and B, their product, symbolized as A × B, can be defined
as {hx, yi|x ∈ A and y ∈ B}. Of course, other definitions of the ordered
pair are possible, for example, hx, yi =def {x, {x, y}}. For mathematical purposes, the choice between these alternative definitions of ordered pair is of
no consequence, as both exhibit the essential feature that
hx1 , y1 i = hx2 , y2 i ⇔ x1 = x2 and y1 = y2 .
The categorical treatment of the notion of a product is most naturally
expressed by means of a diagram. Given objects A and B, a product diagram
for A and B is an object P and arrows p1 and p2 (called projections)
Ao

p1

P

p2

/

B
j

h

such that, for any object T and arrows j and h with A ← T → B, there is a
7

A category is small provided its collection of arrows is a set.
Briefly, a functor F is a function between categories that maps objects to objects and
arrows to arrows while respecting domains, codomains, identities and composites. For
example, the F which appears in the Structural Properties Theorem is a functor.
8
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unique arrow u such that the diagram below commutes.
T
j

Ao




p1

P

u

h


p2

/

B

For two objects A and B in a category, there may be no product for A and
B, or any number of products. Given any two distinct products
p1

p2

q1

q2

A ← P → B and A ← Q → B
for objects A and B, it is a routine exercise to show that P and Q are necessarily isomorphic. As Awodey observes, “The categorical definition of a
product. . . is one of the first examples of category theory being used to give
a purely structural characterization of an important basic mathematical notion” [1, p. 220 ff]. In the present context, one might interpret Awodey’s
remark as highlighting the definition’s embodiment of the two structuralist
perspectives identified in Section 2.1.1. The particular elements of objects
A and B of a category are not explicitly involved in the definition of the
product, and, indeed, there may be no such elements. For example, the
category-theoretic definition of a product applies in the case where the category is a partially-ordered collection,9 in which case a product of two objects
A and B is the greatest lower bound of the two elements. Similarly, the
particular system—in this context, the particular product diagram—is of no
consequence, as, given a pair of elements A and B in a category, all products
for A and B are isomorphic.
When there is product diagram for objects A and B in a category it is
p1
p2
customary to denote a selected product diagram by A ← A × B → B, and,
j
h
given any diagram A ← T → B, the unique u : T → A × B will typically
9

Partially ordered collections can be treated as categories with an arrow from A to B
iff A ≤ B. See the discussion in Section 1.2.
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denoted by hj, hi. The commuting diagram in the definition of a product
then becomes
T
j



{

Ao

p1

hj,hi

A×B

h

p2

/

#

B

The definition of a product in a category is noteworthy for the following
feature:
. . . one and the same categorical definition describes also products
of topological spaces, groups, vector bundles on a smooth manifold, or whatever. The definition. . . provides a uniform, structural
characterization of a product of two objects in terms of their relations to other objects and morphisms [arrows] in a category,
in contrast to ‘material’ set-theoretic definitions which depend
on specific and often irrelevant features of the objects involved,
introducing unwanted additional structure. [1, p. 220]
Notice that the definition of the (Cartesian) product of two sets does not
extend directly to, for example, the product of two groups on the set-theoretic
definition of a group. In a set-theoretic framework, the Cartesian product of
the groups hG, ?i and hG0 , ?0 i is not an ordered pair, and so, a fortiori, not a
group.
Other standard techniques for providing definitions of mathematical objects can also be characterized in the language of category theory. Consider
the notion of an equationally defined subset, and the notion of the kernel
of a homomorphism. These notions are both generalized by the categorytheoretic notion of an equalizer. Given parallel arrows f, g : A → B (arrows
with the same domain and codomain), an arrow e : E → A equalizes f and
g provided f ◦ e = g ◦ e. Given such f, g, E, and e, the arrow e is an equalizer
for f and g provided e equalizes f and g, and for any h : T → A which
equalizes f and g, there is a unique u : T → E such that e ◦ u = h. That is, e
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is an equalizer for f and g provided, given any other arrow h that equalizes
f and g, there is a unique arrow u : T → E such that the following diagram
commutes.
T
u

h



E

e


/A

f
g

/

/

B

It is useful to consider the definition of an equalizer in the set-theoretic
case, in a category where the objects are sets and the arrows set functions.
For two functions f, g : A → B, a function h that equalizes f and g is one
whose range is contained in the set of elements a ∈ A such that f (a) = g(a).
Of course, a function that equalizes f and g may not map onto the entire set
{a|a ∈ A and f (a) = g(a)}; however, the “universal” condition on an equalizer e : E → A, ensures that any such equalizer is maximal in this sense. One
equalizer is given by taking E =def {a|a ∈ A and f (a) = g(a)} and taking e
to be the corresponding inclusion map e : E ,→ A. Of course, such equalizers
are not unique in this context; any set F in bijective correspondence with E
will yield another equalizer; if d : F → E is a bijection, then e ◦ d : F → A
is also an equalizer.
The dual of a category-theoretic statement is given by reversing arrows
(and so, reversing composites and exchanging domains/codomains). The
dual of the definition of an equalizer yields the definition of a coequalizer,
which can be considered a generalization of the notion of a quotient by an
equivalence relation. A coequalizer for a pair of parallel arrows f, g : A → B
is an arrow c : B → C such that c ◦ f = c ◦ g, and for any arrow h : B → H
such that h ◦ f = h ◦ g, there is a unique arrow u : C → H such that the
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following diagram commutes.
f

A
g

/
/

c

B
h

/

C
 

u

T

Again, it is useful to consider this definition in the context of a category
whose objects are sets and whose arrows are set functions. For a given
equivalence relation R defined over the elements of some set B (and so,
R ⊆ B × B), consider the two projections r1 : ha, bi 7→ a and r2 : ha, bi 7→ b,
with ri : R → B. The coequalizer for r1 and r2 is then c : B → B/R, with c :
b 7→ [b]R . In the context of a category of groups and group homomorphisms,
consider the coequalizer of any homomorphism f : G → H and the trivial
homomorphism g : G → H which maps every element of G to the identity
element of H. Letting K be the kernel of f , the function c : H → H/K is a
coequalizer of f and g.
In general, given parallel arrows f, g : A → B in a category of sets and
set functions, a coequalizer c : B → C for f and g can be constructed
by considering the equivalence relation ∼ on elements of B generated by
{hf (a), g(a)i|a ∈ A}.10 Take C = B/∼, and let c : B → C be defined by
c : b 7→ [b]∼ . For any a ∈ A we have f (a) ∼ g(a), and so [f (a)]∼ = [g(a)]∼ ,
i.e., (c ◦ f )(a) = (c ◦ g)(a). Thus we get c ◦ f = c ◦ g as desired. Now consider
any h : B → T such that h ◦ f = h ◦ g. Let u : C → T be defined by
u : [b]∼ 7→ h(b). It can be shown that u is well defined, and that u ◦ c = h.
As c is onto11 we also get that u is the unique function with the property
that u ◦ c = h. Thus, c is a coequalizer for f and g.
10

Note that B × B is an equivalence relation, and so the equivalence relation generated
is a subset of B × B, and is also such that elements not in the image of A through f nor
in the image of A through g are related only to themselves.
11
In categorical terms, c is epic.
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Elements and Subobjects

In considering examples of the products, equalizers, and coequalizers involving categories of sets and (set) functions, we have frequently appealed to
the notion of an element of an object, i.e., a member of a set. While the
category-theoretic treatment of products, equalizers, and coequalizers abstracts from—and so does not appeal to—the notion of an element of an
object, it is nevertheless possible to introduce this notion directly within the
language of category theory. The notation used in modified diagram of the
product,
T
j



{

Ao

p1

hj,hi

A×B

h

p2

/

#

B

is motivated by the method for recovering the notion of an element of an
object.
A terminal object in a category is an object A such that every object in
the category has exactly one arrow to A. In a category with sets as objects
and set functions as arrows, terminal objects correspond to singleton sets,
and it is useful to think of terminal objects as abstract singletons. A category
may have any number of terminal objects, and any two terminal objects are
isomorphic.12 Arrows from terminal objects are easily shown to be monic,13
and so the elements of a set S (viewed as an object in a category of sets) are in
one-to-one correspondence with the arrows from any terminal object to that
set. Since all terminal objects are isomorphic, it is customary to represent
a selected terminal object as 1, in which case the elements x ∈ S can be
identified with the arrows x : 1 → S. As the definition of a terminal object
12

The composite of the unique arrows between two terminal objects A and B is, without
loss of generality, the unique arrow f : A → A in the category, which must then be the
identity arrow for A.
13
See the definitions in Section 2.4.2.
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can be presented entirely in the language of category theory,14 categories that
have a terminal object, 1, allow elements of a object S to be identified with
arrows x : 1 → S.15
Not all categories have terminal objects, and some of those that do are
such that other features of the category prevent the arrows from terminal objects being treated as elements in the manner described above. A one-element
group is terminal in the category of groups and group homomorphisms, but
one-element groups are also initial objects. An initial object I is the dual
of a terminal object: every object A in the category has exactly one arrow
f : I → A from a given initial object. Clearly, then, terminal objects which
are also initial (called zero objects) do not stand in one-to-one correspondence
with the elements of an arbitrary object. Thus the elements of a group, in
the category of groups and group homomorphisms, cannot be identified with
arrows from a one-element group, as one-element groups are zero objects in
the category of groups and group homomorphisms.16
Of course, if one aims to treat elements of groups, it is possible to use the
language of category theory to provide an alternative definition of a group as
a type of object in an arbitrary category, and this method of defining a group
does allow elements of groups to be identified with arrows from a terminal
object. To accomplish this, is is useful to first introduce the notion of a
subobject. If A is an object in a category, then any monic arrow f : B → A
can be viewed as identifying a “part” of A. Monic arrows correspond to
injective functions in a category of sets and set functions, and the images
of such functions (and so, in this sense, the functions themselves) determine
14

See the examples at the end of Section 2.4.1.
In addition to elements in a category with domain 1, any arrow x : T → S can be
viewed as a generalized element of S, sometimes denoted x ∈T S. Arrows x : 1 → S
are sometimes called global elements. Henceforth, the notation x ∈ S will be used to
abbreviate global elements x ∈1 S.
16
While arrows from terminal objects in the category of groups and group homomorphisms don’t suffice for identifying the elements of a group G, the arrows from any group
isomorphic to the integers to G do suffice. See [55, p. 103–104].
15
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subsets of A. The treatment of arrows as subobjects may be viewed as a
natural generalization of this feature of injective functions. For an element
x : 1 → A and subobject i : B → A, x ∈ i provided x “factors through” i,
that is, when there exists an arrow j : 1 → B such that i ◦ j = x, i.e., such
that the following diagram commutes.
1

j

/


x

B


 

i

A

A relation of inclusion, ⊆, can be defined on subobjects i, j of a given object
A; if i : A  C 17 and j : B  C, i is included in j (represented as i ⊆ j)
provided there is an s : A → B such that the diagram below commutes.
A

s



i



C



/

B

j

Such an s is unique and monic. If both i ⊆ j and j ⊆ i, then i and j are
said to be equivalent (represented as i ≡ j), in which case their domains
are isomorphic. Note that the category-theoretic treatment of subobjects in
a “function-based” set theory differs in several ways from the treatment of
subsets in a “membership-based” theory like ZFC. In the category-theoretic
treatment, elements x : 1 → A are identified with their singletons, and
elements are not themselves objects, in particular, an object A in a category
is not an element of any other object. However, fundamental results, such as
the result that, if i ⊆ j, then for all x, x ∈ i ⇒ x ∈ j, are available.18
Relations, then, can be viewed as subobjects of the relevant product. A
binary relation defined over the elements of an object A is simply a monic
17

Henceforth, the usual convention of denoting a monic using an arrow with a “tail”,
, (both in diagrams and arrow descriptions), will be adopted.
18
Note that the converse may fail, and must be added as an additional axiom if needed.
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arrow r : R  A × A. Note that, for any elements x, y : 1 → A, the ordered
pair hx, yi is an element of A × A. Monic arrows from a product A × A to A
can be viewed as binary operations defined on (pairs of elements of) A.
With these category-theoretic notions to hand, we now return to explore
the characterization of a group as an object with associated arrows in a
category. Assuming the category to have a terminal object and products, an
object G of the category is a group provided there is an element e : 1 → G (the
identity element), an arrow m : G × G → G (the multiplication operation),
and an arrow ·−1 : G → G (the inverse operator), such that e is an identity
with respect to m, m is associative, and ·−1 yields an inverse for any element
of the group. All of the conditions on e, m, and ·−1 can be expressed via
commuting diagrams. Following the presentation of Chapter 3 of [60]19 , G is
a group provided each of the diagrams below commutes.20
G
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The commutativity of these diagrams corresponds to (proceeding clockwise from the upper left) e serving as a unit with respect to m, ·−1 mapping
an element to its inverse (again with respect to m), and the associativity
19

A similar treatment can be found in Chapter 4 of [3].
Here, !G : G → 1 is the (unique) arrow from G to the terminal object 1, and the
unlabelled arrow from G×(G×G) to (G×G)×G is an arrow that witnesses the associativity
of the product (such arrows exist for any finite product, and are iso).
20
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of m, respectively. Other algebraic structures (for example, rings) can be
treated analogously.
Thus, we see that it is possible to define a group as an object with associated arrows in any category with a terminal object and products for any pair
of objects. While the AFCS view does not require that groups be defined in
this (or any other) particular manner, this example serves to further illustrate some of the familiar definitions that can be cast entirely in the language
of category theory.

3.2.3

Natural Numbers and Beyond

Following McLarty’s treatment in [61] (which in turn draws on Lawvere’s
treatment in [49]), the collection of natural numbers can be characterized
as an object N in a category, taken along with arrows s : N → N (the
successor arrow) and 0 : 1  N (the zero arrow) such that N “supports
recursive definition”. That is, for any f : A → A, and q : 1  A, there is a
unique arrow u : N → A such that the following diagram commutes.
1 /

0



q

/N

s

/

u

N

 

A

f

/



u

A

Intuitively, u is the unique function on N defined by the recursion data q
and f , i.e., we set u(0) = q, and for (global) elements x of N we have
u(s(x)) = f (u(x)).
The ambient category in which natural number objects are typically identified has, in addition to the usual axioms of category theory,
1. an axiom positing the existence of a terminal object 1,
2. products, equalizers, and coproducts for each pair of objects,

CHAPTER 3. DEFINITIONS AND PRIMITIVE NOTIONS
i

100
i

1
2
3. an axiom of non-triviality, which gives that, where 1 →
1+1←
1 is a
coproduct diagram, the arrows i1 and i2 are distinct,21

4. an axiom that establishes the ambient category to be well-pointed (this
axiom is sometimes called “1 Generates”), which yields that subobjects
are determined by (global) membership,22 and,
5. an axiom which asserts the existence of a stable natural number object,
which is a natural number object that supports recursive definition with
parameters.23
All these axioms save the last are satisfied if the ambient category is a
type of category called a well-pointed topos, and in such a topos any natural
number object will be stable (though the existence of natural number objects
is independent of the axioms determining a well-pointed topos). A topos can
be roughly characterized as a category with properties akin to those of a
set theory like ZFC; “toposes are categories which allow the constructions
used in ordinary mathematics” [60, p. 6]. Toposes have proved a fruitful
topic of research, and are studied in detail in, e.g., [6, 60].24 For present
purposes, it suffices to note that all toposes have terminal objects, products
(and coproducts) for all pairs of objects, as well equalizers and coequalizers
for all parallel arrows.
For an ambient category that satisfies the axioms identified above, it
can be proved that a natural number object satisfies (suitably translated
21

Coproducts are the category-theoretic dual of products, and can be informally thought
of as an abstraction of the set-theoretic notion of a disjoint union.
22
For subobjects i and j of an object A, if i ⊆ j, then any x : 1 → A is such that
x ∈ i ⇒ x ∈ j, although the converse may fail. This axiom expresses the converse. Note
that subobjects in any category are always determined by generalized membership. (See
note 15.)
23
This last axiom of stability is required in order to allow for the standard inductive
definitions of addition and multiplication, which involve parameters.
24
Bell’s [6], in particular, highlights the close relationship between toposes and set theories in developing the formal systems of local set theory; toposes are shown to be (in a
sense that can be made precise) the natural models of local set theories.
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versions of) the Peano axioms, that any two natural number objects N, s, 0
and N 0 , s0 , 00 are isomorphic, that there are infinitely many natural number
objects, and, most importantly, that any two natural number objects have all
the same structural properties. This last result lies at the heart of McLarty’s
[61], and his argument for this result has been adapted to yield the Structural
Properties Theorem of Section 2.4.3.
The axioms above (and, a fortiori, the axioms for a well-pointed topos,
taken with the axiom stipulating the existence of a stable natural number
object), also permit the construction of other familiar number systems, in the
standard manner. As described in [62], one can use the definition of addition
for a given natural number object N along with the relevant products, to produce a pair of arrows f, g : (N × N ) × (N × N ) → N with f : hm, n, m0 , n0 i 7→
m+n0 , and g : hm, n, m0 , n0 i 7→ m0 +n. Taking an equalizer for this pair of arrows yields a subobject of s : S → (N × N ) × (N × N ), the elements of which
are ordered 4-tuples hm, n, m0 , n0 i with m+n0 = m0 +n. We can then consider
the two projections s1 , s2 : S → N × N , with s1 : hm, n, m0 , n0 i 7→ hm, ni and
s2 : hm, n, m0 , n0 i 7→ hm0 , n0 i. The coequalizer z : N × N → Z for arrows s1
and s2 then yields the integers, Z, as (N × N )/∼, where (a, b) ∼ (c, d) provided a + d = c + b, i.e., a − b = c − d. The existence of the relevant products,
equalizers, and coequalizers, is thus seen to permit the usual construction of
the integers from the natural numbers, and the rational numbers can be similarly constructed. The real numbers can be constructed by Dedekind cuts or
Cauchy sequences, although in some contexts the results are not equivalent.25

3.3

The Lens of Category Theory

As was the case with groups, the AFCS program does not require that the
natural numbers, rationals, reals, etc., be given the category-theoretic treat25

In [6] Bell establishes the result (attributed to Johnstone, see [44]) that “Dedekind
cuts within a local set theory need not be (conditionally) order-complete” [6, p. 226].
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ment described above, nor does it require they be given any other particular
account. Indeed, the related aspect of the AFCS proposal is simply that the
models of the axioms that define some type of system be treated as objects
within a category-theoretic framework, as the language of category theory has
been shown to effectively isolate the structural properties of any such objects.
There is no requirement that the models are categories, no requirement that
the models be defined in—or otherwise recovered in—a fixed, predetermined
category of some sort (for example, a well-pointed topos), and no requirement that the models belong to a particular, fixed collection of categories,
such as the collection of toposes.26
The aim in introducing the various category-theoretic methods of definition and demonstrating their use in constructing familiar mathematical
objects is to further illustrate the expressive power of the language of category theory. In Chapter 2, the language of category theory was shown to
be well-suited to capturing the notion of (mathematical) structure, as the
language of category theory preserves the structural properties of isomorphic
objects. When those objects are models of some type of system, the language of category theory can be used to capture the mathematically relevant
features of those objects, independently of that object’s “internal” composition. Models may be conceived as consisting of spacial points, sequences
of thoughts, rotations of objects, etc., but the language of category theory
sharpens the focus, permitting one to isolate and study only those properties
shared by all models isomorphic to a selected model, i.e., only the structural properties. In this chapter, the expressive resources of the language
of category theory have been further explored, and it has been observed
that, starting with some given collection of models of a given type, framed
in the language of category theory, one may appeal to the standard means
26

Other approaches, aimed at developing foundational programs using the resources of
category theory, are often led to constrain the realm of mathematical objects in this way,
and the results of this chapter are of particular importance to such programs (see, e.g.,
[6, 50, 49, 62]).
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of mathematical definition and construction in producing other models, of
either the same type or of a different type. Such techniques permit the familiar construction of product groups, equationally-defined subsets, kernels
of morphisms, quotients, and combinations thereof.
Category theory is thus capable of “standing on its own”, in at least the
sense that it does not dependent on the expressive resources of a membershipbased set theory in order to characterize standard mathematical constructions on mathematical objects. This observation serves to address a concern
related to that raised by Feferman with which we began the chapter. Hellman, for example, has worried that category theory has yet to be shown
. . . autonomous from set theory in a strong sense: not only is
its primitive basis capable of standing on its own and sufficient
for some recovery of ordinary mathematics, even if via a detour
through set-theoretic constructions. . . but, without any such detour, it can achieve a genuinely distinctive, intelligible conceptual
development throughout, not just in its initial stages. . . . unless
and until it [strong autonomy] is achieved, the charge that category theory is ‘parasitic’ on set theory in its recovery of ordinary
mathematics will surely linger. [38, p. 133]
Of course, the call for a “distinctive, intelligible conceptual development” is
difficult to clearly address. Are the methods and notions of category theory
sufficiently distinct (presumably from a membership-based set theory)? Are
the methods and notions sufficiently intelligible? This concern is reminiscent
of Feferman’s call for “psychological priority”, and here Hellman is led to
admit that his request is “not a precise distinction”, and that “perhaps we
would only recognize ‘strong autonomy’ if we saw it” [38, p. 133].
While Hellman’s concerns may be at least partially addressed within this
chapter, a group of related concerns merit further examination. Recall Feferman’s worry about the notions of operation and collection, which were
seen to be focused on the role of the axiomatic method in understanding
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the axioms of category theory, or, indeed, axiomatic systems more generally.
The response offered here was to observe that, insofar as the mechanisms
involved are so ubiquitous as to be plausibly involved in the understanding
of any natural language, demanding an account of these features from a philosophy of mathematics—foundational or otherwise—is inappropriate. We
see this request again in Hellman’s discussion of McLarty’s (foundational)
proposal to pursue an account of “a (meta) category of categories”,27 about
which Hellman remarks that
when we speak of the “objects” and “arrows” of a metacategory of categories as categories and functors, respectively, what
we really mean is “structures (or at least “interrelated things”)
satisfying the algebraic axioms of CT [category theory]”, i.e.
we are using “satisfaction” which is normally understood settheoretically. . . clearly there is some dependence on a background
that explicates satisfaction of sentences by structures, and this
background is not “category theory” itself. . . [40, p. 157]
While this concern should also have been addressed by the foregoing (and, indeed, it was again a concern raised in discussion of foundational programs),
it does suggest that other metatheoretic issues merit some attention. In
turning his attention to Awodey’s anti-foundational proposal,28 very close in
spirit to the AFCS view considered here, Hellman worries that such programs
are faced with a dilemma: either the language of category theory arrives at
the meanings of its terms (arrows and objects)29 via the notion of satisfaction (and so “falling back on prima facie set-theoretic notions after all” [40,
p. 159]), or
. . . what we are really presented with is a kind of formalism, in
27

See [62, 63].
See [2].
29
Since “arrows-only” presentations of the axioms of category theory are possible, Hellman restricts his attention to the notion of an arrow or “morphism.” See [52, p. 9].
28
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which theorems in conditional form, together with definitions, are
all there is to mathematics, that is, we just give up on the notion of mathematical truth as anything beyond deductive logical
validity. [40, p. 158]
While the first horn of this dilemma should now be sufficiently dulled, it
remains to consider the status of mathematical truth on the AFCS view, and
it is to that discussion that we now turn in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Domains, Truth, and Proof
. . . nothing capable of proof ought to be accepted without proof.
[24, p. 14]
Mathematics is “correct” but not “true” [51, p. 443]
To hope to do justice to an account of roles of proof, truth, and domains
in mathematics—over the course of a single chapter—is optimistic at best,
foolish at worst. Thus, this chapter is best viewed as a sketch of the accounts
of these notions either best suited to, or required by, the central tenets of the
AFCS program.

4.1

Theorems as Conditionals

Recalling the discussion of Section 1.5, the AFCS program adopts Awodey’s
characterization of mathematical theorems as both schematic and conditional. Of the claim about the conditional form of mathematical theorems,
Awodey asserts that mathematical theorems are such that
. . . the ‘things’ referred to are assumed to have certain properties,
and then it is shown, using the tacitly assumed methods of reasoning, that they also have some other properties. . . . Of course,
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many theorems do not literally have this form, but every theorem
has some conditions under which it obtains. [2, p. 58].
A quick glance over results established in a variety of textbooks in mathematics offers support for this view. Examples of theorems presented in this
form abound, and the following two examples are typical. A recent textbook
on abstract algebra contains the theorem that “In a ring with identity every
proper ideal is contained in a maximal ideal” [27, p. 254]. A classic textbook
in real analysis states Minkowski’s inequality as the theorem
Minkowski’s Inequality. Let E be a measurable set and 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞. If
the functions f and g belong to LP (E), then so does their sum f + g, and,
moreover,
kf + gkp ≤ kf kp + kgkp .1
At least prima facie, Awodey’s claim seems plausible as a descriptive
claim about the form of many theorems in contemporary presentations of
mathematical results. However, some well-known worries (aimed at nominalistic philosophies of mathematics) seemingly become relevant when one
considers those theorems which “do not literally have this form”, and so
which require rewriting as conditionals. Is it legitimate to rewrite the theorem that there are infinitely many primes as the theorem that in any ωsequence, there are infinitely many primes? Is it legitimate to rewrite the
theorem that there are exactly two groups of order 4 as the theorem that for
any group G, if G has order 4 then G is isomorphic to a cyclic group of order
4 or G is isomorphic to the product of two cyclic groups of order 2 ? The initial expressions of these theorems seem to embed ontological commitments
that do not appear in their conditional translations; do such translations
accurately represent the content of the original theorems?
At least one aspect of this question of representation of content can be
safely ignored: what did the mathematician who produced the result believe
1

See [72, p. 141].
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him or herself to have established? Did he or she regard the statement as
involving a commitment to abstract objects, be they numbers, groups, or
the like? That, when presented with theorems in the original forms above,
whose grammatical structure is such that they “appear to assert the existence
of mathematical objects, and to be true only if such objects exist”, many
mathematicians “assent verbally to them [theorems with apparent existential
commitment] without conscious silent reservations” seems wholly irrelevant
to the question of the correct representation of the mathematical content
of such theorems [71, p. 516]. If these results are indeed theorems, and
not, for example, a mathematician’s conjectures, the concern of both the
mathematician and the philosopher of mathematics is to investigate how to
best represent the mathematical content of those theorems, not to capture
any aspect of the mathematician’s attitude towards those theorems.
In aiming to understand how to best express the content of any such
theorem, one is naturally led to consider the warrant for the assertion of
that theorem. Mathematics is a unique area of research in that the warrant
for asserting a mathematical claim is provided by a proof of that claim;
“Mathematics differs from all other sciences in requiring that its propositions
be proved” [58, p. 3]. The proof of a mathematical theorem then yields
information about the correct description of that proof, i.e., the statement
of the theorem that has been proven. A proof of the infinity of the primes
may be taken by the mathematician who produced the result to describe a
feature of the natural numbers, but the methods employed in the proof will
be readily seen to apply to a whole class of systems, even in the special case of
those systems which admit of a categorical2 description. Such a procedure is
typical of contemporary mathematics, and, indeed, is at the core of both the
axiomatic method and the structuralist view of mathematics. As Mayberry
notes,
2

Here, categorical is used to describe an axiomatic system for which all models are
isomorphic.
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. . . in the axiomatic approach there is no unique, particular
system of natural numbers; there is instead an absolutely infinite
species of mutually isomorphic simply infinite systems. . .
. . . the axiomatic method allows us to dispense with the “mathematical objects” of tradition. [58, p. 194–195]
Thus, while a mathematician may envision having proved a result that holds
for a particular system of objects—the natural numbers, for example—the
methods employed in the proof typically generalize, and so apply to a whole
class of systems.
Of course, it would be disingenuous to represent, for example, Euclid’s
proof of the infinity of the primes as a general claim about ω-sequences (or,
indeed, to present this theorem in its more general, ring-theoretic version).
However, proponents of the AFCS program (and those, like Awodey, who
would endorse at least some of its central tenets) need not view the procedure
of rendering a theorem in conditional form as a process of translation—aimed
at preserving the content of the original theorem—but may instead view the
rendering in conditional form as reflecting the contemporary mathematical
concern to produce a sharper, more accurate, more general, and ultimately
more useful version of the original theorem. The aim of the AFCS conditional rendering is not simply to capture the original or originally intended
content of a mathematical theorem, but instead to properly reflect our current best understanding of that theorem. This contemporary understanding
of a theorem will typically be informed by a study of the methods employed
in proving the theorem, and may be motivated by an aim towards increasing
the scope of applicability of the theorem, to better identify the conditions
under which it obtains, and so to more precisely identify the types of systems to which it applies. One need not claim to have accurately represented
the original theorem, but instead to have distilled and sharpened the original result in order to better display the generality permitted in view of the
methods employed in establishing that initial result.
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Here we may observe that the structuralist perspectives identified in Section 2.1.1 motivate the rendering of mathematical theorems in conditional
form. The particular objects of a system don’t matter, only that they stand in
the relations specified in the conditions given in the theorem. The particular
system—the model of the antecedent conditions specified in the theorem—
doesn’t matter: the proof establishes that the results of the theorem apply
to any system satisfying those conditions. The ubiquity of the structuralist perspectives among the mathematical community, along with the rise of
the axiomatic method which so naturally accommodates those perspectives,
may also explain why many of the results of contemporary mathematics are
already expressed in conditional form.

4.2

Theorems as Schematic

Recalling the discussion of Section 1.5, a further aspect of the AFCS program
is the view that mathematical theorems are best expressed as schematic in
form, i.e., the variables ranging over models which appear in (conditional)
mathematical theorems are not taken to fall within the scope of a universal
quantifier ranging over a fixed domain of objects. The reasons offered for
adopting this view of mathematical theorems as schematic may also serve
to clarify some otherwise curious features of mathematical discourse. In
this section, we consider why the treatment of mathematical theorems as
schematic squares well with the AFCS view, and reflects some of the original
structuralist motivations. In the next section we will explore in greater detail
some potential alternatives to the schematic approach, and establish why
these alternatives are unworkable on the AFCS program.
Consider the above-mentioned ring-theoretic result that any ring with
identity is such that every proper ideal is contained in a maximal ideal.3 In
3

A ring is an additive Abelian group with a multiplication operation that is associative
and which distributes over addition. A ring with identity has an element a such that
ar = ra = r for all elements r of R, i.e., a ring with identity has a multiplicative identity in
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accordance with the view developed in Section 2.6.1,4 the theorem is taken
to involve a claim about rings, and as rings are simply identified as models
of the ring axioms, the conditional theorem is metatheoretic, insofar as it
concerns the properties of models of a collection of axioms.5 As a schematic
conditional, this theorem may be represented as6
if (R  the ring axioms, and has an identity)
then (any ideal I of R is contained in some maximal ideal J of R) (4.1)
Before moving to consider reasons for regarding this theorem as best understood to involve treating the variables7 ranging over rings as schematic, it
is helpful to consider why the apparent reference to rings should be treated
as metatheoretic: involving the notions of a model, satisfaction, and truth,
as discussed in Section 3.1. Contrary to this view, in pursuing his modal
structuralist program Hellman deliberately rejects a (modal) translation of
the theorems of arithmetic into a form that invokes metalinguistic treatments
of, e.g., ω-sequence and satisfaction,8 claiming that such a translation “. . . is
surely an awkwardness, if not a fatal misrepresentation of arithmetic discourse” [35, p. 18].9 Hellman does not expand on his reasons for this assessment, but this metalinguistic translation, which invokes the metatheoretic
notions of model and satisfaction, seems entirely fitting given the structuraladdition to the additive identity coming from the group axioms. Note that some definitions
of ring require that a ring has a multiplicative identity (in which case the additional
qualification in this theorem is unnecessary).
4
See especially the discussion surrounding formula 2.8.
5
Here the axioms that determine a ring (with identity) are first order and finite in
number, but this need not be the case in general.
6
Here we again use the standard symbols for metatheoretic notions as outlined in
Section 2.6.1. Note that an ideal of a ring R is itself a ring.
7
The ideals of a ring are subrings, provided one uses a definition of ring that does not
require that rings have a multiplicative identity.
8
Accounts which proceed via the usual set-theoretic treatment.
9
See Section 2.6.2.
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ist perspectives. Recall Dedekind’s observations that10
. . . it is clear that every theorem regarding numbers, i.e., regarding the elements n of the simply infinite system N set in order
by the transformation φ,. . . possesses perfectly general validity for
every other simply infinite system Ω set in order by a transformation θ and its elements ν [24, p. 48]
Dedekind, of course, considered only (informally treated) sets as candidate
simply infinite systems, but he was also content to allow that his infamous
sequence of thoughts could be taken to constitute such a system. While
a contemporary structuralist may not follow Dedekind in taking Dedekind’s
thoughts to constitute a set in the contemporary sense of the term, his accommodating view is carried forward to the AFCS program, and any model that
one is willing to sanction may count as a system of the relevant sort. For example, the mathematical theorems of arithmetic will apply to any ω-sequence
one is willing to admit, no matter what its constitution. As ω-sequences are
identified as models of the second-order Peano axioms, a structuralist is naturally led to adopt, even in the case of “the” natural numbers, a metatheoretic
view.
Hellman, however, does not dispense with the notions of, e.g., satisfaction,
he instead prefers to avoid treating these notions as metatheoretic in order to
avoid their usual, set-theoretic construal.11 Thus, despite Hellman’s earlier
remark about the “awkwardness” of the translation involving metatheoretic
notions, instead he rejects such a translation for reasons related to the typical
set-theoretic account of metatheoretic notions like satisfaction. First, such a
translation makes, for example,
. . . number theory dependent on set theory in a way that, from
a mathematical point of view, it would be desirable to avoid.
10

See Section 2.1.1.
Hellman instead uses the resources of second-order logic to express satisfaction directly
in the object language.
11
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There is good motivation for understanding number theory and
analysis as capable of standing on their own. Surely we should
resist saddling them—as basic mathematical theories—with the
problem associated with “Cantor’s universe” [35, p. 14]
If—as suggested on the AFCS program—it is legitimate to take the notion
of a model as primitive,12 Hellman’s concern on this point is acknowledged,
and the problem avoided. However, Hellman is also concerned that, on a
set-theoretic approach, the objects of mathematics must then be recovered
as sets, in which case
What will be missed is the full generality of structuralism: arithmetic or analysis investigates relations holding within arbitrary
structures of the appropriate type—not just within those that
happen to be recognized in a weak set theory. [35, p. 14]
In keeping with the general structuralist perspective, any system should suffice, not simply those which are sets.
While taking the notion of model (and related notions) as primitive goes
some way toward addressing Hellman’s second concern as well, sensitivity to
this concern is also reflected in the AFCS treatment of mathematical theorems as conditional and schematic. First, in treating the theorems as conditionals (as Hellman himself does in his preferred modal framework), there
is no commitment to the actual satisfaction, or, indeed, the satisfiability, of
the antecedent conditions—involving objects like rings, metric or topological
spaces—featuring in those conditional statements.13 This ontological neutrality goes some way towards accommodating the view that there should
12

Taking associated notions, such as satisfaction, as primitive as well. See the discussion
in Section 3.1.
13
Recall that Hellman’s modal structural approach does later involve explicitly asserting
that w -sequences, etc., are possible, a manoeuvre aimed at tempering the threat of vacuity.
See the discussion in Section 2.6.2 concerning Hellman’s program and see Section 2.6.1 for
a response to concerns about vacuity within the AFCS program.
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be no restrictions placed on the sorts of objects that may count as groups,
ω-sequences, etc.
Unfortunately, the apparent gain afforded by the treatment of theorems
as conditional in form is lost if the conditional is treated as governed by a
universal quantifier ranging over models. Recall Awodey’s remark that
The ‘schematic’ element in mathematical theorems, definitions,
and even proofs is not captured by treating the indeterminate
objects involved as universally quantified variables, as quantification requires a fixed domain over which the range of the variable
is restricted. [2, p. 59]
Thus, the “generality of structuralism” is reflected in the AFCS program
by treating any variables (like R in theorem 4.1) which could be viewed as
ranging over groups, ω-sequences, metric spaces, and the like—ranging over
the “indeterminate objects” that feature in the (conditional) theorems—as
schematic, thereby avoiding the treatment of those variables as ranging over
a fixed domain of given objects. Groups need not be sets, and they need not
be recovered as elements of some other, privileged collection serving as the
domain of quantification.
In rejecting a single, fixed universe of mathematical objects, the AFCS
proposal resembles that program proposed by Bell in [5, 6], which is also
framed in the language of category theory, and which also seeks to permit
variability in the range of acceptable universes of mathematical discourse.
Bell notes that
From the set-theoretical point of view, the term “group” signifies
a set (equipped with a couple of operations) satisfying certain
elementary axioms in terms of the elements of the set. Thus the
set-theoretical interpretation of this concept is always referred to
the same framework, the universe of sets. [5, p. 410–411]
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Bell’s suggested program can be described as accommodating the “generality
of structuralism” via a loosening of this restriction on the class of models:
instead of being limited to the universe of sets,14 one may instead appeal to
the universe provided by a topos.
Any topos may be regarded as a mathematical domain of discourse or ‘world’ in which mathematical concepts can be interpreted and mathematical constructions performed. [6, p. 238]
The topos of sets, then, is but one possible universe of mathematical objects, and Bell’s proposed program allows for groups, rings, and other types
of objects to be recovered in any topos universe, not just the topos of sets.
Groups, for example, can be interpreted on Bell’s view as objects with suitable arrows in any topos, where a group may be characterized in an arbitrary
category (and so, a fortiori, an arbitrary topos) in the manner described in
Section 3.2.2. However, recall that the AFCS proposal is to require only that
a group be treated as
1. a model of the appropriate sort (in this case, a model of the group
axioms), and
2. an object in a category.
When the category-theoretic method of characterizing a group was presented in Section 3.2.2, it was noted15 that such an approach was permitted,
but not required on the AFCS view. Requiring that, for example, models
of the group axioms are objects with associated arrows in a topos fares no
better in respecting the open-ended nature of the structuralist perspectives
than requiring that a model of the group axioms be a particular sort of set.
14

Bell also notes that there is also a sense in which “the” cumulative hierarchy of sets
admits (or suffers from, depending one one’s aims!) a degree of variability—as witnessed
by, e.g., the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, or Cohen’s independence results. See [5, 6] for
a discussion.
15
See the discussion in Section 3.3.
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In taking models as primitive, the AFCS proposal necessarily treats models
of axioms—groups, topological spaces, ordered fields, etc.—as in some sense
opaque. Whatever their origins, whatever their “home address”, an essential
component of the AFCS view is that models be framed in the language of
category theory in order to best capture their structural properties, the properties of mathematical interest. Taking models as primitive, as described in
Chapter 3, is intended to accommodate any sort of “internal structure” that
may be supposed for the model(s) in question.

4.3

Domains

The AFCS program agrees with Hellman’s aim to respect the “full generality
of structuralism”, and seeks to do so by
1. not restricting the sorts of entities which can be viewed as models of the
various axiomatic systems, and so not committing to a single, definitive
universe of such models, as well as
2. not restricting the universes—the collections of models—which may
provide the context for the interpretation of a conditional, schematic
theorem of mathematics.
The purpose of this section is to further examine the reasons for, and consequences of, these two aspects of the AFCS view.

4.3.1

The Single Domain Option

Concerning this first aspect we are again reminded of Dedekind’s approach,
which could be viewed as leading away from the study of the natural numbers
to the study of simply infinite systems. Where before there may have been
thought to be a single, definite object satisfying a given axiomatic definition,
the mathematician is led to recognize the potential for a multitude of distinct
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objects satisfying that definition; the definition alone does not suffice to fix
a single model. This process of replacing the constant with the variable
has been identified by Bell as leading naturally to the category-theoretic
approach, which “may be said to bear the same relation to abstract algebra
as the latter does to elementary algebra” [5, p. 409]. For the purpose of the
current discussion, it suffices to note that one might consider the replacement
of constancy with variability to be a hallmark of the structuralist approach
to mathematics, and so a view which purports to be a structuralist view, but
which characterizes mathematics as the study of a fixed collection of objects
(models, in the present case) seems prima facie at odds with the structuralist
position. In the case under consideration, why should variability stop at the
level of models?
It is useful here to contrast the AFCS view with the set-theoretic structuralist view (STS) considered by Hellman in [39]. On such a view, systems
(groups, fields, etc., and so models) are identified as types of sets, and one
may hold that, for example, the cumulative hierarchy is the universe of all
models. However, adopting this view is then to deny that the structuralist
perspectives should be applied to the set-theoretic framework that functions
at the meta-level.16 As Hellman explains,
Here we encounter a massive exception to the structuralist point
of view, in that, on its face-value interpretation, set theory itself is not treated structurally: its axioms are not understood
as defining conditions on structures of interest but are taken as
assertions of truths in an absolute sense. [39, p. 540]
Of course, those who defend set-theoretic structuralist programs are often
clear on this point. Mayberry, for example, observes that on his view
. . . the logical dependence of axiomatics on the set-theoretical concept of mathematical structure requires that set theory already
16

See [79] for a discussion of the issues associated with the shift from algebraic axioms
at the object level to assertory axioms at the meta-level.
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be in place before an account of the axiomatic method, understood in the modern sense of axiomatic definition, can be given.
It follows necessarily, therefore, that we cannot use the modern
axiomatic method to establish the theory of sets. [58, p. 7]
As a consequence of this view, the theory of sets developed by Mayberry
constitutes only “. . . a partial description of the absolute universe of sets in
which all conventional structures, including all models . . . are to be found”
[58, p. 243].
A set-theoretic structuralist view might, at the very least, be hoped to at
least partially reflect the “open-ended” aspect of the structuralist perspectives, evident in some of the earliest versions of structuralism. Recall that
Dedekind opens [24] with the sentence “In what follows I understand by thing
every object of our thought”, and he goes on to claim that
It very frequently happens that different things, a, b, c, . . . for
some reason can be considered from a common point of view,
can be associated in the mind, and we say that they form a system S; we call the things a, b, c, . . . elements of the system S, they
are contained in S; conversely, S consists of these elements. Such
a system S (an aggregate, a manifold, a totality) as an object of
our thought is likewise a thing. . . [24, p. 21]
The view that any entity—any thing—can feature as an object in a system,
and that any suitably-structured system can count as a simply infinite system, a group, metric space, etc., lies at the heart of the structuralist view
as characterized in Section 2.1.1. One who accepts the structuralist perspectives, then, should prefer a program that preserves these principles—as the
AFCS program seeks to do—to any that do not.
Unfortunately, the familiar logical and set-theoretic paradoxes point to
our having to tread carefully when treating a single, all encompassing universe that would then be expected to contain all models. Such a universe is
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typically barred from being treated as an element of itself, on pain of contradiction, and so it seems that the universe, which was intended to be all
encompassing, must instead be restricted. Naive comprehension is replaced
with restricted comprehension; some collections may be deemed “too large”
to be considered sets, and terms like species or proper class may be introduced. Such restrictions, already at odds with the structuralist motivations,
introduce a further tension between the principles encoded in typical characterizations of the universe of sets—the universe of models—and the universe
itself. On a theory such as ZFC, the axiom (schema) of comprehension is
restricted in such a way that some problematic totalities are not deemed sets.
Thus, Hellman is led to wonder “. . . what prevents the “collectibility” of “all
sets”. . . . And why aren’t such collections subject to operations analogous to
those of set theory itself, including formation of singletons, power collections,
and so on?” [39, p. 540]. As Mac Lane remarks,
Understanding Mathematical operations leads repeatedly to the
formation of totalities: The collection of all prime numbers. . . the
manifold of all lines in 3-space. . . the set of all power series expansions for a function (its Riemannian surface) or the category of all
topological spaces. There are no upper limits. . . . This is the idea
of a totality, and these are some of its many formulations. After
each careful delimitation, bigger totalities appear. No set theory
and no category theory can encompass them all—and they are
needed to grasp what Mathematics does. [51, p. 390]
Accounts of a single universe of mathematical objects, typically a universe
of sets (which in the case at hand, would be treated as a category of sets),
are generally required to draw boundaries around their proposed universe for
reasons of consistency, but it is the presence of the boundaries themselves that
is at odds with the generality present in the key structuralist perspectives.
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The Multiple Domain Option

Perhaps this generality can be obtained in following Bell to admit not a
single universe of models, but rather a whole class of such universes. On the
single domain option, it was observed that there was a tension between the
AFCS aim—motivated by the structuralist perspectives—to allow anything
one was willing to sanction to stand as a model of some axiomatic definition,
and the restrictions required in order to articulate a single domain view that
does not lead to inconsistency. It may be hoped that allowing variability
in the domains might permit one to preserve the intended generality of the
notion of model intended on the AFCS view. Dedekind’s thoughts may yield
a model of the second-order Peano axioms, and the symmetries of the cube
should be able to stand as a model of the group axioms. While no one, single
domain may contain both these as well as all other models, allowing multiple
domains, none of which are held to contain all models, may yet permit the
intended generality.
On Bell’s program, each topos provides a mathematical universe, and the
models of various axiomatic systems, the groups, rings, natural numbers systems, etc., can be recovered in these topos universes,17 with no one, privileged
universe. Note, however, that the AFCS program does not use categories in
the way that Bell uses toposes in developing his view.18 In particular, on
the AFCS view the language of category theory is not used in defining the
objects of mathematical interest (models of axioms characterizing groups,
vector spaces, and so forth), it is instead taken as a framework in which to
relate those entities, whatever their origins. A group, for example, on the
AFCS view is a model of the group axioms, but is not necessarily a set, nor
necessarily an object with associated arrows in a topos. Given a particular
collection of models meant to serve as the background for the interpretation
17

Note that the existence of a natural number object is independent of the other topos
axioms. See the discussion in Section 3.2.3.
18
See [6] for details of the approach via the notion of a local set theory.
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of a mathematical theorem, the AFCS view requires only that those models
be treated as objects in a category. The ambient category for the interpretation of a theorem in group theory might be a category of groups where
each group is a set in ZFC, or a category of monoids, where each monoid is a
string rewriting system, etc., but no constraints are placed on the description
of the internal structure of such entities, save their being (candidate) models
of the relevant sort.
Given that the AFCS view requires that models be treated as objects in
a category (and so, that variables like R in theorem 4.1 range over objects
in a category), each “universe” on the AFCS would then be a category (of
models). A multiple domain view appropriate to the AFCS program would
thus involve providing some characterization of the “realm” of categories. To
this end, the theory of multiple domains appropriate to the AFCS program
might be expected to resemble the category of categories proposed by Lawvere
in [50], and further refined in, e.g., McLarty’s [59]. Of course, one need not
be committed to the view that all categories may serve as categories of
objects that are models of some axiomatic definition, but certainly those
categories which can be viewed as categories of models would be expected to
be contained in the category of all categories.
A category of categories is a category whose objects are themselves categories, and whose arrows are functors 19 between categories. Assuming the
availability of an identity functor for each category and the ability to form
functor composites, it is an immediate consequence of the definition of a
functor that functors between categories satisfy the conditions on arrows in
a category (where the categories themselves are taken as objects), and thus
a collection of categories and functors between them together constitute a
category of categories.
Some of the remarks made in the presentation of Lawvere’s [50] suggest
19
Recall again that a functor F is a function between categories that maps objects to
objects and arrows to arrows while respecting domains, codomains, identities and composites.
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that the intended generality concerning the composition of models may indeed be available in a category of categories, as “By a category we of course
understand (intuitively) any structure which is an interpretation of the elementary theory of abstract categories” [50, p. 4].20 Thus, it would seem we
are permitted in granting that a category of (models of the axioms for) groups
may contain the group of symmetries of a cube, or whatever else we are inclined to admit as a candidate model of the group axioms. However, such
optimism is short-lived, as the move away from the “intuitive” conception
to the more definite (axiomatic) presentation of the category of categories
requires that one abandon at least some of these intuitions. As in the single
domain theory, the danger of paradox requires modifications that are at odds
with the desired generality. The category of categories is, after all, a category.
Is it an object of itself ? As Hellman observes, “we certainly had better avoid
such things as ‘the category of exactly the non-self-applicable categories’ !”
[40, p. 157]. McLarty offers a reply to Hellman’s concerns21 about the axioms
Lawvere presents in [50], “The Category of Categories as a Foundation for
Mathematics”, (sometimes referred to as the CCAF axioms)22 but his reply
to these concerns does not bode well for the preservation of the generality
sought on the AFCS program.
When we axiomatize a metacategory of categories by the axioms
CCAF, the categories are not ‘anything satisfying the algebraic
axioms of category theory’. . . They are anything whose existence
follows from the CCAF axioms. [63, p. 52]
Such a position may be required for consistency (although it is not immediately clear that, for example, admitting a category of all categories as an
object in the category of categories would lead to inconsistency).23 However,
20

Lawvere’s elementary theory of abstract categories consists of the (first-order) axioms
that define a category.
21
These concerns are also raised in [38].
22
See also McLarty’s strengthening of those axioms as presented in [59].
23
See McLarty’s brief remarks in [63, p. 52] and [59, p. 1243], in which he speculates
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McLarty goes on to note that, “even if there is such a category [of “all”
categories] it will not be the category of absolutely all categories” [63, p. 52].
Again, then, we are faced with boundaries that run contrary to the generality
that motivates the AFCS view.
What, then, of any category containing the group of symmetries of the
cube? Such a category should stand as a possible background for the interpretation of a theorem concerning groups. Clearly such a category is not
something “whose existence follows from the CCAF axioms”, as the axioms
say nothing about the nature of the objects involved in any category whose
existence can be established on their basis. It seems the best one may hope
for is that, for a given category C of models of the group axioms that contains the group of symmetries of the cube, there is some category C0 , whose
existence does follow from the CCAF axioms, such that C is isomorphic to
C0 . That is, we do not have the existence of C as an element of the category
of categories, but we may get the existence of the next best thing, a category
C0 , isomorphic to C. This situation seems at least partly in keeping with the
structuralist perspectives of Section 2.1.1; if we view the given category C of
groups as a system, that our system involves an element (i.e., an object) that
is the group of symmetries of the cube shouldn’t matter: another similarly
structured system, with a different element playing the “role” of the group
of symmetries of the cube, should suffice. Doesn’t the Structural Properties
Theorem establish that we can just as easily work with C0 instead of C?
There is, however, a crucial distinction between the group axioms that
serve to define what counts as a group, and the category axioms which serve
to organize the framework in which models of the group axioms are to be
considered. Once the axioms for a type of structure—like the axioms for a
group—have been provided, models of those axioms may be taken to have any
“internal” structure that one is inclined to admit. For example, one might be
that a category of categories may be admitted in the manner in which a “set of all sets”
can be admitted in Quine’s New Foundations axioms [68].
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interested in groups recovered as sets in ZFC, or one might consider groups
recovered as rigid motions of platonic solids. In either case, one might then
take these objects, along with their associated homomorphisms as arrows, as
the background framework—the ambient category—for the interpretation of
some group-theoretic result. Once this choice of background framework has
been fixed, the structural properties of the objects have also been fixed. The
categories in question are categories whose objects are particular sorts of models, and the structural properties of these models are given by interpreting
the language of category theory with respect to the chosen framework. In the
language of category theory, an object A having a single non-identity arrow
f : A → A corresponds to a structural property of an object A, as it can be
expressed in the language of category theory without names or parameters.
In the case where our groups are taken to be sets in ZFC, the corresponding
property is one concerning non-trivial automorphisms, where an automorphism is a particular sort of function mapping sets to sets. If our ambient
category is instead that in which groups are taken to be rigid motions of the
platonic solids, the claim again concerns automorphisms, where in this case
the automorphisms are functions mapping rigid motions of a solid to rigid
motions of a solid. In the former case, the structural properties concern sets,
in the latter case, the structural properties concern rigid motions of platonic
solids. In short, the language of category theory must be interpreted in the
chosen ambient category in order to determine the structural properties: different ambient categories yield different structural properties. Even though
there may be an ambient category of groups in ZFC that is isomorphic, as a
category, to the ambient category of groups of rigid motions of the platonic
solids, each ambient category determines distinct structural properties. In
moving from C to C0 , then, we change the subject.
Of course, while the structural properties of two distinct ambient categories may themselves be distinct, if the categories in question are isomorphic, those structural properties lie in a natural correspondence given by the
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representation of those properties in the language of category theory. In the
cases discussed above, we would be able to move from structural properties
of groups consisting of sets to structural properties of groups consisting of
rigid motions via the representation of those properties in the language of
category theory. As outlined above, the structural property corresponding
to an expression in the language of category theory concerning the existence
of a single non-identity arrow for an object A can be interpreted in one ambient category or another. Consequently, the representation in the language
of category theory of the properties in question thereby allow us to identify
properties in one category that correspond to property in another. Perhaps,
then, it doesn’t matter that the move from C to C0 “changes the subject”;
we may be able to translate back to our original category. Again, doesn’t
the Structural Properties Theorem license exactly this sort of move?
A reply to this question gets to the heart of the problem with the multiple
domains approach via a category of categories. Taking C and C0 as above,
The application of the Structural Properties Theorem requires that both C
and C0 are objects in the same (ambient) category. That theorem establishes
a connection between objects that are isomorphic in the (ambient) category,
and the structural properties (determined by that ambient category) of those
objects. If the ambient category is taken to be the category of categories,
then we are prevented from applying the theorem: the shift from C to C0
was suggested precisely because C is presumed not to be an element of the
category of categories! This situation is much like the difficulty in working
with ZFC to establish a theorem about (pure) sets, and then hoping to appeal
to that theorem when discussing the set of books on a desk.24
Would it be legitimate simply to add this category C to the category of
categories? This new, extended category of categories would then contain
all categories in question, and in similar circumstances involving other cate24

Perhaps something akin to the use of urelements in set theory could also be used with
the category of categories, but it is not immediately clear that this method, if possible,
would address the present concern.
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gories we might simply add categories as needed. This option, of course, is
untenable. The axioms for the category of categories were proposed in order
to circumscribe our intuitive understanding of the universe of categories, and
were initially proposed as a part of a foundational approach aimed at producing “a single system of first-order axioms in which all the usual mathematical
objects can be defined and all their usual properties proved” [50, p. 1]. Despite Lawvere’s admitted foundational concerns (shared by McLarty), such
a systematization is directly relevant to the multiple domain approach on
the AFCS program, which requires an answer to the question “what are
the categories of models? ”. In order to maintain the AFCS commitment to
strict neutrality with respect to the sorts of entities that can be models, this
question concerning categories of models is necessarily subsumed under the
question: “what are the categories? ”. Any answer to this question, of course,
is aimed at sharpening and improving upon on our intuitive conception. The
well-known difficulties encountered when trying to tame naive views in developing early systems of modern logic and set theory show just how carefully
these systems must be developed, and just how cautious we must be when
working with intuitive views. It runs counter to the principal aim of these
related projects—projects aimed at producing a more precise, systematic approach to address the delicate questions of category-theoretic existence—if
we are simply to ignore the systems that have been developed and return to
the intuitive conception whenever it proves convenient!
It seems, then, the proponent of the AFCS view is unable to accept
either the single domain view or the multiple domain view. Granting that
quantification must be quantification over a fixed domain, the situation may
be expressed as follows. A mathematical theorem, like that in theorem 4.1,
involving a variable R, can be represented as having the form
if R  Ring + Id then R  M, 25
25

Recall the discussion involving expression 2.7 in Section 2.6.1.
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which may be more succinctly represented as
F (R) → G(R),

(4.2)

with the obvious definitions of F and G. Accordingly, the single domain
option involves treating the variable R as ranging over a single, fixed universe
of all models, in which case we might represent the theorem as having the
form
∀R(F (R) → G(R)).
On the AFCS program, that single domain would be a category, and so a
category of all models. Calling this category of all models M, we can then
describe the theorem as being of the form
∀R in M(F (R) → G(R)).

(4.3)

The truth of (4.3) would then involve a claim about all models, but the
difficulty in respecting the AFCS silence on what counts as a model, along
with the familiar difficulties associated with providing a consistent account
of such totalities (in particular, the difficulty in providing an account that
avoids drawing boundaries running contrary to the open-ended character
of mathematics highlighted by Mac Lane and Hellman), seems to leave us
without a characterization of M sufficient to justify (4.3). That is, without
the ability to make substantial claims about M, it is difficult to see what
might justify the assertion that (4.3) is true.
On the multiple domain view, we attempt to remedy this situation by
allowing M to vary. As each such M is taken to be a category of models,
M in (4.3) can be treated as a variable, ranging over the collection of all
categories of models. A mathematical theorem, then, might be represented
as having the form
∀M(∀R in M(F (R) → G(R))).

(4.4)
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Again, the AFCS program’s neutrality on the status of models requires that
we instead investigate the collection of all possible categories (as we lack any
prior criteria according to which we may distinguish those categories which
can be viewed as categories of models), independently of the nature of their
objects, which leads us to appeal to an account of the category of categories.
Here too we find that concessions required to carefully articulate the (presumed) characteristics of the category of categories prevent us from achieving
the desired generality in the interpretation of mathematical theorems, and
we are led to reject (4.4) as properly reflecting the content of a mathematical
theorem on the AFCS view.
Having rejected both (4.3) and (4.4), we are left to treat mathematical
theorems as having the schematic form of (4.2). If instead we were to treat
theorems as instead involving a quantifier ranging over all models, and assuming that the interpretation of quantified expressions involves appeal to a
fixed domain over which the quantifier ranges,26 we would arrive at the form
shown in (4.3), which was rejected in virtue of the incompatibility of the
AFCS program and the single domain view. If instead we pursue the multiple domain view, which again admits quantification over the (now varying)
domains, a theorem would have the general form shown in (4.4), which was
rejected in virtue of the incompatibility of the AFCS program and the multiple domain view.
Note that, had the single domain view proved acceptable, theorems having the form of (4.3) could have been ascribed a truth value in accordance
with the standard semantic account. Similarly, had the multiple domain view
proved tenable, theorems of the form (4.4) could also have been ascribed a
truth value. The situation is somewhat analogous to treating a first-order
expression of the form F x → Gx. If we introduce a quantifier to form the
expression ∀x(F x → Gx), then with a fixed domain, and on the intended
26
It remains to be investigated whether or not this claim is legitimate: does the intelligibility of a quantifier always require a fixed domain over which the quantifier is taken to
range?

CHAPTER 4. DOMAINS, TRUTH, AND PROOF

129

interpretation, that closed formula would express a statement, and so would
obtain a truth value. On this analogy, the multiple domain view corresponds
to allowing the interpretations to vary, in which case we may have been
able to identify those sentences which are true on every interpretation, i.e.,
the logical truths, corresponding to the statement “On all interpretations,
∀x(F x → Gx) is true”.
Given, then, that the AFCS view leads to the treatment of mathematical
theorems as schematic, can they be ascribed a truth value? If not, what
exactly is established by a mathematical proof ?

4.4

Truth and Proof

Chapter 3 concluded with Hellman’s claim that category theory either falls
back on a set-theoretic account of satisfaction, or “. . . we just give up on the
notion of mathematical truth as anything beyond deductive logical validity”
[40, p. 158]. It was argued in Chapter 3 that we may legitimately take the
notion of model (and so, the notion of satisfaction on which it depends) as
primitive, but the status of the notion of mathematical truth remains to be
explored.
Recall that taking the notion of model as primitive on the AFCS program
is intended to best capture what could be called the metaphysical neutrality
of the structuralist perspectives identified in Section 2.1.1. The proponent of
the AFCS program takes mathematics to be concerned with the structural
properties of any model one is willing to admit, and so any principles which
either implicitly or explicitly serve to limit the class of models that can
be treated on the AFCS view are to be avoided. We arrive, then, at an
immediate difficulty in trying to unpack the notion of “deductive logical
validity”: deductive validity in which system of logic?
Note that deductive validity is here being applied to the conditional sentence corresponding to a mathematical theorem (and so, being applied to a
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sentence rather than an argument). For present purposes, one may assume
that deductive validity is framed in terms of the notion of “following from”,
which Beall and Restall express in their principle (V) (where “V” is used for
validity).
(V) A conclusion, A, follows from premises, Σ, if and only if any
case in which each premise in Σ is true is also a case in which
A is true. [4, p. 476]
A valid argument is then taken to be a collection of sentences Σ along with
a sentence A for which condition (V) obtains, and a sentence A is taken to
be valid provided the argument from no premises to A is valid, i.e, provided
A is true in all cases. A logic, then, involves a specification of the relevant
sorts of cases to be considered:
To use (V) to develop a logic you must specify the cases over
which (V) quantifies, and you must tell some kind of story about
which kinds of claims are true in what sorts of cases. For example,
you might give an account in which cases are possible worlds. . . On
the other hand, you might spell out such cases as set-theoretic
constructions such as models of some sort. [4, p. 477]
Of course, in light of the earlier arguments of this chapter, the AFCS program
requires that deductive validity not be characterized as involving quantification over all models, and so an account of validity appropriate to the program
must be given in some other manner.
Already in the course of developing the AFCS program we have had
occasion to discuss first- and second-order classical logic, as well as modal
logic (the latter surfacing in Hellman’s structuralist program). The system
of intuitionistic logic, initially motivated by Brouwer’s Intuitionist program
in the philosophy of mathematics, is another familiar option. Unfortunately,
as debates between intuitionistic, classical, and mathematicians inclined to
even more exotic systems have made clear, these systems themselves may
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be held to embed metaphysical principles that the AFCS program seeks to
avoid. As Heyting’s Int. remarks to the classical mathematician, “Your
argument [for excluded middle] is metaphysical in nature. . . It cannot be the
task of mathematics to investigate this meaning or to decide whether it is
tenable or not” [42, p. 2].
Nonetheless, given the variety of logical systems on offer, one might hope
that some particularly weak logic (perhaps some system of free minimal logic)
may be able to accommodate the strict neutrality requirements of the AFCS
program. Thus, it may be possible to admit certain mathematical theorems
(for example, the theorem that in any group G, the identity element of G
is unique may be one such theorem) as valid, i.e., logically true, but such
metaphysically neutral theorems will be expected to be the exception, rather
than the rule.
Consider, for example, the ring-theoretic theorem discussed earlier: “In
a ring with identity every proper ideal is contained in a maximal ideal” [27,
p. 254]. A proof of this result will go some way to clarifying the sense—if
any—in which this may be considered a logical truth, and there are several
things to note about the proof of theorem. The proof found in [27] runs
essentially as follows.
Proof. Consider a ring R with identity and I a proper ideal of R. Let S be
the set of all proper ideals of R containing I. S is non-empty (as I ∈ S) and
S
is partially ordered by inclusion. If C is a chain in S, then let J = A∈C A.
Then for any elements a, b ∈ J, there are ideals A and B in C such that
a ∈ A and b ∈ B, where either A ⊆ B or B ⊆ A. Without loss of generality,
assume A ⊆ B, then as a, b ∈ B and B is an ideal, we have a − b ∈ B, and
so a − b ∈ J. A similar argument establishes that J is closed under (left and
right) multiplication by elements of R, and so J itself is an ideal. Further,
J is proper, as if 1 ∈ J again we must have some B ∈ C such that 1 ∈ B,
contrary to the definition of S (as B ∈ C ⊆ S). Consequently, J ∈ S, and is
clearly an upper bound for C. Thus, any chain C in S has an upper bound,
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and so by Zorn’s Lemma27 there is a maximal ideal in S (which is thus a
proper ideal containing I), as desired.
Of note, this proof has the following characteristics.
1. It is informal (and the logical system unspecified).
2. It makes use of Zorn’s Lemma, a principle (classically) equivalent to
the Axiom of Choice.28
3. It uses various set-theoretic principles (and notation) without clarification, and so potentially with imprecision. For instance, if a ring is
intended to be treated as an ordered triple hR, +, ∗i, then the definition
of J does not yield a ring (and so, does not yield an ideal), as a union
of ordered triples is not itself an ordered triple.
Each of these characteristics is an obstacle to the treatment of this theorem
as valid. An unfortunate observation for those wishing to treat mathematical proofs as valid, then, is that proofs with characteristics of this sort are
standard fare in mathematics.
Certainly one course of action is to seek to remove these obstacles. For
example, the use of Zorn’s Lemma in the proof suggests that Zorn’s Lemma
could simply be incorporated into the antecedent of the conditional form of
this theorem. Such a move may indeed be held to yield a more accurate
statement of the theorem (for those keen to track the use of Zorn’s Lemma),
as the domain of applicability of the theorem is then more clearly stated. Of
course, Zorn’s Lemma is likely selected for such a move because of its link to
the Axiom of Choice, but the thought that moving all such “controversial”
27

Zorn’s Lemma states that if P is a non-empty, partially ordered set in which every
chain has an upper bound then P has a maximal element.
28
Interestingly, the principle is not intuitionistically equivalent to the Axiom of Choice
(which is objectionable to Intuitionists as it implies the law of excluded middle). Indeed,
Zorn’s Lemma can be shown to have, in a precise sense, no “non-constructive” logical
consequences. See [7, p. 12].
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principles into the antecedent of the conditional (thereby serving as a restriction on the range of applicability of the theorem) allows all mathematical
theorems to be characterized as logical truths again depends on the viability
of a neutral logical framework in which to construct the proof connecting the
antecedent to the consequent. Further, if we are to recover the bulk of modern mathematics as logical truths in this manner, the logical system must
also have sufficient expressive power to encode the relevant mathematical
notions. While such a system may be possible, the considerable difficulties
in even being able to clearly state the requirements for such a system render
this option unappealing at best.
In some sense, then, the state of contemporary mathematics may be described as particularly hostile to this sort of recovery of mathematical theorems as logical truths. As Awodey remarks,
The laws, rules, and axioms involved in a particular piece of
reasoning, or a field of mathematics, may vary from one to the
next, or even from one mathematician or epoch to another. The
statement of the inferential machinery involved thus becomes a
(tacit) part of the mathematics; functional analysis makes heavy
use of abstract functions and the axiom of choice, some theorems in algebra rely on the continuum hypothesis; many arguments in homology theory are purely algebraic, once given
the non-algebraic objects that they deal with; theorems in constructive analysis avoid impredicative constructions; nineteenthcentury analysis employed other methods than modern-day analysis, and so on. The methods of reasoning involved in different
parts of mathematics are not ‘global’ and uniform across fields
or even between different theorems, but are themselves ‘local’ or
relative. [2, p. 56]
Given the difficulties faced in attempting to recover mathematical theorems
as logical truths, which options remain? One way of framing the difficulty
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encountered in this chapter is to note that there is a discrepancy between the
mathematical methodology—proof—and the anticipated use of the resulting
proven theorems. A fundamentally structuralist aspect of the AFCS view is
that, while the theorems themselves involve no commitments to the existence
of groups, sets, topological spaces, etc., those theorems can be used to yield
correct results in their application, that is, when one supposes a model. While
the theorem above involves no commitment to the existence of rings, one who
is concerned to study the integers constructed, for example, as sets in ZFC,
can correctly conclude that every ideal in the ring of integers is contained
in some maximal ideal. If points in physical space can be taken to model
the axioms for a particular type of metric space, then the area of a region
can be correctly calculated using the methods of calculus. Truth does enter
the picture, then, but only as part of the application of a mathematical
theorem: one takes it to be true that there exists a model of a certain sort, and
concludes that such a model has the property that features in the consequent
of the theorem.
The AFCS program takes seriously the possibility that our ends exceed
our means, and so theorems once thought proven may need to be rejected.
If we were able to produce a ring with identity and an ideal of that ring not
contained in a proper ideal, we would have reason to return to study the
supposed proof of that theorem in the hopes of understanding how our reasoning failed in the case at hand. The proof of a mathematical theorem is not
simply produced, then filed away never to be viewed again, the theorem simply added to the list of those that have been proved. A previously accepted
proof may be shown to be flawed, and unanticipated cases may also lead us
to scrutinize theorems that had otherwise seemed correct. This picture of
mathematical development has been persuasively presented by Lakatos in his
Proofs and Refutations [46], in which he charts the development of Euler’s
Formula. Euler’s Formula states that, for all polyhedra, V −E+F = 2, where
V is the number of vertices, E the number of edges, and F the number of
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faces.29 The picture of the evolution of a mathematical theorem is precisely
in keeping with the AFCS view, and the process of “updating” mathematical
theorems30 to best reflect our current, best understanding of that theorem
fits well with the view Lakatos presents.
Another way to characterize the AFCS perspective on the status of mathematical truth and mathematical proof is to borrow Dummett’s notion of the
harmony, as presented in [26], which concerns a sort of balance between the
introduction and elimination rules for a logical constant. As Dummett explains,
Any one given logical constant, considered as governed by some
set of logical laws, will satisfy the criterion for harmony provided
that it is never possible, by appeal to those laws, to derive from
premisses not containing that constant a conclusion not containing it and not attainable from those premisses by other laws that
we accept. [26, p. 219]
Thus, harmony for a logical constant is a property related to that constant’s
behaving as a conservative extension of the language. Relevant to the discussion here, Dummett goes on to remark that
The requirement that this criterion for harmony be satisfied conforms to our fundamental conception of what deductive inference
accomplishes. An argument or proof convinces us because we
construe it as showing that, given that the premisses hold good
according to our ordinary criteria, the conclusion must also hold
according to the criteria we already have for its holding. [26,
p. 219]
29
It is perhaps worth note that I first encountered this theorem in a course on graph
theory, the theorem having been recast to concern planar graphs, with not a polyhedron
in sight!
30
As described in Section 4.1.

CHAPTER 4. DOMAINS, TRUTH, AND PROOF

136

With this account of deductive inference to hand, we see why the proponent of
the AFCS program may be required to abandon the claim that mathematical
theorems are logical truths: the proof that establishes a theorem may not
necessarily secure the conclusions warranted by that theorem’s usage in every
context in which it may be used. Despite deliberate silence on the status of
models, there remains the possibility that implicit assumptions figuring in
the proof of a theorem may not be legitimate for the models figuring in some
application of the theorem.
Such tacit assumptions may appear in a proof, and identifying those assumptions may be made more difficult by the informal presentation of the
proof itself. It is intended that a mathematical theorem be broadly applicable: establishing that, for example, a result holds for all rings, whatever
their “internal constitution”, but the methods employed in producing the
proof may have implicitly restricted the domain of applicability. Do the classical rules of inference employed in a proof apply to all rings treated in any
category? When appealing to the Axiom of Choice in the course of a proof,
do we implicitly restrict our theorem, or does the theorem remain “universally” applicable? In short, the silence on the status of models adopted on
the AFCS view seems to prevent one from being justified in claiming that a
proof secures the unrestricted scope of applicability of a mathematical theorem. Silence is maintained in order to admit models of any sort, but this
silence also appears to prevent one from claiming that proof techniques are
sound with respect to reasoning about models of any sort.
Much of the preceding discussion has not involved the notion of a category: how do categories fit into the discussion of this section? One of the
central claims of this work is that the language of category theory is particularly well-suited to express the content of a mathematical theorem from
the perspective of the structuralist. It is important to note that this need
not involve rewriting theorems so that they are expressed in the language
of category theory; the view is not “revolutionary” in this sense. What in-
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stead is being suggested is that, given a mathematical theorem, our current
best account of the structuralist view of the content of that theorem is expressed in language of category theory. The language of category theory is
thus employed in expressing the content of a mathematical theorem, but the
theorems themselves need not be translated into that language.
It is likely that the most unpalatable aspect of the view sketched here
is the apparent inability to secure the truth of the theorems of mathematics. Happily, this is one aspect of the view that is most readily abandoned.
The view that mathematical theorems cannot be taken to be true is a view
that seems to be a consequence of the deliberate neutrality on the status of
models. As it is common for accounts of validity to proceed via an appeal to
models (typically sets in a some naive set theory), it is not surprising that
a view which aims to maintain neutrality on the status of models encounters difficulties with the notion of validity. There is, perhaps, some comfort
to be found in the observation that some prominent mathematicians (and,
certainly, one of the most prominent category theorists) of the past century
also held the view that mathematical theorems are not true. On Mac Lane’s
view, mathematical theorems can be correct, but not true. Mac Lane holds
that
This view means that the philosophy of Mathematics need not involve questions about epistemology or ontology. If Mathematical
theorems do not assert truths about the world, we need not inquire as to how we know or would come to know such truths. (We
of course do need to inquire how we recognize a correct proof, but
getting the recognition is a major part of advanced education in
Mathematics, and is usually not considered as part of epistemology.) This observation means that the philosophy of Mathematics
cannot be much advanced by many of the books entitled ”Mathematical Knowledge”, in view of the observation that such a title
usually covers a book which appears to involve little knowledge
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of Mathematics and much discussion of how Mathematicians can
(or cannot) know the truth. [51, p. 443–444]
The proponent of the AFCS view, then, is at least in good company!
Many, of course, will not be satisfied with a view that cannot recover an
account of mathematical truth, and will consider this shortcoming a sort of
reductio ad absurdum of the AFCS view. Those who do not feel as though
they have gone too far down the rabbit hole, though, may wonder: if we
refrain from calling our mathematical theorems true, are they any less useful?
If mathematical theorems are not true, is the science of mathematics in any
way diminished?
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In the mathematical development of recent decades one sees clearly
the rise of the conviction that the relevant properties of mathematical objects are those which can be stated in terms of their
abstract structure rather than in terms of the elements which the
objects were thought to be made of. [50, p. 1]
We have no objection against a mathematician privately admitting any metaphysical theory he likes. . . [42, p. 2]
What is mathematics? The preceding chapters contain one articulation of a
structuralist response to this question: mathematics is the science of structure. The particular sharpening of the structuralist position on offer here
is that mathematics is the science of structural properties, and the particular program developed here has been dubbed anti-foundational categorical
structuralism.
The structure of this work can be roughly considered to involve an account of each of the terms in the name of the program. The rise of the use of
axiomatic definitions in characterizing mathematical terms leads naturally to
the key structuralist perspectives identified in Section 2.1.1. Axiomatic definitions allow for multiple instantiations, many instances of the sort of entity
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defined. However, it not clearly required that we recover those entities, i.e.,
those models, as objects of a particular sort: as sets, as physical objects, as
entities of any other restricted collection. Attempts to constrain the admissible collection of models often encounter technical difficulties, but even if this
were this not the case any such constraints are in tension with the generality
that is, in part, characteristic of the structuralist perspective. Indeed, part of
the success of the axiomatic method is a consequence of exactly this lack of
specificity: we leave open the possibility of applying theorems in unexpected
areas, in contexts that had not been anticipated when those axiomatic definitions were produced. In preserving this open-ended aspect of the structuralist
view, the notion of model is taken to be primitive. In understanding what
mathematics concerns, then, we are led away from a description in terms
of a privileged subject matter, and instead to talk of mathematical descriptions, or mathematical features, of otherwise non-mathematical aspects of
the world. These features of mathematical interest are identified here as the
structural properties, and the language of category theory has been shown, via
the Structural Properties Theorem, to be particularly well suited to encode
those structural properties.
However, in order to best preserve the open-ended aspect of the structuralist view, it has been seen necessary to reject (or, at the very least, it
has been seen exceedingly difficult to preserve) other features that have been
variously defended as essential components of any philosophical account of
mathematics. In taking the notion of model as primitive is has been seen to
be difficult to recover a suitable notion of (mathematical) truth, as the link
between the methods of mathematical proof and the structural properties of
models those proofs are taken to concern is difficult to establish, given the
program’s deliberate silence on the nature of those models. In abandoning
mathematical truth, the AFCS program is seen not to count as a foundation
for mathematics, in accordance with the criteria presented in Section 1.3.
Given these aspects of the AFCS program, is the AFCS program accept-
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able as a philosophical account of mathematics? The program is here offered
as an explication of mathematics, from the structuralist perspective, where
an explication “consists in transforming a given more or less inexact concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the first by the second” [19,
p. 3]. Following Carnap, a successful explicatum can be taken to “fulfil to
a sufficient degree” four criteria: similarity to the explicandum, exactness,
fruitfulness, and simplicity [19, p. 5]. How, then, does the AFCS proposal
fare as an explication of mathematics?
Certainly one criterion, that of fruitfulness, is clearly satisfied by a component of the AFCS program: the language of category theory. As Awodey
remarks, “category theory provides a framework (indeed, the currently dominant one) for the practice of modern abstract mathematics” [2, p. 54], and
Corry claims (as cited at the beginning of Chapter 2) that
Category theory is the most elaborate and successful instance of
an axiomatized theory allowing for a systematic characterization
and analysis of the different structures, and the recurring mathematical phenomena that come forward in the latter. [23, p. 12]
It is less clear how well the program fares with respect to the other criteria. While the characterization of the notion of a structural property via the
language of category theory may be considered exact, Carnap holds that an
explicatum is exact insofar as the necessary definitions are incorporated “into
a well-constructed system of scientific either logicomathematical or empirical
concepts” [19, p. 3]. Given that the AFCS view does not acknowledge a single, privileged system of proof for mathematical theorems, is the proposed
program sufficiently exact? In taking the notion of model as primitive, can
the resulting program be considered particularly simple? Of course, candidate explicatums for mathematics are to be assessed relative to one another,
and the arguments contained in this work are taken to establish that the
AFCS program fares better than those other structuralist programs explicitly considered.
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Ultimately, the language of category theory may not be uniquely suited,
or even best suited, to precisely express the notion of a structural property,
and consequently the AFCS program may not best suit the development of
the structuralist view. Instead, the proponent of the AFCS program offers a
pragmatic line of argument, aimed at establishing, in part, that the crucial
structural properties are well rendered within the program, but leaving open
the possibility that the language of category theory may be surpassed by
some other means of description, in the way that, within mathematics, the
language of category theory has gone some way to replace the language of set
theory that was its precursor. The AFCS program is not expected to be the
final stage in the development of the structuralist view in mathematics, but
the arrows of category theory may serve to point us in the right direction.
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on Nineteenth-Century Transformation of Mathematics. In History and
Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, W. Asprey and P. Kitcher, Eds.
University of Minnesota, 1988, pp. 238–259.
[81] Tait, W. Truth and Proof: The Platonism of Mathematics. Synthese
69, 3 (December 1986), 341–370.
[82] Weyl, H. David Hilbert and his mathematical work. Bulletin of the
American Mathematics Society 50, 9 (1944), 612–654.
[83] Wright, C. On the Philosophical Significance of Frege’s Theorem. In
The Reason’s Proper Study, B. Hale and C. Wrigh, Eds. Oxford UP,
2001, pp. 272–306.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

151

[84] Zach, R. Hilbert’s Program Then And Now. In Handbook of the
Philosophy of Science, D. Jacquette, Ed., vol. 5: Philosophy of Logic.
Elsevier, 2006, pp. 411–447.

Curriculum Vitae

Darren McDonald

Areas of Specialization

Areas of Competence

•
•
•

•
•
•

Philosophy of Mathematics
Philosophy of Logic
Philosophical/Mathematical Logic

Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
History of Analytic Philosophy

Education
•

Doctor of Philosophy
o Ph.D. thesis entitled “Anti-Foundational Categorical Structuralism” written
under the supervision of Prof. John L. Bell—University of Western Ontario,
May 2012
o Visiting Research Scholar—University of St Andrews,
July 2006–June 2007
 Attended biweekly seminar meetings of the Logical and Metaphysical
Foundations of Classical Mathematics project and weekly meetings of
the Epistemology project at the Arché Research Centre for the
Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics and Mind
 under the supervision of Prof. Peter Clark
September 2004–June 2005
 attended and presented work at weekly seminar meetings of the
Logical and Metaphysical Foundations of Classical Mathematics
project at the Arché Research Centre
 under the supervision of Prof. Peter Clark

•

Master of Arts in Philosophy
o masters thesis entitled “Quantum Logic: Formal Semantics and the Quantum
Conditional” written under the supervision of Prof. David DeVidi—University of
Waterloo, October 2003

•

Bachelor of Mathematics
o Honours Pure Mathematics, Philosophy Minor, Co-operative program (With
Distinction)—University of Waterloo, June 2002

Refereed Publications
•

“Explication and the Foundations of Number Theory”. Eidos. (2) Volume XVIII (June
2004), 1–18.

Presentations and Other Publications
•

“Ontology and Uniformity”. Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.6,
Sixth International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy, Berlin, 11–14
September 2006. Paderborn: mentis, 2008.
o

•

“Ontology and Uniformity” was presented at the Sixth International
Conference organized by the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP)
—Freien Universität Berlin, September 2006

“Explication and the Foundations of Number Theory” was presented at the
Philosophy Graduate Student Association (PGSA) Conference—University of
Waterloo, March 2004

Scholarships, Awards, and Distinctions
•

Western Graduate Thesis Research Award—awarded in 2006 by the Faculty of Arts
and Humanities at the University of Western Ontario in the amount of $300

•

Mary Routledge Fellowship—awarded in 2006 by the Faculty of Arts and Humanities
at the University of Western Ontario in the amount of $300

•

Robert T. Jones Jr. Chevening Scholarship—awarded in 2004 by British Council,
funded by the Canadian Robert T. Jones, Jr. Scholarship Foundation and the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office in the amount of $40,000

•

Nominated for a Graduate Student Teaching Award—University of Western Ontario
(2004)

•

SSHRC Doctoral Fellowship—awarded in 2003 by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada in the amount of $76,000 ($19,000 annually over 4
years)

•

Ontario Graduate Scholarship (OGS)—awarded in 2003 by the Government of
Ontario in the amount of $15,000 (declined)

•

President's Scholarship for Graduate Study (PSGS)—awarded in 2003 by the University
of Western Ontario in the amount of $15,000 (this scholarship, when combined with a
SSHRC Doctoral Fellowship, becomes a Graduate Tuition Scholarship)

•

Graduate Tuition Scholarship (GTS)—awarded in 2003, a full tuition scholarship for the
duration of the SSHRC Doctoral Fellowship (4 years), approximately equivalent to
$24,000 in funding (this has since been renamed the Western Graduate Research
Scholarship)

•

Certificate for “Outstanding Achievement in Graduate Studies”—awarded in 2003 by
the University of Waterloo

•

Nominated for an Alumni Gold Medal—University of Waterloo (2003)

•

University of Waterloo Graduate Entrance Scholarship—awarded in 2002 by the
University of Waterloo in the amount of $5000

•

St. Jerome’s Founder’s Scholarship—awarded in 1996 by the University of St. Jerome’s
(federated with the University of Waterloo) in the amount of $1600

•

Governor General’s Bronze Medal—awarded in 1995 at St. Joseph-Scollard Hall
Secondary School for the highest academic achievement in the graduating class

Teaching and Other Education Experience
•

Teacher in Mathematics and Theory of Knowledge (for the International
Baccalaureate Diploma Program and GCSE curricula)—Rome International School,
September 2010 to present
o

•

Teaching Assistant for Philosophy and the Mind (PY1004)—University of St Andrews,
January 2007 to May 2007
o

•

graded all student work for the course

Instructor for Formal Logic (PY204)—Wilfrid Laurier University, November 2001–
December 2001
o

•

co-taught the course, 3 biweekly lecture hours

Teaching Assistant for Critical Thinking (PHIL 145)—University of Waterloo, January
2002–April 2002
o

•

involved running two 1-hour tutorial sessions each week, as well as grading

Instructor for Critical Thinking (PHIL 145)—University of Waterloo, May 2002–August
2002
o

•

2 lecture hours and 1 tutorial hour each week, as well as grading

Teaching Assistant for Critical Thinking (PHIL 021)—University of Western Ontario,
September 2003 to April 2004
o

•

involved running two 1-hour tutorial sessions each week, as well as grading

Instructor for Introduction to Philosophy (PHIL 02E)—University of Western Ontario,
September 2005 to December 2005
o

•

22 teaching hours per week

after Professor Graham Solomon’s untimely death, I was selected to teach the
second half of his course, focusing on predicate logic

Head Math Tutor—The Learning Centre, Seneca College, May 2000–August 2000 and
September 1999–December 1999
o
o

tutored in business mathematics, statistics, and logic at a tutorial drop-in
centre
developed supplementary documentation for a business mathematics
program

•

Assignment marker—University of Waterloo
o
o
o

Introduction to Combinatorics (MATH 239), May 1999–August 1999
Linear Algebra II (MATH 235), September 1998–December 1998
Linear Algebra I (MATH 136), January 1998–April 1998

Professional Activities
•

Conference Co-Organizer for the 7th Annual Logic, Math and Physics Graduate
Conference—May 2006

•

Commented on “You Can’t Mean That: Yablo’s Figuralist Account of Mathematics”
by S. Hoffman in the Canadian Philosophical Association (CPA) 50th Annual Congress
—York University, May, 2006

•

Commented on “Epistemic Contexts and Cognitive Control: Toward an Analysis of
Mathematical Thought” by J. Keränen in the 5th Annual Logic, Math and Physics
(LMP) Conference—University of Western Ontario, May, 2004

Extracurricular Activities and Personal Interests
•

Mountain biking, photography, tennis, literature, music, computers

